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Introduction
“How can we convince more companies to follow international volun-
tary principles on large scale land-based investments? We have these
guidelines in place. Now we have to make a business case for their im-
plementation.” (participant at the 2018 Annual Land and Poverty Con-
ference of the World Bank)
“There was no consultation; there was no transparency, no account-
ability. They just did this because they have the political power or in-
fluence. They did it with force. […] According to the protocols, you
have to consult the family. We have to call family meetings and do
other things, consult our elders, consult those who are outside.” (cus-
tomary landowner in Sierra Leone describing a foreign investor leasing
land)
“Nobody explained the content of the documents. And, you know,
most of us were farmers. We don’t know legal terms” (member of a co-
operative in the Philippines, which entered into a contract growing
agreement with a foreign investor)
The three quotations exemplify different experiences I made during the re-
search for this dissertation1 on large-scale land deals. The first citation was
a comment one participant made during a panel discussion at the 2018 An-
nual Land and Poverty Conference of the World Bank. It represents ongo-
ing debates about creating international regulatory frameworks for com-
panies investing in farmland in developing countries. These debates were
the starting point for my research endeavor, which asks for the relevance of
legal provisions for local populations affected by large-scale land deals. The
idea voiced by the panel member at the Conference reflects a market-based
approach, which assumes that companies will voluntarily follow best
practices and consult with affected communities.
This idea contrasted with my experiences during fieldwork in Sierra
Leone, reflected in the second quotation. I was sitting with customary
1.
1 This dissertation was part of the research project “F07 Local orders under threat
from land grabbing – Global civil society and international law as curse or bless-
ing?” of the Collaborative Research Center 923 "Threatened Order – Societies un-
der Stress" funded by the DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft).
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landowners who had not been consulted by an investing company. While
the investor did not follow international best practices, they did follow na-
tional law, which does however not protect customary land rights. Local
landowners were frustrated and their mobilization attempts remained fu-
tile. Neither international soft law instruments nor national law did pro-
tect their land rights.
Yet, legal provisions do not automatically lead to a positive outcome for
local farmers, as my third experience from the Philippines showed (as rep-
resented by the third quotation). I met with members of cooperatives, who
had entered into a contract-growing-agreement with an investor in palm
oil. The investment project had put the economic risk on the cooperatives’
members, who only realized the detrimental effects once they were highly
indebted. Administrative rules, meant to protect the interests of small-scale
farmers, had not been implemented. Furthermore, as the quotation shows,
cooperatives had not received any legal help and therefore did not fully un-
derstand the contract as well as possible risks involved in the project.
 
All three quotations present a different view on the regulation of foreign
investments in agriculture. Foreign large-scale land investments have been
on the rise globally since 2007/2008 and have received considerable atten-
tion from civil society organizations (GRAIN 2008), international organi-
zations (Deininger/Byerlee 2011) as well as academics (Cotula 2013; Bor-
ras/Franco 2012). Critics often refer to the deals as ‘land grabbing’ and
point out numerous detrimental effects for local communities. Proponents
of these investments and host governments emphasize the potential for job
creation and economic development (Braun/Meinzen-Dick 2009). How-
ever, both sides agree that lease agreements have to be set up in a fair and
legal manner to benefit local communities, who usually give up one cen-
tral element of their daily livelihoods – land. Despite this agreement, there
are broadly speaking two approaches to regulation: A market-based ap-
proach, which focuses on voluntary principles and self-commitments of
companies on the one hand; and a rights-based approach, which demands
binding and enforceable regulation, on the other hand. Most of this debate
follows ideological or normative assumptions. What is so far missing is sys-
tematic empirical evidence and a conceptualization of how local actors use
voluntary principles or hard law when faced with foreign investors.
The dissertation addresses these gaps by developing its own framework
and applying it to empirical cases from Sierra Leone and the Philippines.
In doing so, the dissertation makes a more fine-grained but theoretically
and empirically grounded, three-fold argument: First, legal instruments in
1. Introduction
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themselves do not change the situation of local actors, who need support
networks to access and make use of them. Second, voluntary market-ori-
ented instruments can help local actors in settings in which companies are
receptive to these demands. Third, binding laws as suggested by rights-
based approaches should be preferred, as they do not rely on the receptivi-
ty of the company. In consequence, the findings of this dissertation under-
line the need for a human right to land in addition to providing legal sup-
port to local communities.
In this chapter, I will first introduce the research question and relevant
basic concepts of my dissertation (chap 1.1), before I will give a brief
overview of the research program with its theoretical framework and em-
pirical analysis (chap 1.2). I will then discuss the academic and practical
relevance of the study (chap 1.3) before outlining the structure of this the-
sis (chap 1.4).
Research question and scope of the study
Research on large-scale land deals has been extensive since these deals were
first described as a global phenomenon and termed ‘land grabbing’ by a
Spanish NGO in 2008 (GRAIN 2008). The Land Matrix, a database which
collects global data on these deals, defines large-scale land deals2 as a
“transfer of rights to use, control or own land through sale, lease or conces-
sion” (Anseeuw et al. 2012: 48) of at least 200 hectares from local commu-
nities to foreign investors (which can include joint ventures with national
companies). In the dissertation, I use this definition, which excludes purely
national or local land deals or cases of state expropriation. The land deals
can include a variety of business models form large plantations to out-
grower schemes (Hall 2011). I explicitly include contract-growing models,
which are often introduced in combination with leases. While contract-
farming systems are frequently presented as viable alternative to large-scale
lease contracts (FAO 22/06/2010), they often contain considerable corpo-
rate control over the land as well (Vellema 1999).
Many large-scale land deals are accompanied by considerable land-use
change: from small-scale agriculture for local markets to large-scale indus-
1.1
2 I vary the terms used throughout the dissertations such as large-scale foreign invest-
ments in land, land investment deals, large-scale land based investments, large-
scale land agreements or simply land deals. I use all those terms in line with the
definition of large-scale land deals introduced here.
1.1 Research question and scope of the study
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trialized production for the world market (Borras/Franco 2012). Estimates
on the total area affected range between 26.7 (Nolte et al. 2016: vi) and 30
million hectares (GRAIN 2016: 4) globally, including all foreign invest-
ment deals since 2000. It seems that for the moment, the pace of closing
new large-scale land agreements has slowed down. However, it is now that
many of these investments have become operational, which is a crucial
moment for affected communities (Nolte et al. 2016: 12–14).
Apart from describing ongoing trends (White et al. 2012; Hall 2011;
Anseeuw et al. 2012), the literature on large-scale land deals has focused on
explaining the ‘land rush’ (Akram-Lodhi 2012; Cotula 2012) and analyzed
its oftentimes negative impacts (Schoneveld 2017; Kress 2012; Oya 2013b).
The two main problems identified are lacking community participation in
closing the land investment deals (Vermeulen/Cotula 2010) and insuffi-
cient benefits, which cannot make up for the loss of land (Schoneveld
2017).
Responses to large-scale land deals can be observed among local popula-
tions as well as on the global level. One research strand focuses on ‘reac-
tions from below’ (Hall et al. 2015) including a number of case studies fo-
cusing on resistance against, or for better incorporation in, land invest-
ment deals (Gingembre 2015; Grajales 2015; McAllister 2015). Another re-
search strand looks at ‘reaction from above’ (Margulis et al. 2013) and criti-
cally discusses different global governance initiatives to regulate foreign
large-scale land investments (Seufert 2013; Stephens 2013; Johnson 2016).
The dissertation builds on this existing research but goes one step fur-
ther in linking the ‘reactions from above’ with the ‘reactions from below’
in asking how local actors can actually make use of such instruments. It
therefore contributes to closing the following research gap:
“It is of great interest to study how international frameworks trickle
down to local policy arenas, how they are used by stakeholders, and
how they are finally shaping conflicts at the local level and affecting
their results.” (Brüntrup et al. 2014: 433)
Essentially gaining a better understanding of how legal frameworks sug-
gested on the global level can have an effect locally is one good reason for
focusing on legal aspects in local reactions to large-scale land deals. Anoth-
er reason is the inherent legal nature of large-scale land deals. Current
large-scale land deals are usually based on contracts, often in the form of
lease agreements. Large-scale land deals are therefore an inherently legal
process and are shaped by the surrounding legal framework (Cotula 2011).
1. Introduction
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To get a closer understanding of how affected communities use legal in-
struments, I use the concept of legal mobilization, which is defined on a
very basic level as “[…] the act of invoking legal norms to regulate behav-
ior” (Zemans 1983: 700) – in the case of my dissertation the behavior of
investing companies. Primarily, I am interested in how local actors can
successfully use legal mobilization to get better deals or change company
behavior. Consequently, my research question for this dissertation is: Un-
der which conditions can local actors successfully pursue their goals through legal
mobilization?
 
I will elaborate further on the research question before I give an outlook
over the research program.
First, the research question zooms in on local actors and their actions. It
focuses on those actors who do become active and make demands vis-à-vis
an investor. I specifically focus on smallholder farmers who are directly af-
fected by a large-scale land deal through entering into a contract with a
company or through losing their land involuntarily. These actors can vary
considerably from case to case: a whole community, a local chief, chief-
dom elites, local civil society organizations, women, or youth groups. As I
do not want to predetermine this group, I will speak of local actors, local
communities or simply smallholders3. Furthermore, many affected com-
munities are far from homogenous, and different groups within an invest-
ment area might have varying demands vis-à-vis an outside investor (Gilfoy
2015; Larder 2015; Borras/Franco 2013). I will only specify the term local
actor in each empirical case. In this way, it is also possible to broach the
issue of excluded or marginalized local groups and to discuss conflicts
within the communities. Even though my starting point are local actors,
this does not mean that other actors such as NGOs, lawyers, government
officials, national elites and international civil society do not play a role.
On the contrary, outside actors play a decisive role in providing local com-
munities with resources, expertise and alliances (Polack et al. 2013: 33–35).
In this way, the analysis is not limited to the local level but follows the var-
3 It should be noted that my dissertation does not specifically discuss or investigate
indigenous people rights, as this has been done elsewhere (Xanthaki 2007; Wiess-
ner 2008; Prill-Brett 1994). This should in no way be regarded as a normative deci-
sion but rather follows pragmatic considerations: ‘Indigenous rights’ have been dis-
cussed in separation of ‘peasant rights’ on the international level and have received
formal recognition in regards to their collective right to land (Sändig/Schramm
2016: 257).
1.1 Research question and scope of the study
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ious legal measures in their respective use and origin throughout the lev-
els.
The second term in need for further concretization is the concept of le-
gal mobilization, which in its most general sense means ‘using the legal’.
This can happen in three different ways (McCann 2004: 507): Calling on
legal institutions such as courts, human rights commissions, ombudsman
offices etc.; using legal representation through paralegals or lawyers; and
making legal arguments drawing on a range of legal norms. In this disser-
tation, I will be looking for all three forms of legal mobilization, which of-
ten coincide.
It is important to note that I do not focus specifically on litigation,
which is often at the center of studies on legal mobilization (McCammon/
McGrath 2015). Instead, I am interested in the many ways in which legal
arguments are employed outside the courtrooms. Calling on legal institu-
tions or following a litigation strategy are far-reaching instruments. Social
actors might not be able to use them due to a lack of resources. At the
same time, they might not want to aim for litigation right away, because a
good relationship with the other side is more important. In consequence,
“[c]itizens routinely mobilize legal strategies for negotiating exchanges and
resolving disputes in many social settings without relying on direct official
intervention” (McCann 1994: 8). In these contexts, having a lawyer can
make a difference, especially when individuals face powerful actors such as
transnational corporations. Legal representation is often crucial for navi-
gating through complicated and disempowering legal procedures as well
as creating realistic expectations about what can be achieved (Gallagher/
Yang 2017: 171). As will be discussed in the theoretical as well as empirical
part of this dissertation, legal advice is highly relevant in large-scale land
deals in which local actors, who often miss a formal education, have to ne-
gotiate with transnational corporations.
Apart from legal representation, the use of legal arguments is probably
the most widespread form of legal mobilization, even though it is not of-
ten explicitly studied as such. Legal arguments are not only formulated in
courts but during advocacy campaigns (Hertel 2015), in the media (Gianel-
la 2017) and in everyday lives (Ewick/Silbey 2007).
Following this broad view on legal mobilization, I employ a comprehen-
sive understanding of ‘the legal’, which means “to refer to the meanings,
sources of authority, and cultural practices that are commonly recognized
as legal, regardless of who employs them or for what ends” (Ewick/Silbey
2007: 22). The term contains the concept of written law but goes beyond
this narrow understanding to include references made to less formalized
1. Introduction
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rules. This approach enables an open and unbiased look on the empirical
material and allows me to include references to customary law. This broad
definition furthermore pays tribute to the great variety of initiatives found
on the ground (Polack et al. 2013).
The third element of the research question in need of clarification is the
successful pursuit of goals by local actors. I use the term goals, although I am
aware that this might mean protecting fundamental rights. Yet, I do not
want to make any presumptions about the kind of claims affected people
make vis-à-vis a company. As existing research has highlighted, only some
communities ask for a complete withdrawal of an investing company. In
many cases, local actors aim for better terms of incorporation in the land
deal (Borras/Franco 2013: 1735). In consequence, I identify respective goals
as the demands made vis-à-vis the company by local actors. Essentially, suc-
cessfully pursuing their goals means that local actors have their demands
met by investing corporations. In this view, the abandonment of an invest-
ment project might not be considered a success, as this might not necessar-
ily be what local actors wanted. In this way, partial success is possible, as
the company might make some concessions, for example paying higher
rental fees, while at the same time not giving in on other issue areas. What
success means can only be specified in each case.
 
Apart from the elements, which are explicit in the research question, fur-
ther considerations determine the scope of my study:
First, my research focuses on transnational companies and their local
subsidiaries as the main interlocutor of local actors, even though govern-
ment officials and national elites usually play a leading role in facilitating
and signing a large-scale land deal (Keene et al. 2015). The latest research
has additionally identified financial actors such as pension funds, invest-
ment or development banks as important players (Ouma 2014: 163). As
these actors often provide pivotal funding for large-scale investments in
land, they are able to exert considerable influence on the daily operations
of the plantations (Millar 08/01/2016). In consequence, local groups target
not only transnational corporations in their fight for their interests but
also express demands towards these other actors. If these demands aim at
influencing the setup of the investment, I will include them in the analy-
sis. However, if requests are made towards the national government in a
general way, for example, for land reform, these campaigns will not be
considered further in the research. Essentially, the focus is on the relation-
ship between the investing company signing the land deal and the affected
local population.
1.1 Research question and scope of the study
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Furthermore, my research is limited to large-scale land investments in
‘developing’ countries, which I define according to the ‘low’ and ‘lower
middle’ income groups of the World Bank (World Bank 2018a). There are
three reasons for this decision: First, data from the Land Matrix shows that
developing countries are among the most targeted countries (Anseeuw et
al. 2012: 10; Nolte et al. 2016: 19). According to my calculation4, 77 % of
all large-scale land deals with the participation of a transnational investor
take place in these countries. Second, the impacts large-scale land deals can
potentially have positively or negatively are considerable in these coun-
tries. On the one hand, agriculture plays an important role in these
economies, contributing 30,1 % to the GDP in low and 16,5 % to the GDP
in lower middle income countries in 2016 (World Bank 2018b). Even
more, the agricultural sector employs about 69 % of the workforce in low
and 39 % of the workforce in lower middle income countries in 2017
(World Bank).
On the other hand, rural areas in developing countries are extremely
prone to poverty:
“Three of every four poor people in developing countries live in rural
areas—2.1 billion living on less than $2 a day and 880 million on less
than $1 a day—and most depend on agriculture for their livelihoods”
(World Bank 2007: 1)
In consequence, growth in the agricultural sector is seen as a big chance in
reducing poverty and creating economic growth for the poorest (World
Bank 2007). In these contexts, large-scale land deals could have positive but
also extremely negative impacts, including increasing poverty and food in-
security (Nolte et al. 2016: 19). Third, it is often in low and lower middle
income countries that the legal system and state capacities to protect
tenure rights and regulate large-scale land investments is the weakest
(Deininger/Byerlee 2011: 97). The role of international regulation could
therefore be potentially higher.
Apart from my focus on developing countries, I further limit my re-
search to foreign investment in land agriculture. I exclude land transac-
4 For the purpose of the calculation, I coded all countries according to their income
category as defined by the World Bank (as categorized in June 2017). I differentiat-
ed the land deals into ‘transnational’ land deals, which had at least one foreign in-
vestor involved, and ‘domestic’ deals in which investors came from the very same
country. All own calculations in this dissertation are based on the complete Land
Matrix dataset downloaded on 12/06/2018.
1. Introduction
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tions and expulsions for the purpose of mining (Sibaud 2012), tourism
(Cohen 2011) or conservation (Fairhead et al. 2012). There are two reasons
for this decision: First, underlying mechanisms for investment in these sec-
tors are different. The state wholly owns sub-soil minerals in most coun-
tries and mining is usually regulated in specific legislation. Agricultural
land, on the other hand, is owned by individuals, families and communi-
ties, whether through formal or informal tenure rights (FAO 2002: 11).
Even in cases where land is state-owned, local communities usually have
more or less formalized use rights. Second, most of the debate around
large-scale land deals and new attempts of global regulation took place in
the context of investments in agriculture, making it a relevant research en-
deavor in itself. However, this does not mean that insights from this re-
search are not applicable to other types of investment.
One last limitation of my research is the focus on issues arising directly
around the land transfer itself: Who leased or planned to lease whose land
for which amount of rent and is this contested? I exclude other issues such
as social responsibility commitments, environmental problems, or labor
rights issues, even though they frequently arise during the operation of
large-scale agricultural investments. During my research interviewees re-
peatedly raised concerns around recruitment and labor conditions; how-
ever, it is merely beyond the scope of this thesis to analyze all these issues
at the same time. Labor and environmental issues are covered by different
national and international regulation than land tenure issues, making it ex-
tremely difficult to study all relevant legislation. While I might mention
some of these issues in the case studies of individual land deals, the overall
focus is clearly on the land transfer and the underlying regulation in re-
gards to decision-making and land tenure.
Summarizing these points, an extended version of my research question
would be: Under which conditions can local actors successfully pursue their
goals, linked to decision-making processes around land deals, vis-à-vis transna-
tional companies, through legal mobilization in cases of large-scale agricultural
land investments in developing countries?
 
Before I continue with describing the research program of this study, a
note on terminology: The literature often uses the term ‘land grabbing’ to
describe the same phenomena as I do. The term was initially coined by the
Spanish NGO GRAIN, who used it to describe the surge in large-scale land
deals since the beginning of the 2000s (GRAIN 2008). While prominent
researchers in the ‘land grabbing’ literature acknowledge the political con-
notation of the term, they argue that the term ‘large-scale land invest-
1.1 Research question and scope of the study
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ments’ is even more problematic as it suggests these investments as “solu-
tion to rural poverty” and “ethical ‘win–win’ outcomes” (Borras/Franco
2012: 35). This picture of land deals as something potentially beneficial for
local populations is strictly denied by these researchers and activists who
argue that large-scale land-based investments are never benefiting the local
population but are rather a tool “to further capital accumulation for the in-
satiable corporate hunger for profits” (Borras et al. 2013: 171).
Other researchers have, however, pointed out that existing evidence is
not enough to support these sweeping claims: Case studies trying to deter-
mine the socio-economic consequences of large-scale land investments of-
ten lack reliable baseline data (Oya 2013a: 512). And cumulative oriented
studies, which look at socio-economic impacts of these deals beyond the
individual case, are largely missing (Cotula et al. 2014: 905). This missing
evidence is one of the reasons why I use the term ‘large-scale land deals’
instead of land grabbing in this dissertation, even though I do not assume
that large-scale land deals are necessarily beneficial for local populations ei-
ther. However, I do believe that if local actors are able to protect their in-
terests and get a fair deal, large-scale land deals can be socio-economically
beneficial. According to this assumption, land deals that are only prof-
itable under exploitative circumstances (for example, through paying ex-
tremely low rents), would not even materialize (Li 2011: 284).
Research program and findings
In my research question, I ask for the conditions for the successful use of
legal mobilization vis-à-vis investors. By doing so, I follow a configura-
tional approach, in which different conditions can be combined in various
ways to explain a particular outcome (Blatter/Haverland 2012: 80). While I
do assume that it is possible to identify regularities and causal mechan-
isms, I believe that the context and the combination of factors play a sig-
nificant role in explaining a social outcome. My theoretical framework
conceptualizes core conditions, which will help me to analyze my empiri-
cal material systematically. My empirical analysis will furthermore be open
enough to allow for the identification of additional conditions.
I derive the building blocks for my analytical framework from three dif-
ferent theoretical perspectives applied to the basic situation: Local actors
and investing companies find themselves in a bargaining situation, which
is structured by the legal framework in a country. A legal perspective is the
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tures will lead to different outcomes. A social mobilization perspective looks
at social dynamics, which might enable or impede local actors to access the
legal opportunity structure. Missing knowledge and missing resources are
major challenges, which can be overcome with a strong support network.
A business management perspective zooms in on the company and asks how
managers determine who is an important stakeholder worth responding
too. These three perspectives lead to three conditions: The favorability of
the national legal opportunity structure, the strength of the support network and
the receptivity of the company.
The three conditions guide my empirical analysis, which focuses on two
countries with different national legal opportunity structures: Sierra Leone
and the Philippines. I choose two cases of large-scale land deals in each
country. In these cases, I identify legal mobilization attempts that are ana-
lyzed using causal process tracing. I thereby focus on the role of the sup-
port network and the receptivity of the company. The findings from the
case studies are then compared within each country and across countries.
My findings underline the following relationship between the three con-
ditions: If the national legal opportunity structure is favorable and locals
have a strong enough support network, they should be able to reach their
goals through legal mobilization. If the national legal opportunity struc-
ture is unfavorable and the support network is strong, it depends on the
receptivity of the company if legal mobilization can be successful. Further-
more, two additional conditions are discussed: the inhibiting role local
and national political elites and missing unity among local actors. I subse-
quently suggest conceptualizing the situation of large-scale land deals as ex-
tended bargaining situations, which has to take into account multi-level
and multi-actor bargaining.
Overall, the thesis provides an analytical framework that is illustrated
and refined through empirical research. The framework is applicable in
other contexts of company-community relationships beyond foreign in-
vestment in agriculture and therefore provides a useful tool for further re-
search. The empirical work offers not only rich case studies but also a sys-
tematic and comparative view on the research question of how local actors
can successfully use legal mobilization in large-scale land deals. Through
this interaction of theory and empirics, my dissertation contributes to dif-
ferent strands of academic literature as well as ongoing policy debates.
1.2 Research program and findings
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Contributions to academic literature and policy debates
The starting point of this dissertation is the literature on large-scale land
deals and the discussion about possibilities of legal reform and internation-
al regulation in creating beneficial outcomes for local populations (Mar-
gulis et al. 2013; German et al. 2013; Borras et al. 2013; Brüntrup et al.
2014; Johnson 2016; Narula 2013; Polack et al. 2013). As the literature re-
view in chapter 2 will show, there is considerable debate about whether
national legal reform and international soft-law instruments can bring
about meaningful change for local actors affected by large-scale land deals.
Existing empirical research shows that even when there are national laws
in place, they do not automatically generate better conditions for local
communities (German et al. 2013). Furthermore, there is considerable
doubt that international public or private soft law regulations have any
benefit as they do not contain any real accountability mechanism (Johnson
2016). At the same time, case studies show that local actors undertake ef-
forts to protect and claim their rights through local and national authori-
ties but also by appealing to international certification schemes (Polack et
al. 2013).
My dissertation contributes significantly to this literature in three ways:
First, it provides a ‘bottom-up’ legal perspective. Instead of viewing nation-
al laws or international regulations from a purely ‘top-down’ view, I argue
that rights, rules and laws have to be claimed and applied locally. The con-
cept of legal mobilization mirrors this approach. Second, I develop a theo-
retical framework that helps me to understand under which conditions le-
gal mobilization attempts of local actors are likely to be successful. My re-
search thereby provides a comprehensive picture of the possibilities and
limits of national and international law in this field. Third, the empirical
case studies provide further insights into causal mechanisms, differences,
and commonalities between cases in two different countries. They also
raise questions for future research, which will be discussed in the conclu-
sion.
Apart from the research on large-scale land deals, the dissertations con-
tributes to legal mobilization approaches and law and development re-
search (Jacquot/Vitale 2014; McCann 1994; Vanhala 2012; Zemans 1983;
McCammon/McGrath 2015). My conceptualization of the legal opportuni-
ty structure can map the options of local actors comprehensively. I thereby
show how a weak national legal opportunity structure makes international
law regulations all the more necessary. This conceptualization can be used
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concept of legal mobilization in a broad way, clearly going beyond litiga-
tion to include calling on institutions and administrations, legal claims in
advocacy and legal representation. I thereby follow calls “that the study of
legal mobilization should include not only impact litigation but also the
use of law in lobbying, policymaking, and implementation, as well as oth-
er types of advocacy work that activists pursue” (Boutcher/Chua 2018: 5).
Understanding legal broadly helps to open up the view for the influence of
law in many social settings and especially in activism vis-à-vis foreign in-
vestors. This perspective helps to make the concept of legal mobilization
usable in settings where litigation is more complicated or unlikely and
thereby opens the idea to non-Western countries5. So far, most of the stud-
ies on legal mobilization have focused on the United States (Boutcher/
Chua 2018: 8) and other “liberal democracies in industrialized countries”
(Lemaitre/Sandvik 2015: 7). There is therefore a need to decenter the study
of legal mobilization to include the Global South (Lemaitre/Sandvik 2015:
8). This dissertation does so through providing a framework that is flexible
enough to work in many different contexts and by providing empirical
case studies from developing countries, with a less well functioning admin-
istrative and judicial system than many Western democracies.
Through focusing on Sierra Leone and the Philippines, my findings fur-
thermore add to the law and development field, which asks about the rela-
tionship between the two concepts (Moerloose 2017). In many cases, in-
vestment in agriculture is regarded as a way to promote rural development;
however, one can find a “frequent disconnection between the law, broadly
understood, and its development objectives” (Moerloose 2017: 185). My
findings underline the need for better national laws and regulations while
not denying the difficulties that exist in their implementation.
Apart from legal studies, my dissertation also provides new perspectives
for the social mobilization and business management literature. While the
legal mobilization literature was largely inspired by research on social
movements (Hilson 2002; McCann 1994), the social mobilization litera-
ture has not dealt with the role of law in a more general way. In this re-
gard, my dissertation provides a new perspective: Through the lens of a
broad legal mobilization concept, the role of the law for local activism be-
comes visible. The focus is thereby not on broader social movements for
societal change (even though activism often links to broader movements)
5 However, this does not mean that there is no court litigation in developing coun-
tries, litigation in cases involving social and economic rights have been on the rise
in these countries (Gauri/Gloppen 2012: 497).
1.3 Contributions to academic literature and policy debates
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but instead on particular local demands raised by affected smallholders.
The research thereby resembles the idea of ‘rightful resistance’, which de-
scribes a middle ground of social mobilization:
"It [is] neither as institutionalized as most political participation nor as
uninstitutionalized as the ‘politics by other means’ that social move-
ment scholars usually studied. The contention we were hearing and
reading about was more noisy, public, open and consequential than
James Scott's (1985) ‘everyday forms of resistance’, yet still fell short of
rebellion or revolution" (O'Brien/Li 2008: xii)
The concept of ‘rightful resistance’ was developed using these observations
from rural China but helps grasp actions undertaken by local actors in my
case studies. In consequence, my empirical research mostly fits this middle
ground, which has not received that much explicit attention by social mo-
bilization research yet.
When it comes to the business management literature, my dissertation
fits in with trends to connect social mobilization and business manage-
ment approaches in explaining successful outcomes of activism vis-à-vis
companies (King 2007; Waldron et al. 2013). My research does not only
add empirical examples from the Global South but also links this activism
with the existing legal contexts in which firms operate. I argue that the le-
gal structure not only provides opportunities for claims-making but also
influences how companies react. In this way, my thesis also contributes to
ongoing debates about corporate social responsibility (CSR) and, more
specifically, the element of corporate accountability (Garvey/Newell 2005).
It provides theoretical and empirical considerations of how local actors try
to hold companies accountable.
 
Apart from the academic literature, my research contributes to policy de-
bates as well.
The first and most obvious contribution is the debate about internation-
al regulation of large-scale land deals. As described, legal reforms and new
regulations on land tenure and foreign investment in land are regarded as
an important tool in the fight against land grabbing. Consequently, the
question under which conditions local communities might successfully
use legal means is of high practical importance. International organiza-
tions, especially the FAO, non-governmental organizations and develop-
ment agencies allocate resources to implement new guidelines and to train
local authorities and communities. To get a systematic view on chances
and challenges for local communities in using legal measures can be useful
1. Introduction
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for civil society actors and policy makers alike. At the same time, it seems
essential to have realistic expectations on how far legal reform in itself
leads to change.
More concretely, my findings point to the importance of binding legal
instruments, which provide local smallholders with an effective veto right.
This underlines the need for a right to land, which needs to be interpreted
through the lens of free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) if it is sup-
posed to be effective. I thereby support long-standing demands by civil so-
ciety actors (Brot für die Welt 2018), who routinely claim FPIC for local
smallholders in advocacy campaigns around large-scale land deals.
In addition, my findings show the importance of legal support for local
actors and therefore provide further evidence for legal empowerment
projects. This fits with ongoing international efforts to promote legal em-
powerment as a critical element of development (Commission on Legal
Empowerment of the Poor 2008) and a growing number of civil society
initiatives in this field (Goodwin/Maru 2017). My findings show that it
would be beneficial if actors who provide legal support also have compe-
tences in creating inner-group consensus to deal with the multiple voices
within affected communities. Finally, my findings concerning the role of
local and national elites point to the issue of corruption, which needs to be
dealt with in the context of large-scale land deals, but is, of course, a much
larger problem (De Schutter et al. 2016).
Outline of chapters
The dissertation will proceed as follows:
Chapter 2 provides the background of the issue of regulating large-scale
land deals and concretizes the existing research gap. I will go into detail in-
to the phenomenon of large-scale land deals in developing countries since
the early 2000s, and discuss international responses, which focused on cre-
ating new regulations. I will discuss different opinions about the useful-
ness of new regulation for affected communities and show that existing re-
search is not conclusive in this regard.
Chapter 3 introduces the analytical framework, which will help me to
answer my research question under which conditions local actors will be
able to achieve their goals vis-à-vis investing companies through legal mo-
bilization. My framework uses a basic bargaining model in combination
with three theoretical perspectives to derive three core conditions. Follow-
1.4
1.4 Outline of chapters
31
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748907602, am 02.12.2021, 19:08:03
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
ing a configurational approach, I formulate logical relationships between
the conditions.
Chapter 4 discusses my research design, which is based on a qualitative
small N case study approach, comparing two cases of large-scale land deals
in two different countries: Sierra Leone and the Philippines. Apart from
discussing the methods used for analysis and my case selection, this chap-
ter also describes my field visits, conducting of interviews and other data
sources used.
Chapter 5 and 6 contain the analysis of Sierra Leone and the Philip-
pines. Both analytical chapter follow the same structure through providing
some country specific background and analyzing the national legal oppor-
tunity structure first. Legal mobilization attempts are then analyzed in two
cases of large-scale land deals, before they are compared within the coun-
try.
Chapter 7 goes on to compare findings from Sierra Leona and Philip-
pines. Country-specific differences but also similarities will become clear.
On an abstract level I will use my findings to specify and extend my analyt-
ical framework, which can be used in future research on company-commu-
nity relations.
Chapter 8 finally summarizes my research, discusses implications for the
existing debates and reflects limits and further research desiderata.
1. Introduction
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Large-scale land deals: overview and debates
Foreign large-scale land deals have received an enormous amount of atten-
tion since they were observed as a new global trend in 2008 (GRAIN
2008). The diagnosed new ‘land rush’ ushered a ‘literature rush’ (Oya
2013a) with a plethora of reports by non-governmental and international
organizations as well as a significant interest by academics. While early
publications were characterized by an alarmist tone and were often based
on a ‘finding out fast’ approach (Oya 2013a: 505) more recent research has
focused on the complex interplay of a variety of actors from local elites, na-
tional governments (Keene et al. 2015) to the role of international finan-
cial institutions. Apart from the studies on the causes and consequences of
foreign large-scale land investment, research has emerged on the resistance
to this trend on the global (Margulis et al. 2013) and the local level (Bor-
ras/Franco 2013). I will draw on this existing literature to describe the gen-
eral trends, causes and consequences of foreign large-scale land deals in
chapter 2.1.
The global interest in farmland has not only triggered a lot of literature
but has also gained the attention of policymakers and civil society organi-
zations. Debates about the right way to deal with ‘the global land grab’ de-
veloped: from demands on a moratorium on large-scale land deals (FIAN
2011) to different initiatives to create guidelines for investment in land
(FAO et al. 2010; De Schutter 2009; CFS 2012). Most observers agree that
there need to be better mechanisms in place to ensure proper participation
of the local population and the protection of their rights. Essentially legal
regulation and reform is seen as the major way forward. In chapter 2.2 I
will give an overview of these initiatives undertaken on the international
level.
As these steps to rein in land grabbing were taken in different interna-
tional settings, academics and civil society actors alike debated the suitabil-
ity of these efforts. A lot of skepticism was formulated using different argu-
ments about why legal reforms would not suffice to protect local popula-
tions. At the same time, knowledge on the implementation and use of le-
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Foreign large-scale land deals in developing countries – an overview
Much of the ‘landgrabbing’ literature points out that large-scale land in-
vestments are by no means a new phenomenon (White et al. 2012: 623;
Mollett 2016). They have rather existed throughout history, especially dur-
ing colonial but also post-colonial times. Nonetheless, there has been a sig-
nificant increase of large-scale land deals for agricultural use since the early
2000s. In the following, I focus on the specificities of this ‘new’ wave of
land deals, its trends, causes and consequences.
Global trends
As described in the introduction, the term large-scale land deals refers to
the purchase or leasing of large tracts of land – more than 200 or 500
hectares – through foreign companies. In the following, I will give an
overview of these land deals that are focused on agricultural use. What are
the characteristics of these deals? Where do they take place? Who are the
investors and how are these deals closed?
Numbers on the global phenomenon of large-scale land deals are not
easy to come by (Oya 2013a). Figures of a total size of up to 227 million
hectares of land acquired globally have been floating around in NGO and
media reports (Scoones et al. 2013: 473). However, more realistic estimates
for the time period between 2000 and 2016 range between 26.7 (Nolte et
al. 2016: vi) and 30 million hectares (GRAIN 2016: 4).
The Land Matrix, which contains the most comprehensive data compila-
tion, recorded 1004 land deals with a size bigger than 200 hectares. In this
dataset, an average foreign large-scale land deal has a size of 10.000
hectares. In Africa, the vast majority of land deals consist of leases, whereas
in the Americas most deals are actual purchases, pointing to differences in
legislation and land tenure systems.
The lease periods were only known for 327 deals, but over 90 % of them
lasted for 20 years or longer, up until 99 years. 44 % of the globally leased
area is used for the production of oilseeds, mainly oil palm and jatropha,
followed by cereal (20 %) and sugar crops (10 %) (Nolte et al. 2016: 8–11).
When it comes to the buying prices and lease rents, the picture remains
blurry, mainly due to missing data for individual land deals. However, rent
payments, especially in the poorer countries, are quite low, with prices of-
ten ranging from 1 to 10 dollars per hectare per year (Nolte et al. 2016: 41).
2.1
2.1.1
2. Large-scale land deals: overview and debates
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The number one target region is Sub-Sahara Africa, in terms of numbers
of contracts but also in terms of hectares. As of 2016, the Land Matrix
recorded 10 million hectares and included data on another 13.2 million
hectares of intended deals (Nolte et al. 2016: vi). Large-scale land acquisi-
tions appear very concentrated. The data shows that the 20 top target coun-
tries account for the size of over 80 % of all land deals, with Indonesia,
Ukraine, Russia, Papua New Guinea and Brazil being the top 5 in total size
(Nolte et al. 2016: 17).
However, the total size does not tell us much about the size in relation
to the agricultural land available in country. Older data calculated by Rulli
et al. (2013) show that in relation to their size, countries like Uruguay, the
Philippines, Sierra Leone and Liberia are top host countries. However, it is
not just the mere size of a land deal that is relevant but also its previous use
(Edelman 2013: 498; Cotula 2012: 655): Has it been cultivated before? How
fertile and profitable is the land? How many people live on the land? Re-
search indicates that only one third of the land deals occur in sparsely pop-
ulated forest land, while one third of the deals take place in areas with
densely populated croplands (Messerli et al. 2014: 453).
On the country level, Nolte et al. (2016) included socioeconomic data in
their analysis and show that there are essentially two groups of target coun-
tries: One the one hand countries with a low prevalence of hunger and low
relevance of agriculture for the GDP (such as Russia, Uruguay, Ukraine).
And on the other hand, countries with a high prevalence of hunger and at
the same time a high relevance of agriculture for the GDP (such as Sierra
Leone, Ethiopia or Laos). Most commentators are especially concerned
about the second group of countries and the possible adverse effects land
deals might have on food security (Havnevik 2011; Kress 2012). These are
the cases I deal with in the rest of the dissertation. As outlined in the intro-
duction, I focus on large-scale land deals in developing countries.
Investors mainly originate from Western Europe and the United States,
as well as South-East Asia and the Middle East; though, it is often challeng-
ing to determine the country of origin due to the complex structure of
transnational corporations. Some companies can be traced back to tax
havens like the British Virgin Islands and offshore structures are common
(GRAIN 2016: 7). Contrary to commonly voiced narratives, there is no evi-
dence that China plays a bigger role in the ‘new scramble for Africa’ than
European or South-East Asian actors (Nolte et al. 2016: 22–25; Ayers 2013).
Most investors are private companies accounting for 71 % of all land in-
vestments in agriculture. State-owned entities only cover 6 % of all land
deals, while private investment funds are the primary owners of 9 %. How-
2.1 Foreign large-scale land deals in developing countries – an overview
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ever, these numbers might underestimate the role of investment and pen-
sion funds as they often appear as tertiary shareholders (Nolte et al. 2016:
26). Furthermore, national and international developmental banks have
become an important investment partner for many land investing com-
panies (GRAIN 2016: 7).
During the process of closing a land investment deal, national govern-
ments but also local communities and their elites play a considerable role.
The first step for TNCs planning to invest in agriculture is to get in contact
with the host government – oftentimes special investment promotion
agencies. In many instances, the government and the investor sign an
agreement (e.g. Memorandum of Understanding = MOU), which outlines
the planned investment and benefits as well as duties on both sides.
Under this rather broad agreement, a more specific land lease agreement
is then signed with local authorities and with landowners (Vermeulen/
Cotula 2010: 906). However, when it comes to the consultation of affected
communities, who live on the leased land, evidence shows that consulta-
tion procedures are often insufficient. Quantitative data is not readily avail-
able, but the Land Matrix contains information for 161 cases. In 41 % there
was no consultation, some consultation in 43 % and an FPIC (Free Prior
and Informed Consent) process in 14 % of the cases (Nolte et al. 2016: 40).
However, these numbers are difficult to interpret and reporting bias might
be either overly positive or overly negative.
Even if consultations take place, they are often considered “as a one-off
event rather than an ongoing interaction through the project cycle” (Cotu-
la/Vermeulen 2011: 44). Furthermore, meetings often only include village
elders and local elites, lack proper recording and do not necessarily give lo-
cal communities the realistic option to veto an investment project (Cotula/
Vermeulen 2011: 44). Generally, these insufficient consultations processes
and the subsequent disregard for the interests of the local population are
regarded as highly problematic and often lead to the use of the term land
grabbing.
Summing up, the data shows that foreign large-scale land investments
are a major issue in a limited number of countries, where previously used
land is targeted. Large-scale land deals usually involve a considerable de-
gree of land-use change (Borras/Franco 2012). At the same time, some of
the top host countries are among the poorest and food-insecure countries
in the world, while investing TNCs usually originate in high-income coun-
tries.
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Drivers
The literature discusses different causes and drivers for the sudden rise in
large-scale land investments. Global political-economic drivers are identi-
fied as an overall push to this kind of investment, while certain host coun-
try characteristics function as pull factors to attract investment. Further-
more, a discourse about a specific type of development, global food securi-
ty and the narrative of ‘empty’ lands enable and legitimize large-scale land
investment deals.
On the global level, three main drivers are usually identified in causing
the surge in large-scale land investment since 2007/2008: The food price
crisis, the financial crisis and new policies subsidizing bioethanol produc-
tion. The food price crisis occurred when prices for food stocks like rice,
wheat or maize nearly doubled in comparison to the early 2000s (Akram-
Lodhi 2012: 121). It did create not only unrest in many countries but also
showed the vulnerability of food-importing countries. Reacting to the cri-
sis, Saudia Arabia and other Gulf states, as well as South Korea and China
issued programs that incentivized companies to produce food abroad for
the home market.
The price volatility also signaled investors that substantial profit could
be made within commodity markets at a time when much of the banking
sector was in crisis (De Schutter 2011b: 516–517). As investors looked for
new places to invest, the agribusiness market became increasingly impor-
tant. Estimates of 9 billion people living on the planet in 2050 led to pre-
dictions that food prices will hike further in the future. Rising food de-
mands in booming economies of Africa are regarded as a ‘high-growth
market’ (Cotula 2012: 662–664). All of a sudden, investing in large-scale
agriculture became an attractive investment option, despite high risks (Li
2015).
Last but not least, the ‘oil peak’ and subsequent government policies in
subsidizing biofuels in the European Union but also the US added another
incentive to invest in land and use it for the production of oil seeds like
sugar cane or oil palm especially among energy and biotech companies
(Cotula 2012: 663).
These three interrelated tendencies led to a strong push to invest in land.
And while the trend has subsided a little in comparison to the initial
‘rush’, it is ongoing (GRAIN 2016).
 
Apart from the global push factors national pull factors are also identified.
The number one factor is probably the active strategy of developing coun-
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tries to attract foreign investment in agriculture to increase foreign ex-
change reserves (Cotula et al. 2014: 915). Also, many developing countries
face a huge problem of rural poverty, food insecurity and marginalization
of subsistence farmers. Since development assistance and national subsi-
dies in agriculture have been cut in the 1980s, agricultural sectors in many
countries have been in dire need of investment (De Schutter 2011b: 509–
512). Governments try to attract these investments through advertising
their agricultural land and granting tax and tariffs exemptions (Cotula
2012: 669).
Aside from this active role of host states, weaknesses in governance can
also be a factor for large-scale land investments. In a World Bank study,
Deininger and Byerlee (2011) show that, contrary to the doing-business in-
dex assumptions, low levels of rule of law and investors’ security increased
the interest in farmland investment by foreign investors. Furthermore, ru-
ral tenure security was negatively correlated with foreign land investments,
showing that less secure tenure made land deals more likely (Deininger/
Byerlee 2011: 54–55). These correlations are confirmed by case study evi-
dence, which suggests that post-conflict countries are attractive to foreign
investors wanting to secure themselves cheap access to land (van der
Haar/van Leeuwen 2013; Shanmugaratnam 2014; Takeuchi et al. 2014:
245).
 
In addition to these push and pull factors, researchers point to the rele-
vance of enabling discourses that legitimatize the investments. The neolib-
eral global food security discourse argues that massive investment in agri-
culture is needed to feed the world in the future and that this investment is
best achieved through agribusiness and open markets. In this view, com-
mercialized agriculture is the only way to close the diagnosed ‘yield gap,’
and small scale farmers who are being pushed out of the market are better
off looking for wage labor. In this way, large-scale land investments are re-
garded as a way to ‘feed Arica’ (Nally 2015: 343–346; Baglioni/Gibbon
2013: 1571). At the same time, climate change is alluded to, to legitimize
large-scale investments in biofuel production, which is supposed to help
bring down greenhouse gas emission, while at the same time creating local
jobs (Boamah 2011: 163). These narratives are furthermore linked to a
broader discourse of development, which regards commercialization as an
important element of development and believes that this can best be
achieved through foreign investment (Schoneveld 2017: 127). From a post-
colonial perspective, these discourses have strong underpinnings of saving
the ‘savagery’ through ‘civilization’ (Mollett 2016). In the end, these over-
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lapping discourses serve to enable and legitimize large-scale land invest-
ments in developing countries.
In conclusion, macro-economic push factors have caused a rising inter-
est in investing in land while state-specific pull factors make some coun-
tries more attractive for investors. At the same time, legitimizing discours-
es around global food security, climate change and development are fur-
ther enabling the deals.
Consequences
Benefits and risks of large-scale land investment deals are difficult to cap-
ture as they might vary significantly depending on the individual invest-
ment project, the people concerned and the kind of dimension studied –
be they economic, social or ecological (Boamah 2014). At the same time,
the necessary baseline data, indicating living conditions prior to a land in-
vestment, is usually missing (Cotula et al. 2014: 919). I will nonetheless
give a short overview of the mentioned effects of land deals on the local
level.
A lot of the research points out negative economic consequences of
large-scale land investments. As locals lose access to land, they lose their
livelihoods which are based on small-scale farming, herding or collection
of products such as firewood and charcoal, building materials, fruits and
herbs. Additionally, access to water might also be inhibited. As a conse-
quence, food security might decline as well as the ability to deal with eco-
nomic shocks (as income becomes less diversified) (Schoneveld 2017: 120).
Furthermore, the promise of the creation of new jobs often falls short of
expectations (Li 2011). New employment opportunities usually consist of
casual labor – often only during certain seasons or mainly in the start-up
phase. The number of jobs created fluctuates between different crops, with
grains and cereal plantations creating the least amount of employment
(Nolte et al. 2016: 43–46).
Nonetheless, wage labor is created, which might be favored by parts of
the local population, who for example might not have had access to land
(Gilfoy 2015). Also, in cases where wage labor is already an existing form
of income, bigger foreign-owned plantations are found to pay higher
wages than smaller local businesses (Cramer et al. 2008). Apart from the
employment created, other economic benefits expected from foreign in-
vestment in agriculture is income through lease rents, increased tax base,
technology transfer, market access for local farmers, improved agricultural
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productivity and an increased availability of food commodities on the na-
tional level (Görgen et al. 2009: 21; Hallam 2011: 94).
Concerning the social dimension of large-scale land investments, differ-
ent effects have been pointed out, the most obvious one probably being
dispossession and expulsion from the land. The Land Matrix dataset men-
tions displacement in 57 out of 89 cases for which this kind of information
was available. In seven cases, over 10,000 people were reportedly displaced
by the respective projects (Nolte et al. 2016: 42). However, these seem to
represent rather extreme cases; case study evidence shows that frequently
people are not physically relocated through the investment project; even
though many might relocate over time due to economic pressure (econo-
mic displacement). In many cases, a considerable amount of people remain
on the land and serve as wage laborers.
Despite not being displaced, these communities often face a rise in con-
flicts – within but also between communities, with the company or gov-
ernment officials and within households. Most of these conflicts revolve
around being for or against the deal, but also about benefit- and income-
sharing and existing land rights (Alden Wily 2009: 30; Hall 2011; Borras/
Franco 2013; Millar 2015).
When it comes to positive social effects, corporate social responsibility
measures are usually cited. Apart from constructing new infrastructure like
roads, housing for employees or electricity grid, investing companies often
promise to build or support local schools and health centers, support local
farmers with machines or capital and provide skills training and capacity
building (Nolte et al. 2016: 46).
Another issue brought up in the literature pertains to social power rela-
tions, most importantly gender relations. Yet, again there are two different
positions on this issue. One side argues that large-scale land deals can em-
power women – especially when the investment creates new economic
possibilities for them (through wage labor but also through selling pro-
duce or cooked meals to workers). The opposite position refers to the cir-
cumstance that women are often disadvantaged in tenure systems leaving
them without compensation or lease money and therefore making women
even more vulnerable to large-scale land deals (Doss et al. 2014; Daley/
Pallas 2014; Behrman et al. 2012).
Environmentally, most commentators agree that large-scale land invest-
ments are most likely to have negative impacts, such as deforestation and
increasing erosion. Agribusiness can result in declining soil quality due to
the use of chemicals, reduction of biodiversity through monoculture and
possible unintended consequences on local ecological systems through the
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introduction of new plant varieties (Görgen et al. 2009: 24). However,
measures can be taken by investing companies in reducing the negative en-
vironmental impact as much as possible. Government regulations and
oversight are needed to enforce strong standards. At the same time, large-
scale investment projects in agriculture can also have positive effects on the
environment such as the introduction of less damaging production meth-
ods, which could be taken up by the local population (Görgen et al. 2009:
24).
Discussing the economic, social and ecological consequences of large-
scale land investments made one thing clear: Positive changes for the local
population are not easily delivered. The literature points to a plethora of
issues that need to be adequately addressed. At the same time, foreign agri-
cultural investment can provide a chance for the local population and
should not be wholly rejected. Nevertheless, even proponents of large-scale
land deals agree that there needs to be strong regulation and oversight for
these deals to deliver on some of the development promises made. I will
discuss these calls for regulation and the actual action taken on the global
level in chapter 2.2.
Global responses to foreign large-scale land deals
The GRAIN report, “Seized! The 2008 land grab for food and financial se-
curity”, published in 2008, ushered substantial interest in the issue of large-
scale land deals. Numerous media and NGO reports followed and warned
of the dire consequences for the local population if the trend continued.
Calls for regulation of foreign large-scale land investments followed by civ-
il society, international organizations and research institutes.
With the food price and subsequent hunger crisis in 2007/2008 fresh on
their minds, international organizations and global governance fora acted
quickly in creating new principles and guidelines. At the same time, heat-
ed debates about the right form of regulation ensued. I will take a closer
look at the discussed ideas focusing on the issue of how affected local ac-
tors should be involved in a large-scale land deal.
In a first step, I will describe the differences between a human rights and
a market-based approach towards large-scale land deals and land more gen-
erally (chap 2.2.1). In a second step, I will describe international instru-
ments, created to address the land rights issues around large-scale foreign
investments (chap 2.2.2). Finally, the analysis of these instruments reveals a
2.2
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considerable gap in the regulatory framework when it comes to veto rights
for local smallholders (chap 2.2.3).
Human rights versus market-based approaches towards large-scale
land deals
International actors varied in their approaches towards large-scale land
deals. While there was recognition by various actors that regulating large-
scale land deals was desirable, the underlying ideas and connected de-
mands diverged. A human rights approach focuses on the rights of affected
people and demands their protection. In the market-based approach land
is a valuable commodity and regulation can help to create more efficient
land markets and mitigate risks for affected populations (Narula 2013). I
will discuss these differences further; however, it should be noted that I
will do so in an idealized manner – in many real-world examples traces of
both approaches can be found.
The basic idea of a human rights based approach to large scale land deals
is “that individuals are entitled to specific rights guarantees that cannot be
traded away in the context of large-scale land deals” (Narula 2013: 126). In
this way, agricultural land investments should not infringe on either own-
ership or land use rights but also food security and economic develop-
ment. Even more, land is seen as a “gateway to the realization of numerous
human rights” (Narula 2013: 127), such as the rights to food or develop-
ment. To enable the fulfillment of these rights for as many people as possi-
ble, equal land distribution should be favored over free land markets. Fur-
thermore, the human rights approach argues for the protection of custom-
ary tenure, especially in terms of use rights.
A human rights approach does, however, not imply the creation of indi-
vidual land titles (Narula 2013: 149). In the context of large-scale land
deals, a human rights perspective means an effective veto right by local
smallholders: “In order to be meaningful, consultations must be under-
girded by the ability of affected communities-both legally and politically-to
withhold their consent.” (Narula 2013: 152).
As this approach takes rights as a starting point, there are duty bearers,
who are obliged to ensure that rights are kept. These duty bearers are first
and foremost host governments but also companies and countries of ori-
gin of investors. Affected people are regarded as right-holders, who can
make legitimate and enforceable claims (Narula 2013: 126–127). A human
2.2.1
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rights approach does not rule out large-scale investments as such; it instead
sets precise boundaries for investment projects.
One proponent of a human rights approach towards large-scale land
deals was the acting Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food, Olivier de
Schutter. Drawing on existing human rights standards, he developed
eleven principles, which were supposed to serve as a baseline for future dis-
cussion. The principles clarified that large-scale land investments have seri-
ous human rights implications, which need to be addressed as such
(Claeys/Vanloqueren 2013). The most obvious is the right to food, which
would be violated if a state agreed to a land deal which would be “depriv-
ing local populations from access to productive resources indispensable to
their livelihoods, unless appropriate alternatives are offered” (De Schutter
2009: 5). Apart from food security, freedom from forced eviction and
workers’ rights have to be guaranteed. Besides, local people have the right
to participate in the decision-making process based on their right to self-
determination regarding natural resources and their right to development
(De Schutter 2009: 5–12).
Based on these human rights De Schutter recommended that negotia-
tions for large-scale land investments need to be transparent and ensure
the free, prior and informed consent (FPIC) of affected communities.
States should furthermore take provisions to protect informal tenure rights
and consider possible alternatives to large-scale agribusiness investments.
Impact assessments need to be carried out as well as ongoing monitoring
of companies’ commitments (De Schutter 2009: 14–15). Even though only
a few actors (states and civil society) endorsed the Principles, they formed
the basis for a human rights perspective on large-scale land investments
(Claeys/Vanloqueren 2013).
 
In contrast to a human rights approach, a market-based approach focuses
on the reduction of risks for affected populations and investing companies.
The focus lies on good governance, which should make foreign invest-
ments easier and secure. As such, the rights of affected people are just one
risk element that has to be weighed against long-term macro-economic
gains: “short-term costs may very well be justified by these long-term
gains” (Narula 2013: 137). In this view, market-based solutions such as pri-
vate investments are the most important driver for economic development.
Government regulation should only play a role in mitigating risks for local
actors and investors and not be too restrictive. Land is seen as an economic
commodity, which should be put to its most efficient use for the overall
greater good of economic growth (Narula 2013: 121). This is achieved by
2.2 Global responses to foreign large-scale land deals
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creating secure land markets based on individual land titles, which should
enable land allocation to those with the most productive means. As a con-
sequence, land concentration is not per se regarded as problematic (Narula
2013: 148). Overall,
“[t]he market[…] approach assumes that robust land markets, coupled
with community consultations and good governance measures, can
help mitigate the risks and deliver the benefits of large-scale land trans-
fers” (Narula 2013: 151)
In this approach, large-scale land deals are regarded as something positive,
while it is admitted that some basic rules have to be applied to mitigate
negative effects.
Human rights vs. market-based approach to land
 Human rights approach Market-based approach
Underlying idea Land as a means to fulfill
human rights and secure
livelihoods




Protection of all forms of
tenure systems and use
rights
Formalization and priva-




to ensure livelihoods of
smallholders
Land distribution accord-






FPIC of all affected land
owners and users
Consultation of affected






(Source: own compilation based on Narula 2013; Toft 2013)
A comparison of the two approaches shows that there are considerable
overlaps when it comes to demands for regulation. Both perspectives agree
to “principles of transparency, accountability, and participation” (Narula
2013: 131) as well as the idea of respecting existing tenure rights. Nonethe-
less, there are considerable differences between the approaches when it
comes to underlying ideas about the socio-economic meaning of land, ex-
Table 1
2. Large-scale land deals: overview and debates
44
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748907602, am 02.12.2021, 19:08:03
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
isting land rights and the role of land distribution. A human rights ap-
proach demands FPIC of local actors, while a market-based approach em-
phasizes consultations. Furthermore, a human rights approach implies that
rights can be claimed and are enforceable. In contrast, a market-based ap-
proach wants to limit state intervention and favors a more loosely regula-
tory regime in the form of codes of conduct (Toft 2013: 1185–1187). Ta-
ble 1 summarizes these differences between the two approaches. However,
it should be noted that this presents an ideal-typical characterization of the
two approaches. Most international regulatory instruments contain traces
of both approaches as will be discussed in the next chapter.
International instruments for regulating large-scale land deals
In this chapter, I will review the most important international instruments
regarding large-scale land deals6. I will thereby focus on newly created in-
struments by international organizations such as the Voluntary Guidelines
on the Governance of Tenure and the Principles for Responsible Agricul-
tural Investment. I will also take a look at initiatives by the private sector,
exemplary the IFC Standards and two Roundtables (Roundtable on Sus-
tainable Biofuels and Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil). I will intro-
duce each instrument in a general way but then focus on specific stipula-
tions made in regard to tenure rights and decision-making processes, as
this is my main research interest7. The table at the end of the chapter pro-
vides an overview of these instruments.
The instrument regarded as an important response to large-scale land
deals from a human right perspective was the Voluntary Guidelines on the
Governance of Tenure (VGGT), adopted by the Committee on World
Food Security (CFS). Through extensive participation rights in this forum,
civil society groups pushed for the creation of the VGGT, which were to
become the first-ever agreed-upon standards on the global level regarding
2.2.2
6 I will only include instruments, which make specific reference to land tenure is-
sues in relation to foreign investment and are usually discussed in the context of
large-scale land deals. Other frameworks exist, which might be of relevance in the
broader context, for example the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights or the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. In addition, I leave
out regional instruments such as the African Union Framework and Guidelines on
Land Policy in Africa.
7 I do not discuss the implementation or empirical effectiveness of individual instru-
ments.
2.2 Global responses to foreign large-scale land deals
45
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748907602, am 02.12.2021, 19:08:03
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
the governance of tenure (Duncan/Barling 2012; McKeon 2013). The pro-
cess included various regional and stakeholder meetings as well as exten-
sive intergovernmental negotiations. The Voluntary Guidelines on the Re-
sponsible Governance of Tenure of Land, Fisheries and Forests in the Con-
text of National Food Security (full title) were adopted in 2012 and were
applauded by governments and civil society actors alike (Seufert 2013;
Paoloni/Onorati 2014). Despite their voluntary nature, the guidelines are
regarded as highly relevant due to their high legitimacy (Seufert 2013: 184)
as well as their references to binding human rights frameworks (Golay/
Biglino 2013: 1643).
In regard to investment in land, the guidelines make a number of stipu-
lations: They demand the consultation and participation of people, ”whose
tenure rights, including subsidiary rights, might be affected” (CFS 2012:
para 12.9). This right to consultations does not include a veto right as it
does for indigenous people; nonetheless, the principle of consultation and
participation of affected people and the provision of information and sup-
port to these groups is a step forward (von Bernstorff 2012: 31).
Furthermore, “[s]tates should ensure that existing legitimate tenure
rights are not compromised by such investments” (CFS 2016: para 12.10).
The guidelines advise that states should recognize and provide instruments
to protect customary tenure systems and collective land rights (CFS 2012:
para 9.). Besides, the guidelines suggest that states should create new regu-
lations and policies to regulate large-scale land investment for example, on
deciding on maximum sizes or for including parliaments in decision-mak-
ing (von Bernstorff 2012: 32). In the same vein, investors are asked to re-
spect the rule of law and provide sufficient information on a planned land
deal:
“Contracting parties should provide comprehensive information to en-
sure that all relevant persons are engaged and informed in the negotia-
tions, and should seek that the agreements are documented and under-
stood by all who are affected.” (CFS 2012: para 12.11)
The VGGT furthermore put an emphasis on the protection of human
rights and the duty of states to ensure beneficial outcomes for the local
population. Land investments should not threaten an adequate standard of
living, especially food security (von Bernstorff 2012: 33–37). Besides the
host states, who are the primary guarantors of human rights, private busi-
nesses are named as being responsible. Also, if states actively support an in-
vestment project or they become an investor abroad, they are obligated to
“the protection of legitimate tenure rights, the promotion of food security
2. Large-scale land deals: overview and debates
46
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748907602, am 02.12.2021, 19:08:03
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
and their existing obligations under national and international law” (CFS
2012: para 12.15). This recognition of states’ extraterritorial duties, when
financing and supporting investment in foreign countries, was a remark-
able step and the first time this principle was mentioned in an internation-
ally negotiated document (von Bernstorff 2012: 41).
Prior to the VGGT another document had been created by the World
Bank, the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization), IFAD (International
Fund for Agricultural Development) and UNCTAD (United Nations Con-
ference on Trade and Development). The Principles for Responsible Agri-
cultural Investment that Respects Rights, Livelihoods and Resources (WB
PRAI) were created in 2010 and received considerable criticism as a typical
market-based instrument. In fact, the WB PRAI emphasized the role of
best practice and codes of conduct in dealing with issues around large-scale
land deals:
“Arguably, the magnitude of the present phenomenon and the hazards
involved warrant a broader effort to build on ongoing initiatives that
involve some mix of guidelines, codes of good or best practice, and
perhaps even independently verifiable performance standards coupled
with benchmarking.” (FAO et al. 2010: 1)
Nonetheless, the seven principles spell out issues that should be addressed
during large-scale agricultural investment projects such as respect for exist-
ing land rights, food security, transparency and consultation of contracts,
good business practices and social and environmental sustainability (FAO
et al. 2010). Furthermore, “all those materially affected” (FAO et al. 2010:
Principle 4) should be consulted in land investment deals. As such, the
World Bank PRAI suggest that all forms of land rights, also informal
rights, should be respected and that governments should create legal
frameworks that create clear rules for land transferals. In this way, the
World Bank PRAI do emphasize the need for national regulatory frame-
works.
The principles were endorsed by the G8 and the G20, but were met with
harsh criticism from the UN Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food and
civil society organizations (The Global Campaign for Agrarian Reform/
Land Research Action Network 2010). They argued that the principles
would simply legitimize the ongoing trend of land grabbing and connect-
ed human rights violations. Additionally, the non-inclusive top-down pro-
cess in which the WB PRAI were developed was criticized (Stephens 2013).
In a quite remarkable move, the Committee on World Food Security
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(CFS) decided to only take note of the principles without adopting them,
further delegitimizing the World Bank principles (Duncan 2015: 174).
The CFS later developed its own principles for responsible investment
(CFS-PRAI). The Principles for Responsible Investment in Agriculture and
Food Systems (CFS-PRAI) aim to create investments which “contribute to
food security and nutrition, thus supporting the progressive realization of
the right to adequate food” (CFS 2014: para 10). The ten principles stipu-
late, for example, that investment should increase food security and lead to
development or that grievance mechanisms and transparency measures
should be set up (CFS 2014). The principles acknowledge that large-scale
land investments are sometimes impossible to design in a responsible man-
ner und should not take place in those situations. Furthermore, they
specifically include financing institutions as being responsible for the hu-
man rights record of the investments made (Johnson 2016: 77–78). At the
same time, the CFS PRAI recognize the role of smallholders as the ones re-
alizing most of the investments in agriculture:
“Farmers should be recognized as key contributors to food security
and nutrition and as major investors in the agricultural sector, in par-
ticular taking into account those family farms that invest their own
capital and labour in their agricultural activity.” (CFS 2014: para 5)
Furthermore, the principles build on existing human rights norms and ex-
isting CFS guidelines (CFS 2014: para 19A). Accordingly, decisions about
large-scale land deals should involve participation and consultation with
affected rights holders in line with the VGGT (CFS 2014: para 25).
 
Aside from intergovernmental governance fora and international organiza-
tions, the private sector reacted to the surge in large-scale land deals and
the surrounding criticism. They suggested modifications of existing princi-
ples and roundtables. The instruments regarded as most relevant to large-
scale land acquisitions, are the IFC Performance Standards (as part of the
Equator Principles) and biofuel certification schemes, most notably the
Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB), and the Roundtable on Sus-
tainable Palm Oil.
The Equator Principles were set up as a ‘risk management framework’ in
2003 to guide large investment projects in countries with poor regulatory
capacities. To fulfill the Equator Principles, the IFC Performance Stan-
dards on Environmental and Social Sustainability have to be followed. In
2012, the IFC Standards were updated to include “very specific standards
about land use and access, as well as guidance for investors and financiers
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on how to best interact with affected communities” (Goetz 2013: 201). IFC
Performance Standard 5 specifies that involuntary displacement (defined
as physical or economic displacement without the consent of affected peo-
ple) should be avoided; or if not otherwise possible, negative impacts
should be minimized through compensation and livelihood improvement
(IFC 2012: 5.1 – 5.3). In doing so, “clients are encouraged to use negotiated
settlements meeting the requirements of this Performance Standard, even
if they have the legal means to acquire land without the seller’s consent”
(IFC 2012: 5.3).
The principle of consent of affected people is only inscribed in regard to
indigenous people, for which FPIC is required. In other cases, the Stan-
dards do not provide any restrictions, meaning that investment projects
can be implemented against the will of affected people. In consequence,
the IFC standards have received criticism for not going far enough (Goetz
2013: 201).
Other private sector initiatives, mainly roundtables and attached certifi-
cation schemes, were created by companies, often in collaboration with
civil society actors. The Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels (RSB) is the
most far-reaching when it comes to setting standards in regards to land
tenure and consideration of local interests (German/Schoneveld 2012:
771). Founded in 2007, the Roundtable established 12 principles for certi-
fication for sustainable biofuel production. The RSB principles clearly
state that no involuntary resettlement should take place (Goetz 2013: 202).
A lease agreement should furthermore only enter into force when all exist-
ing land conflicts, including with land users, have been settled following
the FPIC principle. This provision is far-reaching as it includes people who
might not have ownership rights but are traditional land users, for exam-
ple, tenants or pastoralists. The RSB also makes provisions in regards to
compensation of and creating development for the local population
(Fortin/Richardson 2013: 146–147). The RSB principles stick out against
other biofuel certification schemes, which only cover the issue very superfi-
cially (German/Schoneveld 2012: 772) or focus on environmental concerns
and thereby omit socio-economic consequences (Bracco 2015: 138).
However, it is feared that it is precisely this ambitious approach that
might make the RSB principles less effective:
“Unfortunately, due to its comprehensiveness (and associated cost and
complexity), the RSB is likely to attract only those companies that are
already largely compliant with RSB principles and can therefore bene-
fit from related reputational gains at limited cost” (German/Schon-
eveld 2012: 776)
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This fear might be realistic, especially against the background that the RSB
has to compete against other biofuels certification schemes, which are less
comprehensive (Ponte 2014: 267). As of February 2019, only 36 operators
(producers and traders) worldwide ever received RSB certification, of
which several certifications had already terminated (RSB 15/02/2019).
Another roundtable that is worth considering is the Roundtable on Sus-
tainable Palm Oil (RSPO), as oil palm is one of the main crop grown on
new plantations developed through foreign investment (Nolte et al. 2016:
11). The RSPO was founded in 2004 as a response to growing criticism and
consumer boycotts due to the alleged unsustainability of palm oil produc-
tion (Nesadurai 2013: 515). While the initial focus was on environmental
issues, NGOs pushed for the inclusion of socio-economic criteria, amongst
others, an emphasis on land rights. They were successful in introducing
FPIC for local smallholders as one criterion (Pesqueira/Glasbergen 2013:
299–300). In consequence, criterion 2.3 reads: “Use of the land for oil palm
does not diminish the legal, customary or user rights of other users with-
out their free, prior and informed consent.” (RSPO 2013: 2.3).
The RSPO is similarly far-reaching when it comes to land rights protec-
tion as the RSB principles. At the same time, more companies are certified.
With 82 growers and 373 palm oil mills (RSPO 15/02/2019) RSPO certi-
fied members produce 19 % of the global palm oil production according to
information by the roundtable (RSPO).
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Through comparing the discussed instruments, two issues become visi-
ble:
First, most instruments contain traces of a human rights and a market-
based approach and end up demanding similar safeguards in regards to
large-scale land deals. There are, for example, considerable overlaps be-
tween the VGGT and the IFC Performance Standards (Windfuhr 2017).
“[T]he Performance Standards have not been written explicitly within
a human rights-based approach. However, they reflect implicitly the
content of several human rights standards, and help to avoid infringe-
ment of human rights […] the institutions that apply the IFC PS […]
already cover essential core elements of the VGGT” (Windfuhr 2017:
10–11)
At the same time, the VGGT also contain market-based elements and do,
for example, fall short of a human rights approach in calling for consulta-
tions and not for FPIC as guiding principle. This is a result of international
negotiations, in which the demands for veto rights made by civil society
members were met with resistance from market-friendly actors (von Bern-
storff 2016: 59). In the Roundtable on Biofuels and the Roundtable on
Palm Oil, civil society was more successful and managed to introduce the
element of FPIC into the principles and criteria. In this way, the roundta-
bles contain details that represent a human rights perspective, even though
they are per se grounded in market-based ideas.
Second, when focusing solely on the issue of consultation or consent
rights of locally affected communities, an interesting picture appears:
Globally oriented standards like the VGGT, the World Bank PRAI and the
CFS PRAI only demand participation and consultations and are further-
more non-binding. The IFC Standards are binding for clients of banks that
subscribe to the Equator Principles and therefore have considerable reach.
However, they probably contain the softest language ‘encouraging’ negoti-
ated settlements. Finally, the two roundtables include FPIC. However,
their scope is the smallest – only being binding for companies that aim for
certification.
There is, therefore, a considerable gap in international regulatory frame-
works when it comes to decision-making power for local communities in
large-scale land deals.
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Gaps in international regulation and the question of a right to land
The previous chapter showed that different international actors created
several instruments to regulate large-scale land deals. However, none of
these instruments grants local smallholders the right to veto on the global
level. This gap has not gone unnoticed and has let to numerous calls for
the creation of new human rights – most specifically, a right to land. I will
discuss this development, which culminated in the UN Declaration on the
Rights of Peasants and Other People Living in Rural Areas (UNDROP),
which was adopted by the General Assembly in December 2018.
So far, a human right to land has not been formally recognized as a right
in itself by international human rights regimes. The right to property,
which could potentially protect smallholders from unlawful eviction,
presents one possibility to indirectly claim a right to land (De Schutter
2010: 315). However, it depends to a considerable degree on national legal
frameworks, which often define the conditions of what constitutes ‘lawful’
eviction broadly – often to the detriment of local populations (Diergarten
2019: 4). More often, a possible right to land is linked to the right to food,
as land is an essential avenue for fulfilling this right for significant parts of
the world’s rural population (De Schutter 2010: 305). Yet, due to the dif-
ferent ways in which a right to food can be interpreted, this can be prob-
lematic:
“Relying on other human rights to get at the land issue is a risky strate-
gy. […] The interpretation of the right to food for example leaves open
whether people feed themselves through direct cultivation of lands or
through an income and food distribution system. This flexible inter-
pretation has been misused to justify removing people from their lands
because they are not using land ‘sufficiently/ efficiently/sustainably’”
(Künnemann/Monsalve Suárez 2013: 139)
One way forward would be the creation of a right to land, as it has been
accorded to indigenous people through ILO Convention No 169, the UN
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and several regional hu-
man rights bodies (De Schutter 2010: 311–313). In these frameworks, in-
digenous people are granted far-reaching rights when it comes to their
land, most notably the principle of FPIC in the case of any kind of invest-
ment or development project on their domain (Diergarten 2019: 9). Usual-
ly, these rights are based on “the cultural attachment that indigenous and
tribal peoples have with their territory” (Diergarten 2019: 2), something
which is difficult to apply to all smallholders. Nonetheless, the indigenous
2.2.3
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land rights regime provides important lessons in terms of showing that
customary and collective land use rights can be protected without necessar-
ily creating individualized land titles (De Schutter 2010: 314).
To address this gap in international human rights law, civil society ac-
tors, most prominently La Via Campesina, have demanded the recognition
of peasant’s rights of which land is an important element. In 2008, the or-
ganization drafted a Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and focused its
advocacy on the UN Human Rights Council to take up the issue (Claeys
2015: 125–126). Subsequently, the Council formed an intergovernmental
working group in 2012 and adopted the final text in 2018, which was later
confirmed by the UN General Assembly. UNDROP is the first intergov-
ernmental document, which formulates a right to land for smallholders:
“Peasants and other people living in rural areas have the right to land,
individually and/or collectively, […] including the right to have access
to, sustainably use and manage land” (UN General Assembly
12/17/2018: Art. 17.1)
Article 17 of the declaration furthermore specifies that states should pro-
tect existing customary and informal tenure systems and carry out agrarian
reform to ensure equal access to land ‘where appropriate’ (UN General As-
sembly 12/17/2018: Art. 17). The declaration follows the VGGT in provid-
ing regulations in regards to investment in and exploitation of resources
used by peasants and other people living in rural areas. It demands:
“(a) A duly conducted social and environmental impact assessment;
(b) Consultations in good faith, in accordance with article 2.3 of the
present Declaration;
(c) Modalities for the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits of such
exploitation that have been established on mutually agreed terms be-
tween those exploiting the natural resources and the peasants and oth-
er people working in rural areas.” (UN General Assembly 12/17/2018:
Art. 5.2)
However, the declaration falls short of providing smallholders with a di-
rect veto right. Article 2.3 formulates the principle of “active, free, effect-
ive, meaningful and informed participation” (UN General Assembly
12/17/2018: Art. 2.3).
Overall, UNDROP presents a next step in the development of a right to
land and has certain consequences for large-scale land investments, such as
the necessity to conduct social and environmental impact assessments. Yet,
the gap of a general right for peasants and other people living in rural areas
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to veto a possible investment or development project has not been closed.
Furthermore, the declaration is non-binding and it remains unclear how it
will be taken up and used in practice.
Debate: How does the law help?
While the appropriate form of regulation in regards to large-scale land
deals was debated, a lot of skepticism appeared in terms of the usefulness
of new international regulation for the local population. Some civil society
actors and academics feared that the new standards would lead to a mere
legitimation of large-scale land deals instead of changing anything for the
better for the local population. Others argue that new rules would remain
ineffective if they were not legally binding. Again, others were more opti-
mistic, claiming that the regulations could work if implemented in the
right way. I describe these three lines of argumentation in more detail in
the first part of this chapter (chapter 2.3.1), before I turn to existing empir-
ical evidence in chapter 2.3.2. So far, the empirical evidence is mainly anec-
dotal and missing a clear theoretical background.
Theoretical arguments
The global governance responses to issues concerning large-scale land deals
outlined in chapter 2.2 triggered different kinds of reactions by civil soci-
ety members but also academics. While the Voluntary Guidelines received
generally positive feedback, market-based measures such as the World
Bank PRAI and private-sector mechanisms were criticized more heavily.
Despite different perceptions in regards to specific instruments, I can iden-
tify three over-arching arguments8: First, there is the radical position,
which argues that no large-scale land investment has positive effects for the
local population. More regulation is, therefore, not helpful as long as it
does not stop and roll back land deals (Borras et al. 2013: 170). The second
critical position focuses on the type of international law created: Only
binding regulations based on human rights can make a change on the
2.3
2.3.1
8 I identify these arguments based on underlying ideas raised by actors. It is not a
classification of individuals, activist groups or academics into categories, even
though actors might overall tend towards certain positions.
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ground. The third optimistic position expects new rules to have a positive
impact on the local population.
 
The radical position developed from a perspective that generally denounces
the ability of large-scale agriculture to feed the world and create sustain-
able economic development. The debate about large-scale land invest-
ments is understood as a fight between transnational agribusiness corpora-
tions and small-scale family farms. Large-scale land deals are regarded as
expressions for the expansion of predatory capitalism. In this view, they de-
stroy the livelihoods of the rural poor, exploit them for cheap labor and ex-
pand TNC’s control of the food chain. Only international regulation,
which stops and rolls back large-scale land deals is regarded as desirable
(Borras et al. 2013: 170–171). The most influential civil society advocate of
this position is the global peasant movement La Via Campesina. To
counter the current focus on agribusiness they suggest the concept of food
sovereignty, which aims to bring control over agricultural production back
to the local level (Borras et al. 2013: 170–171; McMichael 2015).
Apart from the food sovereignty movement, other civil society actors as
well as academics raise this fundamental critique about global regulation
of large-scale land investments. The critique focuses on two linked argu-
ments: First, global governance efforts legitimize large-scale land invest-
ments without questioning the underlying neoliberal logic. Goetz (2013)
describes this for the private sector driven Equator Principles and RSB:
“[..]both instruments engage in the construction of an understanding
of sustainability (e.g. biofuels, risk) that frames debates around how in-
vestments shall take place, while removing from consideration the far-
reaching questions of whether these investments should occur at all.”
(Goetz 2013: 204)
Similar fears were raised in regards to the World Bank PRAI (Stephens
2013) as well as the CFS RAI (Gaarde 2017: 70). Considering the human
rights-based VGGT there are fewer critical voices, although the same fear is
raised. The Civil Society Mechanism (CSM) of the Committee on World
Food Security voiced some disappointment with the VGGT:
“We deeply regret the fact the guidelines do not explicitly challenge
the untruth that large-scale investments in industrial agriculture, fish-
eries and forests are essential for development.” (CSM 2012)
This disappointment is echoed by some researchers who point out that the
VGGT can be interpreted in many different ways, which might open the
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door for more large-scale land deals (Borras et al. 2013: 172; Paoloni/
Onorati 2014: 396).
The second argument posits that global regulations do not only legit-
imize large-scale land deals but even make them easier, as they help to cre-
ate land markets. The NGO GRAIN argues: “[T]he main objective of regu-
latory processes is still to formalise land markets and titles, which experi-
ence tells us will lead to further concentration of land in the hands of few”
(GRAIN 2016: 3). In this view, policies that aim at enhancing tenure secu-
rity through formalization commodify land and make it easier for in-
vestors to acquire. Due to the socio-economic inequalities between in-
vestors and small-scale land-holders fair negotiations are not possible and
would in the end only foster further dispossession (Borras/Franco 2012: 54;
De Schutter 2011a: 268–270).
Essentially, advocates of this radical position fear that regulatory efforts
will only change the manner of large-scale land investments, which will
still be against the interests of rural populations (Borras et al. 2013).
 
The second, critical position looks at international regulation more opti-
mistically. New global instruments are regarded as a step forward to pro-
tect local interests. However, it is regarded as problematic that the regula-
tions are not binding and largely depend on the goodwill of companies
and national governments for implementation. In this view, a human
rights-based approach is regarded as the better option and existing instru-
ments are criticized for lacking accountability.
The most criticized instruments in this regard are the market-based
World Bank PRAI and private-sector mechanisms, which are based on the
logic of voluntary self-regulation by the companies themselves (The Global
Campaign for Agrarian Reform/Land Research Action Network 2010: 7).
Certification schemes can provide some kind of accountability but only
from corporations who voluntarily undergo certification (Johnson 2016:
80). In contrast to these private-sector mechanisms, the VGGT target na-
tion-states as primarily responsible. Even though the guidelines are volun-
tary, they are indirectly obligatory as they are rooted in human rights,
which nation-states are supposed to guarantee (Golay/Biglino 2013: 1643).
As states are supposed to translate the guidelines into laws and policy pro-
grams, bindingness can be created. “Regardless of these contributions, the
VGGT itself lacks accountability mechanisms, as no actors need to account
for actions they take in line with the VGGT and no actors have agreed to
be bound by its provisions.” (Johnson 2016: 77). The implementation of
the voluntary guidelines depends on the goodwill and capacities of states.
2.3 Debate: How does the law help?
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These processes can easily get co-opted by transnational corporations and
national elites and the question remains if new laws and regulations can be
efficiently enforced (Claeys/Vanloqueren 2013: 196; Narula 2013: 151).
The missing bindingness of global governance instruments to regulate
large-scale land investments is regarded as especially problematic in light
of the strong legal protection investors are guaranteed under current inter-
national investment law, usually in the form of Bilateral Investment
Treaties (BITs) signed between states. These BITs contain clauses on pro-
tecting investors not only from expropriation but also from new laws and
regulations. So-called umbrella clauses declare every breach of contract as a
breach of the BIT, making it possible for investors to call on transnational
tribunals. In consequence, the space for governments to change policies,
for example, in the realms of environmental protection or land gover-
nance, is severely limited by these treaties (Brüntrup et al. 2014: 453–457).
This investment protection regime creates a strong imbalance between in-
vestors and affected communities: While investors can easily call on an in-
ternational arbitration system – which usually also work in their favor – lo-
cal communities who might be adversely affected by an investment do not
have such a right (Johnson 2016; Cordes/Bulman 2016). This imbalance
can only be overcome with binding regulations and obligatory account-
ability mechanisms.
The third, optimistic position focuses on the positive effects new regula-
tions can have, despite their shortcomings. There are generally two argu-
ments made in this regard:
First, civil society actors can use new governance instruments to push
for favorable policies and to build up pressure vis-à-vis companies. The VG-
GT suggest that multi-stakeholder platforms are created on the regional
and national level to discuss ways of implementation. These provisions are
an entry point for NGOs and peasant representatives to demand participa-
tion in law-making processes. Furthermore, the clear anchoring of the VG-
GT in human rights language provide civil society actors with strong argu-
ments when making demands vis-à-vis a transnational corporation
(Paoloni/Onorati 2014: 398; McKeon 2013: 118; Seufert 2013: 185). In a
similar vein, private sector certification schemes can function as a reference
point. They have the potential to increase the transparency of land deals as
auditing is obligatory and reports are made public. Civil society actors can
use a company’s membership in a certification scheme as leverage to have
their claims heard (Fortin/Richardson 2013: 153–154).
Second, states but also International Financial Institutions (IFIs) can
translate voluntary guidelines into binding law and regulations, which can
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then be used by local actors. The biggest chances for implementation and
usefulness for the local population are ascribed to the Voluntary Guide-
lines. Their provisions should be translated into national law with the par-
ticipation of all relevant groups in the country (CFS 2012: para 26.2). Na-
tional legal frameworks for improved tenure security can potentially pro-
vide economic leverage for right-holders (Vermeulen/Cotula 2010: 900).
Commentators also ask International Financial Institutions to use the VG-
GT to reform their obligatory conditions for companies who rely on their
funding (Paoloni/Onorati 2014: 384). In essence, the hope is that national
laws and regulations by IFIs can turn voluntary agreements into binding
rules, which can then help the local population to protect their interests.
 
These three different positions are not mutually exclusive. Seufert, for ex-
ample, notes that small-scale food producers were disappointed that the
VGGT did not wholly rule out large-scale land investments (radical pos-
ition). However, given the reality of global governance, they did have the
feeling that they achieved a vital document they can use for their struggles
(optimistic position) (Seufert 2013: 185). Often commentators do seem to
believe in the usefulness of new global governance instruments (optimistic
position) – especially of the Voluntary Guidelines – while they simultane-
ously argue that these instruments would have a more significant impact if
they were binding (critical position).
At the same time, it is often not clear what the empirical basis for the
underlying assumptions is. What do we know about the usefulness of legal
instruments – be they international or national – for the local population?
Existing empirical research
Empirical research on the actual use of international as well as national
law by the local population affected by large-scale land investments is
rather sparse. Most of the empirical literature focusing on legal aspects of
large-scale land deals point out the shortcomings of national law or the
missing implementation of existing laws. Apart from this top-down ap-
proach, a few studies focus on how affected people actually make use of le-
gal mobilization from a bottom-up perspective. I will present these per-
spectives in the first step, before I make a short excursion into the broader
literature on local resistance against large-scale land deals. Several gaps will
appear, which I will discuss in a third step.
2.3.2
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When it comes to a top-down view on the effectiveness of existing or
new regulations, national legislation and policies are often at the center of
analysis. In Ethiopia, for example, the process of negotiating large-scale
land deals was highly centralized, giving the state the power to make deci-
sions irrespective of customary land use rights (Mulleta et al. 2014). Legal
deficiencies were also found in other Sub-Saharan African countries, such
as lacking recognition of customary land rights, missing procedures of
land demarcation and unclear provisions in regards to benefit-sharing
(Schoneveld 2017: 124; Polack et al. 2013: 19–21). At the same time, some
countries included provisions for Environmental and Social Impact Assess-
ments “modeled after international best practices” (Schoneveld 2017: 125).
Yet, capacities for implementation are often missing, a study of Schon-
eveld showed (Schoneveld 2017: 126). Existing differences in the land
tenure system between different countries (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Zambia, and
Ghana) did not change the situation on the ground:
“This study shows that despite profound differences in especially land
laws, local land users are systematically dispossessed of valuable liveli-
hood resources without redress. This highlights that regulatory frame-
works relevant to land tenure have limited bearing on outcomes.”
(Schoneveld 2017: 129)
However, the study noted that none of the four studied countries did pro-
vide affected smallholders with the right to withhold consent (Schoneveld
2017: 124).
When it comes to the issue of local participation through consultations
or consent, existing legal frameworks often only grant minimal participa-
tion rights to affected communities (Polack et al. 2013: 30). Yet, even when
progressive laws are in place, they might not have the desired outcome.
Comparative case studies from Sub-Sahara Africa find that even when ‘best
practice’ legislation is in place, community consultations and decision-
making processes were insufficient for protecting local rights. The reasons
are a lack of proper implementation due to missing capacities of state ac-
tors but also the power of customary authorities, who did not make deci-
sions in the interests of the local population (Vermeulen/Cotula 2010; Ger-
man et al. 2013). Legal provisions and the actual practice are often far apart
(German et al. 2013; Nolte/Väth 2015). And, better protection of tenure
rights might simply not be sufficient in itself to protect the interests of af-
fected people, who are in a weak position to negotiate with the companies
(Vermeulen/Cotula 2010).
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"This raises the question of whether legal frameworks are of limited ef-
fectiveness due to deficiencies in design and enforcement, or whether
similar outcomes occur through diverse pathways." (German et al.
2013: 14)
On a positive note, some authors suggest that large-scale land investment
deals can be a driver for legal innovation, either through creating pressure
on national legislators (Nolte/Väth 2015; Alden Wily 2014) or through a
subsequent questioning of customary authorities (Bottazzi et al. 2016). De-
spite these possible positive legal innovations, research in this field leads to
skepticism about the decisive role of legal reform for smallholders affected
by large-scale land deals.
This top-down view on the law and its effects for local actors should be
complemented with a bottom-up perspective:
“Ultimately, much depends on how legal frameworks are appropriated
and used by citizens in their accountability strategies. Promising legal
entries may remain underutilised – or citizen action may push the
boundaries of applicable law.” (Polack et al. 2013: 30)
On the one hand, it is noted that local actors often lack the capacities to
claims their rights and involve the judiciary system (Schoneveld 2017:
128). On the other hand, several case studies show that local actors are tak-
ing measures to claim their rights through litigation, calling on adminis-
trations to enforce the law or using customary rules. Grajales (2015) de-
scribes how activists called on the Constitutional Court of Colombia as
well as the Interamerican Human Rights Court and Commission in the
case of large-scale land investments in Colombia. The courts acknowl-
edged that agribusiness investors had greatly profited from forced displace-
ment through militias, a finding which was useful for further mobilizing
efforts of displaced people and civil society (Grajales 2015). Research on
mobilization efforts by the Q´eqchi´ indigenous people in Guatemala
shows the importance of forming alliances for strategic litigation. The re-
sistance against oil palm and sugar cane investors included a variety of sup-
port strategies from different allies:
“Strategic litigation involves grounded practices of resistance exerting
pressure ‘from below’, together with politico-juridical advocacy ‘from
above’, and support from research and social communication ‘from
the sides’.” (Alonso-Fradejas 2015: 506)
Other cases show how legal argumentation was part of the resistance strat-
egy of local actors towards an investing company. In Laos, a village affect-
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ed by a Chinese rubber plantation used legal argumentation and channels
to state officials alongside other resistance mechanisms such as withhold-
ing labor or sabotage. The cooperation with state actors was regarded as
highly relevant by the observing researcher: “By working within state
structures rather than by open confrontation or acts of violence, the Khmu
have thus far been able to stall the establishment of the plantation on their
lands." (McAllister 2015: 834). This might be especially relevant in a con-
text like Laos where open protests are difficult to organize (McAllister
2015: 828). Customary law can also play a role: In a case in Madagascar a
local politician was sanctioned with exile (which was later revoked) after
having signed land away without having consulted relevant customary
leaders (Gingembre 2015: 572). The evidence from these case studies shows
that legal mobilization by local actors does take place; however, success
conditions were not at the center of analysis of these studies.
Apart from single case studies, Polack et al. (2013) put together a review
of cases in which legal mechanisms – they refer to accountability mechan-
isms – were used by local actors and their allies. They looked at 16 cases
from 12 different countries across Sub-Sahara Africa, relying on media and
NGO reports. They describe a range of actors who are involved in citizen
action: National and international NGOs were key supporters for affected
people, while peasant movements mainly played a role in francophone
West-Africa (Polack et al. 2013: 34). Local actors used a range of strategies
– most notably, the writing of letters of complaint and petitions aimed at
state authorities. In two cases, civil society actors called on the grievance
mechanism of the Round Table on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO), while
five cases were brought in front of a court. These formal mechanisms did
accomplish marginal improvements but also failed at times: In one of the
RSPO cases, the company simply withdrew from the Roundtable and for-
went certification (Polack et al. 2013: 40–41).
Overall, the success of the action undertaken by local actors remains
somewhat unclear in the review. In three cases, renegotiations with the
company took place; however, the outcome unknown. Three investment
projects were abandoned, though this was explained by economic difficul-
ties and not necessarily resistance by locals. In this regard, the review could
not provide explanations, but rather pointed out a gap in the literature:
“The literature that documents citizen action has not systematically
analysed the actors action-outcome chain of causation. This desk-based
study does not therefore attempt to draw conclusions on causal rela-
tions between specific actors or strategies and outcomes, which more
2. Large-scale land deals: overview and debates
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in-depth comparative field research methods would tackle more effec-
tively.” (Polack et al. 2013: 31)
While the literature which focuses specifically on the role of legal argu-
ments, representation or legal institutions in large-scale land deals is rather
sparse, more research exists around resistance more generally (Hall et al.
2015). Parts of this literature builds on conceptualizations of peasant resis-
tance (Moreda 2015; Kandel 2015; Martiniello 2015) and focuses on forms
of ‘everyday resistance’. The term describes little uncoordinated acts of in-
dividual defiance, for example, foot-dragging, pilfering or slander (Scott
1985: 27). Yet, these local and often spontaneous acts are often not visible
to outsiders (Borras/Franco 2013: 1725).
When organized forms of collective contention appear, local actors are
often linking to national and international allies, many times NGOs or
transnational agrarian movements (Rocheleau 2015; Temper 2019). These
processes and possible difficulties developing the cooperation with NGOs
are further studied (Larder 2015; Gilfoy 2015). Yet, the literature usually
does not systematically inquire about the conditions under which these
mobilizations are successful. Nonetheless, effective networks (Rutten et al.
2017) are usually mentioned as well as economic pressures on companies:
“Activism against companies has shown to be most successful when it
impacts upon profit or previsions of future profit (often related to rep-
utation with specific audiences), scaring investment and increasing
risk for investors.” (Temper 2019: 202)
So far, only one case study specifically focused on the role of the company
in explaining its reactions to critique (Salverda 2018). The European in-
vestor in Zambia studied, was highly aware of the ‘land grabbing’ debate,
tried to avoid potentially contentious behavior, and applied the VGGT.
The case shows that ‘the countermovement’ to large-scale land deals can
have positive effects on investors, who might over time “feel ‘obliged’ to
respond and/or may become even more open to (some of) the concerns
raised” (Salverda 2018: 13). However, in order to understand variation be-
tween different responses, “much more investigation on the ground is
needed” (Salverda 2018: 14).
 
Reviewing the arguments made in regards to international regulation and
the existing empirical evidence presented in this chapter gaps become visi-
ble.
First, existing evidence seems to indicate that legal improvements in re-
gards to local rights in large-scale land deals do not automatically lead to
2.3 Debate: How does the law help?
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better outcomes for affected communities. At the same time, case studies
find that local actors can successfully pursue their goals by claiming their
rights through administrations, courts or other state institutions. It, there-
fore, becomes clear that the most relevant question is not whether new
laws and regulation provide local communities with better outcomes, but
rather under which conditions this can happen. This is the research
question this dissertation addresses (as discussed in chapter 1): Under
which conditions can local actors successfully pursue their goals through
legal mobilization?
Second, the literature that uses a bottom-up perspective on local actors
employing legal means, focuses on individual cases and does not, apart
from the overview by Polack et al., include systematic comparisons. The re-
view by Polack et al. does provide evidence from several cases; however,
these are not theorized systematically. As pointed out earlier, they are not
able to provide causal explanations. There is, therefore, a need for a system-
atic comparative analysis, which is able to identify some causal relations.
Third, the broader literature on resistance against large-scale land deals
points to the importance of civil society networks for successful campaigns
in influencing the investor. Yet, most of the studies do not focus specifical-
ly on explaining success or failure of resistance. Furthermore, there is only
one study that analyses the responses of a company more closely. Differ-
ences in company reactions have not been analyzed by this literature,
which is another gap this dissertation will address.
The remainder of this dissertation will deal with these three gaps
through creating a heuristic framework, which will then guide a systemat-
ic case comparison. The framework will consider three perspectives: A le-
gal, a social mobilization and a business management perspective. As there
is no linear relationship between existing laws and better outcomes for lo-
cal communities, a configurational approach, which considers causal com-
plexity, seems especially fitting. I will further elaborate on this framework
in the next chapter.
2. Large-scale land deals: overview and debates
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A multi-perspective framework on legal mobilization
success
This chapter develops a multi-perspective framework that will help me to
answer my research question. The framework and core concepts should be
broad and flexible enough to be usable in different empirical contexts but
provide some first suggestion for explanatory conditions. As I ask a y-cen-
tered research question (how the outcome can be explained), I am faced
with a myriad of possible conditions. To narrow possible conditions down,
I view my research question through the lens of a simple bargaining model
and three theoretical perspectives: A legal, a social mobilization and a busi-
ness management perspective. In this way, I integrate different research
fields, which – I argue – is necessary to understand the dynamics between
local actors and foreign companies.
At the outset of my framework, it is necessary to clarify my metatheoret-
ical considerations (chap 3.1). In the next step, I construct company-com-
munity relations as an ongoing bargaining process, which sheds light on
the asymmetrical power relations that are often at play in interactions be-
tween local actors and foreign investors (chap 3.2). Chapter 3.3 then intro-
duces the three theoretical perspectives on answering my research question
and central models discussed in the respective literature. Chapter 3.4 final-
ly combines these three perspectives into one framework and suggests cen-
tral conditions. Finally, chapter 3.5 summarizes the framework, discusses
its limits as well as its reach.
Metatheoretical considerations
Before starting to map out my analytical framework, I will discuss two ba-
sic assumptions and meta-theoretical considerations. First, (chap 3.1.1), my
framework assumes that social actors act according to what is rational for
them. I employ the concept of bounded rationality, which for me has two
implications: First, actors always act in spaces of imperfect information
and second, what is rational is defined by cultural socialization of actors.
In consequence, what is rational behavior for a company might not be ra-
tional for an affected local community. Second (chap 3.1.2), my theoretical
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sume that causal mechanisms can be identified, I believe that relevant con-
ditions appear in different configurations, which can lead to the same or
different outcomes.
Bounded rationality
My research question deals with human behavior: What do local actors do?
How do they use legal mobilization? What does the company do? Do they
give in or ignore claims of affected communities? Consequently, I need an
underlying idea of how social behavior can be explained. I use the concept
of bounded rationality, which assumes that actors act according to what is
rational to them, even though that might not follow purely maximum util-
ity assumptions.
The concept of bounded rationality was introduced as a more realistic
version of the utility-maximizing understanding of rationality:
“Bounded rationality is simply the idea that the choices people make
are determined not only by some consistent overall goal and the prop-
erties of the external world, but also by the knowledge that decision
makers do and don't have of the world, their ability or inability to
evoke that knowledge when it is relevant, to work out the conse-
quences of their actions, to conjure up possible courses of action, to
cope with uncertainty (including uncertainty deriving from the possi-
ble responses of other actors), and to adjudicate among their many
competing wants.” (Simon 2000: 25)
For my dissertation, it is not necessary to go into more detail about the var-
ious ways in which bounded rationality and behavioral choice theories
have been modeled, theorized and studied empirically (Jones 2003;
Gigerenzer/Selten 2002). Instead, I rather use the concept to think about
two boundaries of maximum optimizing decision-making in cases of large-
scale land deals: Insufficient information processing capabilities and the
socio-cultural socialization of actors.
All human decisions are made in settings of insufficient information, as
actors do usually not hold universal knowledge about their complex envi-
ronments. However, even if they possessed the most relevant information
to make a cost-benefit calculation, cognitive constraints will keep actors
from doing so in a rational-maximizing way. First, actors might simply
lack the expertise and the knowledge to interpret available information
and draw conclusions. Furthermore, people often follow ‘wishful think-
3.1.1
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ing’ and ignore information that counters their preferences and wishes for
the future. Essentially, “[w]e see what we want to see” (Skovgaard Poulsen
2015: 17). In addition, actors often chose ‘default options’ over alterna-
tives, which might be more beneficial but more complicated to achieve.
Overall, instead of carefully weighing pros and cons, social actors often
take cognitive shortcuts, which might result in less favorable outcomes
(Skovgaard Poulsen 2015: 17–25).
These dynamics can undoubtedly be found in large-scale land deals:
They are often closed in a hasty manner, miss transparency and affected
communities often only receive insufficient information (Cotula/
Vermeulen 2011: 44). In many cases, locals lack full awareness of the impli-
cations – both positive and negative – when signing large-scale land deals.
Furthermore, rural communities in developing countries often lack ‘viable
economic alternatives’ (Rutten et al. 2017: 8) and the legal and economic
expertise to judge an investment. As a consequence, they might sign a land
deal to get the lease money even though it might not be high enough to
cover the value that is lost through leasing the land (Millar 2015: 1708).
Cognitive shortcuts also apply to companies’ decision-making. A high
number of failed agricultural investment projects (GRAIN 2018) and
projects, which are struggling financially9, shows that investing companies
often fail to make proper cost-benefit calculations themselves. Problems
are caused, among others, by host country policies, missing infrastructure,
missing access to finance, land disputes and management issues (World
Bank 2014: 17). Studies show that “from the perspective of the investor,
land acquisition is unlikely to be the most profitable business model” (Liu
2014: iv), yet companies pursue them. A purely rationalist-optimizing view
on human behavior would therefore not be able to explain both the behav-
ior of investors and affected communities.
 
If people use cognitive shortcuts to make decisions, how are these short-
cuts shaped? One crucial element is cultural socialization. In this context,
culture can be understood as:
“[T]he ideas, values, beliefs, behavioral strategies, perceptual models,
and organizational structures that reside in individual brains, which
can be learned by other individuals through imitation, observation,
9 A study surveying 39 mature agricultural investment projects in Africa and South-
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(plus inference), interaction, discussion, and/or teaching” (Henrich et
al. 2002: 344)
Oftentimes, groups share a similar culture, but we can also find subcul-
tures and differences among groups. At the same time, culture is nothing
fixed but can evolve and change over time. Cultural socialization leads to
individuals taking certain cognitive shortcuts, which are in line with their
distinctive cultural norms when making decisions (Henrich et al. 2002).
Frequently, culture is linked to geographic spaces. However, certain narra-
tives or assumptions can also be found transnationally. Severine Autessere
for example showed that interveners, who work in peacebuilding interven-
tions often follow the same or similar assumptions about how peacebuild-
ing is supposed to work, regardless of their country of origin. They have
been socialized into a specific work environment (Autesserre 2017: 120).
For the context of large-scale land investments, this means that not only
the different cultures of origin and host country meet but also the different
cultures found in a transnational corporation versus the way an investment
is understood locally. Foreign agricultural investors often believe in the su-
periority of agribusiness over small-scale farming (Schönweger/Messerli
2015; Neef 2014: 195) and in their ability to contribute to development in
poorer countries through economic rationality and technology (Calvano
2008: 798). Local communities, on the other hand, usually interpret
transnational corporations and the promises made according to their cul-
tural framework. Through ethnographic research in a large-scale land deal
in Sierra Leone, Gearoid Millar showed that affected communities inter-
preted their relationship with the company through the lens of the existing
patron-client system. Local people perceived the transnational investors as
one of the patrons, who will ‘help’ them, and expected all kinds of benefits
(Millar 2014: 72–78). In many instances, transnational corporations are
perceived by local communities as being “insensitive to their non-econo-
mic needs” (Calvano 2008: 798). The meeting of different ‘cultures’ with
their underlying norms, ideas and assumptions, poses a considerable chal-
lenge to investor-community relations and can easily lead to misunder-
standings.
Overall, my concept of bounded rationality is built on the finding that
humans use cognitive shortcuts in decision-making. One decisive factor for
how an actor evaluates a situation is their cultural socialization containing
certain norms and assumptions about the world. At the same time, this
does not mean that outside factors and the environment do not play a role.
I assume that causal conditions can be identified as relevant for certain
choices. Yet, the concept of bounded rationality does show me that I have
3. A multi-perspective framework on legal mobilization success
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to consider the characteristics of social actors when theorizing about their
decision-making.
Configurational thinking
Configurational thinking, also referred to as set-relational, is often the ba-
sis of qualitative research, even if it is not made explicit (Ragin 2010: 2).
On the most basic level, it rests on the assumption that social outcomes
can be explained by a number of interrelated conditions, which can work
differently in different contexts. Using this line of thinking in my disserta-
tion enables me to identify causal mechanisms, while at the same time tak-
ing seriously the various settings in which large-scale land deals take place.
Configurational understanding of causation developed in differentiation
to dominant quantitative research. Central to quantitative thinking is the
idea of independent causal factors, which can be analytically separated (Ra-
gin 2010: 112), and, which have a symmetric correlatory effect: “an in-
crease in the independent variable prompts an increase in the dependent
variable and […] a decrease in the independent variable coincides with a
decrease of the dependent variable” (Rohlfing 2012: 47–48). In contrast, a
configurational approach is interested in how conditions produce different
outcomes in different combinations and contexts (Ragin 2010: 114). Addi-
tionally, symmetry is not assumed: Just because a condition causes a partic-
ular outcome, does not mean that the outcome would not be there if the
condition would be absent (Ragin 2010: 15).
The underlying assumptions of configurational thinking can be
summed up (Blatter/Haverland 2012: 80):
– “almost all social outcomes are the result of a combination of
causal factors;
– there are divergent pathways to similar social outcomes (equifinali-
ty); and
– the effects of the same causal factor can be different in different
contexts and combinations (causal heterogeneity).”
By focusing on the complexity of individual cases, configurational think-
ing is more holistic and more focused on ‘how’ things take place (Ragin
2010: 109). Instead of speaking about variables, configurational thinking
uses the terms conditions and outcomes.
As such, configurational thinking helps me with my research question,
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pirical research is not conclusive under which conditions a more favorable
legal situation can help local actors in protecting their interests. There is
no linear relationship between legal reform and better outcomes for local
actors, even though policymakers and academics assume some kind of
link. At the same time, the contexts and the characteristics of large-scale
land investments vary considerably. Identifying central success conditions
and their combinations, which might play a different role in different set-
tings, seems to be fitting. It enables me to point out relevant factors, which
should be taken into consideration by other researchers as well as by poli-
cymakers, without making overly simplistic predictions and denying the
social complexity of each case (Berg-Schlosser et al. 2009: 6).
In consequence, my research does not aim to identify the ‘net effect’ of a
factor but instead focuses on ‘causal complexity’ (Ragin 2010: 6). Overall,
the aim of my research is to identify “different contexts and conditions
that enable or disable” (Ragin 2010: 5) local actors in successfully using le-
gal mobilization vis-à-vis TNCs.
The final objective of a configurational approach is to identify “the
causally relevant conditions that combine to produce a given outcome”
(Ragin 2010: 109), also referred to as the configuration. These configura-
tions can be expressed through formulas, but can also be depicted in so-
called truth tables.
In many cases, configurational thinking implies the use of Qualitative
Comparative Analysis (QCA). However, instead of applying QCA in my
analysis, the configurational approach supplies me with a causal logic and
a language, which will help me to systematize my empirical findings.
A bargaining lens towards company-community relations
My framework rests on the assumption that local actors and transnational
corporations investing in their land find themselves in an interactive and
ongoing bargaining situation (Rutten et al. 2017; Shohibuddin et al. 2016).
This chapter will introduce this approach (chap 3.2.1) and discuss the con-
sequences such an approach has for answering my research question (chap
3.2.2).
3.2
3. A multi-perspective framework on legal mobilization success
70
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748907602, am 02.12.2021, 19:08:03
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Background: bargaining theory
This chapter provides a short overview of bargaining theory. I use the theo-
ry as a heuristic tool that provides me with a particular lens on communi-
ty-company relations; therefore, I do not go into details on bargaining
strategies or game-theoretical modeling. Instead, I focus on the conceptual-
ization of bargaining power and asymmetrical bargaining situations,
which is most relevant for thinking about large-scale land deals. Instead of
only looking at actual negotiations, I use the bargaining approach to de-
scribe the whole situation.
Generally, a bargaining situation emerges between two parties who need
to negotiate about something to achieve the desired outcome. Central to
the definition of a bargaining situation is the interdependence of two ac-
tors, which can take the form of competition over scarce resources (Lewic-
ki et al. 1997: 31). Yet, these situations are also an “opportunity to collab-
orate for mutual benefit” (Nash 1950: 155).
In the literature, the classic example to describe simple bargaining situa-
tions is a buyer-seller setting, where two actors bargain for a price (Lewicki
et al. 1997: 32; Hopmann 1998: 56). Speaking in abstract terms, actor A
(the buyer) prefers a price at point a, whereas actor B’s (the seller) optimal
outcome would be price b. However, both actors would be able to agree
on a different price, but only to a certain point – the resistance point.
These are marked with a` and b` along the issue dimension.
a a` b b` 
Basic bargaining situation
(adapted from Hopmann 1998: 55)
The resistance point is determined by the Best Alternative To a Negotiated
Agreement (BATNA), meaning the point at which no agreement would be
more favorable for an actor than agreeing to any kind of outcome. Fisher
and Ury, who coined the term, argue that knowing one’s BATNA is vital
in protecting actors against deals, which harm them. In these instances,
leaving the negotiations is a better option (Fisher/Ury 2012: 99–102). All
agreements between a and a` would be an acceptable outcome for A,
while all points between b and b’ would leave B better off than without an
agreement. The space between b’ and a’ is the bargaining space in which a
3.2.1
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mutually beneficial agreement can be reached. The bargaining process it-
self is then described as a process of offers and concessions until the two
parties reach a settlement point, which is (ideally) located in the bargain-
ing space, therefore leaving both parties better off than without an agree-
ment (Fisher/Ury 2012: 32–33).
 
This model is overly simplistic in two regards: First, issues are usually far
more complex and might not easily fit on a continuum (Hopmann 1998:
76). Second, the model implies rational choice actors, for whom we could
objectively identify a mutually beneficial arrangement. However, as de-
scribed in chapter 3.1.1, actors usually decide in situations of imperfect in-
formation and according to their own cognitive biases. Nonetheless, I can
use the model as a lens for viewing relations between local actors and com-
panies and reflect upon their bargaining power.
From a bargaining perspective, power is relational and based on depen-
dence. In this relational understanding, the power actor A has over actor B
is the dependence B has on A in fulfilling its goals (Emerson 1962). Bal-
anced relationships are those relationships in which the dependence on
each other is more or less equal, while a difference in dependence marks
asymmetrical relations. In line with my bounded rationality approach, so-
cial actors cannot have an objective understanding of how much power
they have over another actor; instead, they have perceptions about their
power relations. At the same time, material factors still play a role (Zart-
man/Rubin 2000: 13). Essentially, perceived power is essential for actors’
behavior but is also linked to the material reality of the world. Power per-
ceptions usually build on considerations about the distribution of capabili-
ties and resources (Rubin/Zartman 1995: 350).
Research shows that power differences usually have important implica-
tions. It is generally accepted that more powerful parties are more likely to
have their interests addressed, while the demands of the weaker party are
not considered. Strong actors are less incentivized to care about the inter-
ests of lower-power parties, which in turn are more reluctant about voicing
their views (Wolfe/McGinn 2005: 4–7). Nonetheless, there is some evi-
dence that weaker actors are at times able to change the power relations
and might reach a favorable agreement (Rubin/Zartman 1995: 357). In
some cases, ideologies of resistance (weapons of the weak), in which the
weaker party acts assertively and forms coalitions with other weak actors,
can help to overcome power imbalances (Rubin/Zartman 1995: 352). Be-
sides, awareness for interdependence enhances the motivation to search for
mutually beneficial agreements. Actors realize that it will help their
3. A multi-perspective framework on legal mobilization success
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prospects if they help the other party to achieve their goal (Wolfe/McGinn
2005: 15).
Overall, the research shows that power imbalances often result in a bet-
ter outcome for the powerful party; however, power relations and their
perceptions are not set in stone and can be changed throughout a bargain-
ing process.
Local actors – TNC relationship: an interactive bargaining process
A bargaining lens helps me to theorize the relationship between local ac-
tors and foreign investors. It makes visible power potentials but also power
asymmetries between the two parties. However, the notion of a bargaining
situation implies two preconditions: First, there needs to be actual possibil-
ities for interaction between local actors and transnational corporations.
Second, interdependence between the two actors has to exist. I will show
that these two preconditions are met in most cases of large-scale land deals
before I discuss the issue of bargaining power.
The first precondition is usually fulfilled, even though in some cases on-
ly at later stages of the investment when operations have started. Local ac-
tors, even though it might only be a minimal number of people, are usual-
ly consulted at some point of a large-scale land deal (Vermeulen/Cotula
2010: 907). These consultations are often not very inclusive, fair or broad
(Cotula/Vermeulen 2011); nonetheless, they can present a window of op-
portunity in which local actors can actively negotiate for a better lease
agreement or deny the signature.
Even when there are no or only limited consultations before a lease
agreement, more interactions are inevitable once the investor starts opera-
tions. Local communities often live on or close to the plantations. They are
a source of labor, but they are also affected by the plantations in terms of
pollution, reduced access to land and water sources. Contestation against
company operations, inter or intra-community conflicts as well as commu-
nity-government conflicts occur in many places (Borras/Franco 2013:
1730). Companies usually make changes to their initial plans and try to
adapt to the local conditions. Rather than seeing large-scale land invest-
ment deals as a fixed deal, which is then simply implemented, it makes
more sense to conceptualize them as an interactive and ongoing bargain-
ing process (Shohibuddin et al. 2016: 109).
The second precondition, interdependence between the two actors, is
mostly met as well: Transnational corporations depend on the cooperation
3.2.2
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of local actors not just to gain access to the land, but also to keep a planta-
tion running. When starting consultations with local actors, TNCs have
usually invested considerably in a project. They have, in many cases, al-
ready signed an agreement with the host government about a particular
area, and have started exploration. The more the company has invested in
a proposed investment, the more ‘location-dependent’ (Cotula 2009: 79)
they are on local actors, who could, in some way or the other, deny them
access to land. Local actors can potentially sabotage plantation equipment
or infer considerable reputational costs through national and international
campaigns. Even more, investing companies rely on the active cooperation
of the local population to recruit labor or to combat bush fires.
Local actors often strive to profit from rents, jobs and corporate social
responsibility projects (Borras/Franco 2013: 1735). At times, they also want
the investor to leave. For both goals, they are dependent on the actions of
the transnational corporation. In most instances, local actors do not have
the option of choosing between different investors, weakening their bar-
gaining power (Vermeulen/Cotula 2010: 913). Still, both sides are depen-
dent on each other in fulfilling their goals. A large-scale land investment
can consequently be conceptualized as a bargaining situation between a
transnational corporation and local communities (Rutten et al. 2017), even
if it often is a asymmetrical one.
The described interdependence between local actors and investing firms
shows that both sides hold some degree of bargaining power. Companies
are dependent on the local population for land, labor and the functioning
of the plantations. In contrast, local communities are dependent on the fi-
nancial investment, jobs and other development opportunities represented
by the company. Yet, in reality, the power is usually distributed asymmet-
rically. Local populations affected by foreign large-scale land investments
are usually marked by socio-economic or political marginalization. Despite
the trend of urbanization worldwide, most of the world’s poorest and
food-insecure people live in rural areas (Borras 2009: 6–7). It is in this con-
text that many land deals in developing countries emerge.
Local actors often welcome investors initially, as they are desperate for
any kind of investment and financial capital. However, local understand-
ings of lease or contract growing agreements and their consequences are
often limited (Cotula/Vermeulen 2011: 44). At the same time, TNCs come
equipped with international legal advice (Vermeulen/Cotula 2010: 913)
and usually the backing of national elites (Keene et al. 2015). In these situa-
tions, community members often feel that they do not have the option to
reject a proposed lease agreement, even when they are consulted (Gingem-
3. A multi-perspective framework on legal mobilization success
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bre 2015: 566). They express that they might simply not be powerful
enough to fight for their interests as this account of an Ethiopian small-
holder shows: “We cannot wrestle with these rich investors… we know
that they have a link with and support from the government. If we wrestle
with them, it is obvious that we will lose” (Ethiopian smallholder cited in
Moreda 2015: 527). This view represents many accounts of large-scale land
deals, in which local smallholders do face a powerful outside investor.
By constructing large-scale land deals as a bargaining situation, the em-
phasis is put on opportunities for local actors to improve their position,
while at the same time considering the existing power differences. Rather
than seeing local communities as mere victims of neoliberal expansion in-
to rural spaces, their agency is stressed. They become central actors, who
hold considerable power but are often not able to translate the power into
a more favorable outcome. Against this theoretical background, my re-
search question can be read in a new light: How do local actors use legal
mobilization as a way to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis com-
panies?
local actors investing company 
    
       legal mobilization 
ongoing bargaining process 
The research question
In order to answer the question, I will now turn to three different perspec-
tives on this question.
Three theoretical perspectives
Three theoretical perspectives follow the basic bargaining model and my
research question. As I am interested in legal mobilization, a legal perspec-
tive is the most obvious choice. This perspective suggests that a favorable
legal opportunity structure should translate into legal mobilization success
for local actors (chap 3.3.1). However, this rather static view needs to be
complemented by taking the agency and interaction of local actors and in-
vesting companies into account. I consequently discuss a social mobiliza-
Figure 2
3.3
3.3 Three theoretical perspectives
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tion perspective on the characteristics and activities of local actors (chap
3.3.2), before I introduce a business management perspective with the use
of the stakeholder salience model (chap 3.3.3).
Legal perspective
The first and probably most apparent perspective is on legal norms.
Viewed from such a perspective, local actors should be successful in their
legal mobilization attempts if the law is on their side. Laws that protect
formal and informal tenure rights, grant smallholders veto power and en-
sure that contracts are none-exploitative should lead to investments that
are more favorable to the local population and help local actors in achiev-
ing their goals. I use the term legal opportunity structure (LOS) from the
legal mobilization literature to refer to the opportunities presented by laws
and regulations. After introducing the term, I will offer a conceptualiza-
tion of the LOS, which will help to describe the potential ‘menu’ for the
legal mobilization attempts of local actors.
The concept of legal opportunity structure (LOS) draws heavily on the
concept of the political opportunity structure (Vanhala 2012: 526–527).
The general idea behind the political opportunity structure is that an open
political system creates more opportunities for societal actors to influence
state policies than a more closed system (Hilson 2002: 242). Similarly, “the
LOS represents the degree of openness or accessibility of a legal system to
the social and political goals and tactics of individuals and/or collective ac-
tors” (Vanhala 2012: 527). It asks “what may be litigated, who can litigate
and where and when such litigation can occur” and focuses on “the practi-
cal and strategic situation within which groups decide whether or not to
become active in the legal arena” (Vanhala 2012: 526–527). Studies of legal
opportunities suggest that a favorable LOS makes it more likely for social
movements to choose legal measures instead of other strategies (Hilson
2002; Fazio 2012) and can potentially help marginalized groups advance
their political interests (Wilson/Rodríguez Cordero 2006). Different stud-
ies have different understandings of the legal opportunity structure. Some
use the term broadly to include a movement’s identity (Jacquot/Vitale
2014), the strength of one’s own allies, the strength of the opponent and
existing cultural and legal framings and counter-framings (Andersen
2009). In contrast, I use a narrow approach to LOS representing the legal
norms in a country, its statutory law, customary law, policies and legal de-
cisions.
3.3.1
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Even though I only include legal elements in my understanding of the
legal opportunity structure, I still follow a broad understanding of legality,
as outlined in chapter 1.1. This comprehensive understanding of legality
enables me to not only focus on national laws but also to include custom-
ary and local regulations, which might not be formalized but are under-
stood locally as binding rules. Furthermore, I can add ‘non-state soft law’
(Olsson 2013: 190), which is necessary if I want to consider the potential
role of private-sector driven regulation like certification schemes. In this
way, I follow a pluralistic understanding of the legal setup:
“[T]he legal order is pluralistic rather than monolithic. Not only is of-
ficial state law a maze of diverse, indeterminate, and often contradicto-
ry legal traditions, but in addition a multitude of relatively au-
tonomous ‘indigenous’ law traditions contend for preeminence within
the many subculture and institutional terrains of society“ (McCann
1994: 8)
The following categorization is only one possibility to get some order into
these overlapping webs of legal norms. I will use two dimensions to do so:
the degree of formalization and the different levels of law.
The degree of formalization considers the legal nature of the source of
law. In international law, this differentiation is often referred to as ‘hard’
and ‘soft’ law (Blutman 2010). Treaties between states are considered hard
law, as they are a “form of legal source recognized by international law”10
(Blutman 2010: 606). In contrast, soft law refers to norms that might be of
legal relevance, which are, however, not expressed in a formal legal source
such as a convention (Olsson 2013: 185).
However, even international binding mechanisms are not necessarily
‘hard law’ in a very narrow sense, because “in the international realm, even
binding judicial channels typically lack effective enforcement authority”
(Graubart 2008: 33). A clear distinction between hard and soft law is conse-
quently often difficult and it makes more sense to think of the differentia-
tion as a continuum rather than as a dichotomy.
Generally, private governance initiatives by companies, the financial sec-
tor or civil society actors are not highly formalized, as they are typically not
globally obligatory. Some refer to these initiatives as ‘non-law’, as they are
not adopted by states; however, there seems to be an “increasingly blurred
boundary between the public and private domains” (Olsson 2013: 190),
10 Usually this is understood to mean the sources officially listed by art 38(1) of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice (Olsson 2013: 185).
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making the distinction between international ‘law’ and ‘non-law’ problem-
atic. An example of hybrid forms of governance are the private sector driv-
en sustainability standards like the RSB and the RSPO principles. They are
among several certification schemes, which are accepted by the European
Union to import biofuel. While companies, who want to import biomass
to the EU, can choose from a number of certification schemes, certification
is obligatory. The combination of the private sector initiatives and the EU
regulations make up a public-private hybrid regime (Schleifer 2013). In
consequence, I do not exclude private sector driven regulatory frameworks
but simply think of them as less formalized rules.
I use the dimension of formalization not only for the international level
but also for the national and sub-state level.
Using the degree of formalization for the national realm has the advan-
tage that I do not solely focus on statutory laws, which might not contain
regulations for foreign investment in land. Instead, it is often other policy
documents such as investment policies, which do formulate rules for for-
eign investors, for example, regarding local consultation procedures, rent
payments or tax exemptions (Cotula/Vermeulen 2011: 41–45). These regu-
lations might be exact and even obligatory to a certain extent. However,
they are usually less formalized.
On the local level, using a broad understanding of law allows me to in-
clude customary law, which locally governs land tenure issues in many
countries, especially in Sub-Sahara Africa (Peters 2013). Customary tenure
rights are often not formalized, meaning that the state does not officially
recognize them. Nonetheless, they might be highly institutionalized with-
in local social relations and provide locals with local security of tenure
(FAO 2002: 11). It consequently makes sense to include these locally un-
derstood rules in regards to land rights in the conceptualization of the le-
gal opportunity structure – while at the same time making clear that they
are less formalized than national statutory law.
Overall, large-scale land-based investments cut across these different lev-
els of law, which are often interconnected in complex ways. Typically, a
contract about the land concession is closed with the national government
but has to be specified in agreements with local authorities or landowners.
Different government authorities might play a role in the negotiation and
implementation phases such as special investment promotion agencies,
land and trade ministries, environmental oversight offices as well as local
or chiefdom authorities (Cotula/Vermeulen 2011: 42).
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In order to systematize the existing complexity, I suggest the following
table, which captures both the level of regulation (local, national, interna-
tional) as well as the degree of formalization (high-low).
Conceptualization of the legal opportunity structure
 
 Degree of formalization 
 














IOs or private 
sector) 






Local customary law 
As a heuristic tool, the table helps to get an overview of the potential for
legal mobilization. Here, first gaps might already appear in many in-
stances. For example, so far, “[n]o African country has established in its na-
tional legislation the principle of free, prior and informed consent” (Cotu-
la/Vermeulen 2011: 46). At the same time, missing institutional opportuni-
ties on one level could potentially be compensated by referring to another
level (Hilson 2002: 239). “In other words, groups employ international law
when using local laws is not enough. International law, then, provides ex-
tra political leverage to domestic social movements” (Massoud 2006: 10).
However, if local actors are able to mobilize international law depends, of
course, on additional factors – first and foremost, the mobilization capaci-
ties of local actors, which I will deal with in the following chapter.
Table 3
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Social mobilization perspective
A social mobilization perspective focuses on the capacities of local actors
to access and use the legal opportunity structure. The perspective denies an
overly simplistic legal view that the existence of particular legal norms
automatically has an inevitable outcome. Instead, “laws are interpreted,
disputed and implemented by numerous state and non-state actors at mul-
tiple levels, beginning with the very local” (Franco 2008a: 992). The exis-
tence of favorable laws does not imply that social actors are automatically
able or willing to apply them (Vanhala 2012: 528). To the contrary, there
are considerable barriers to using legal mobilization – such as missing
knowledge and missing resources. I discuss these challenges in the context
of large-scale land deals before I turn to the mobilization of networks as a
way to overcome these barriers. I will introduce the boomerang model as a
specific way to conceptualize the role of support networks.
 
The first and probably most apparent barrier to accessing legal norms is
knowledge. If you don’t know about the laws, regulations and procedures,
you cannot refer to them. The concept of legal empowerment, which de-
scribes “the process through which the poor become protected and are en-
abled to use the law to advance their rights and their interests” (Commis-
sion on Legal Empowerment of the Poor 2008: 26), contains information
and education as a central cornerstone. However, many people lack educa-
tion about the rights themselves or the necessary background education to
understand laws. People usually need a ‘rights consciousness’ to be able to
use the laws.
Illiteracy and missing language skills add to the problem. In many devel-
oping countries, legislation is written in the official language, which might
not be spoken locally (Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor
2008: 32–33). These language issues can be found in many large-scale land-
based investments as the lease agreement is usually in the official language
– often in English, French or Portuguese. Consequently, the local popula-
tion often fails to understand the plans of investors. Socio-legal studies
show that higher education generally increases the likelihood of using le-
gal measures. However, legal knowledge can also be obtained informally,
for example, through self-education.
Last but not least previous experiences with legal norms play a consider-
able role as well (Gallagher/Yang 2017). In the case of communities affect-
ed by large-scale land-based investments, it can be decisive if they hold this
3.3.2
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expert knowledge, which can be gathered through previous experience
(Gingembre 2015: 572).
The second barrier is the availability of material and organizational re-
sources. “In most cases, pursuing a legal campaign is a lengthy, costly and
risky process” (Vanhala 2012: 526). Socio-legal studies show that actors
with better financial and organizational resources have better chances in
litigation cases, acknowledging that the courtrooms do not present equal
playing fields for all (Epp 1998; Galanter 1974). Getting legal counsel, de-
veloping a legal strategy, financing supportive research or generating pub-
licity for a case all require substantive resources (Epp 1998: 19). However,
population groups affected by large-scale land-based investments are often
among the poorest in their countries and certainly in the world economy.
Legal advice before signing the lease contract, or accessing international ar-
bitration institutions, which are typically located outside the host coun-
tries (Cotula 2011: 41), are not affordable to these actors. Foreign investors,
on the other side, come equipped with extensive legal advice and financial
resources (Vermeulen/Cotula 2010: 913).
One way of overcoming these barriers and advancing a legal mobiliza-
tion strategy is through social networks. Personal networks can be helpful,
for example, in gaining legal expertise through informally connecting to a
lawyer (York Cornwell et al. 2017). In addition, networks are essential for
securing funding, exchanging ideas and know-how, but also for building
alliances in common struggles (Epp 1998: 19; Andersen 2009: 209). If these
alliances are formed with actors on a higher level – such as national and
international civil society actors, they can be conceptualized according to
the boomerang model.
In its original version, the boomerang model was developed to capture
the cooperation between national NGOs from developing countries, who
use their connections to transnational civil society actors and NGOs from
other states to indirectly pressure the government of the original country
(Keck/Sikkink 1998: 12–13). The assumption behind the model is that “in-
ternational contacts can amplify the demands of domestic groups, pry
open space for new issues, and then echo back these demands into the do-
mestic arena” (Keck/Sikkink 1998: 13). These contacts are especially neces-
sary in cases in which domestic governments are not responsive or local ac-
tors are somehow blocked from pressuring their governments directly
(Keck/Sikkink 1998: 12).
The boomerang model is broad enough to be applied to local-national
dynamics (Kraemer et al. 2013) as well as companies as the main addressee
(McAteer/Pulver 2009). Adopted to my research question, this means that
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networks could help local actors in gaining access to legal mobilization
strategies, which they can then use to directly or indirectly influence the
company. In many cases, these networks will consist of civil society organi-
zations like farmers’ associations, local, national and international NGOs,
but also members of the diaspora, journalists, researchers, local authorities
or politicians (Polack et al. 2013: 32–39). Personally knowing political or
administrative officials who have the authority “to provide and enforce
land rights, influence land policies, mediate in conflicts over land deals
and the terms of inclusion” (Rutten et al. 2017: 16), can provide an impor-
tant starting point for enforcing one’s rights. In consequence, networks are
a valuable source to practically gain access to legal institutions for commu-
nities affected by large-scale land-based investment projects.
Networks, which are helpful for local actors, can be pre-existing organi-
zations such as farmers’ associations or NGOs, working in a region. In
many instances, networks between local smallholders and civil society ac-
tors need to be created in the face of an incoming investor or raising
grievances. These might either happen through local actors reaching out to
national and international NGOs, or through NGOs approaching affected
communities and offering their support. A critical literature on transna-
tional NGO advocacy has rightly pointed out that many local groups do
not get the attention and support of transnational civil society and have to
sell their cause in a certain way to appeal to the logic of international
NGOs (Bob 2005). In the realm of large-scale land deals, support from in-
ternational NGOs might be more readily available as the civil society mo-
bilization around the issue has been immense since it appeared on the
agenda in 2008. However, this does not mean that the goals of civil society
organizations and local actors are necessarily the same, which might lead
to misrepresentation of local demands by NGOs (Gilfoy 2015; Boamah
2011). Consequently, local actors need to be aware of the risks of paternal-
istic behavior of supportive organizations (Schramm/Sändig 2018).
Yet, while the cooperation with civil society actors can be problematic
for local actors in some cases, I argue that some kind of support network is
necessary for local actors to access the LOS.
Business management perspective
Finally, a business management perspective focuses on the investing com-
panies and explains their reactions to local demands and their legal mobili-
zation attempts. Stakeholder salience models try to understand why firms
3.3.3
3. A multi-perspective framework on legal mobilization success
82
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748907602, am 02.12.2021, 19:08:03
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
listen to certain outside actors and not to others: Actors that are regarded
as ‘relevant stakeholders’ are given more attention. In the following, I will
explain this approach by focusing on a revised stakeholder salience model
(Ali 2017), which uses the three attributes of power, legitimacy and organi-
zation to differentiate the ‘salience’ of actors.
From a business perspective, managers face the “empirical reality that
virtually anyone can affect or be affected by an organization's actions”
(Mitchell et al. 1997: 854). So, whom or what should they pay attention to?
The stakeholder salience model, first developed by Mitchell et al. (1997)
and later revised and refined by others, represents practical advice as well
as an analytical frame for understanding companies’ decisions. In its re-
vised version by Ali, the combination of the three attributes power, legiti-
macy and organization11 of actors helps to understand their ‘salience’ for
the company. I use this model as an analytical tool to understand com-
panies’ reactions to local demands. In consequence, the attributes are not
‘objective’ characteristics of potential stakeholders, but rather subject to
the judgment of the respective management of a company12.
Stakeholder salience model following Ali (2017: 163)Figure 3
11 In the original version, Mitchell et al. include ‘urgency’ instead of organization
(Mitchell et al. 1997). However, the ability to create a certain urgency can be sub-
sumed under the factor of power, leading Ali to abandon this factor and instead
introducing the factor of organization (Ali 2017: 154).
12 This is not the approach taken by Ali, who aims to create a normative model of
stakeholder salience (Ali 2017). I rather follow Mitchell et al. who emphasize the
cognitive dimension of the model.
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Power is probably the most obvious. An actor who holds considerable
power over the company, for example, in terms of funding or being able to
incur high costs, is more likely to be taken seriously. Corporate power is
often defined in line with a dependence perspective described in the chap-
ter on bargaining theory (chap 3.2.1). “When stakeholders control access
to some needed resource, the stakeholders have the ability to put those re-
sources at risk and thereby endanger the firm’s survival.“ (King 2007: 24).
This power is not necessarily stable but can change over time (Mitchell et
al. 1997: 866). One way in which social actors try to influence a firm is, for
example, through reputational damage, which might discourage investors
and lead to falling stock prices (King 2007: 40). Power can, therefore, be
exerted indirectly. At the same time, companies differ in their vulnerability
to these types of collective action due to their funding structure, but also
the respective industry13, their main markets or their country of origin
(Garvey/Newell 2005: 397–398).
The factor of legitimacy is more difficult to grasp. Mitchell et al. rely on
Suchman in their definition in which legitimacy is “a generalized percep-
tion or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or ap-
propriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, be-
liefs, and definitions” (Suchman 1995 cited in Mitchell et al. 1997: 866).
This definition shows that legitimacy is not only a matter of perception
but is incrementally linked to the cultural and normative mindset of man-
agers who ascribe legitimacy to claims or not. In consequence, the at-
tribute of legitimacy does not reflect some independent normative assess-
ment but instead follows the impressions of high ranking company staff
(Ali 2017: 164). Against this background, the demands of local communi-
ties might not be automatically regarded as legitimate by TNCs. Transna-
tional corporations often think of development in purely technical and
economic terms. They view low-wage jobs as a benefit for the local popula-
tion. In consequence, some companies regard demands and complaints by
local communities as ungrateful (Calvano 2008: 798).
13 Generally, companies whose economic success relies a lot on ‘branding’ such as
typical in the footwear or apparel industry are more vulnerable to reputational
damage than other non-branded industries (Spar/La Mure 2003: 84–85). How-
ever, most cases of large-scale land deals are not part of the branded industries
and the products such as crude palm oil or bioethanol are not directly bought by
the final consumer but are usually further processed along the value chain. Clas-
sic consumer boycotts are therefore not a realistic option in the many cases of
large-scale land deals.
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Yet, companies have different approaches to local communities. These
views are often linked to different corporate cultures and company identi-
ties (Waldron et al. 2013: 401).
“The distinct histories and cultures of firms also shape their percep-
tions of their responsibilities to the communities in which they invest;
[…] The stance of corporations on these issues ranges from a position
of non-engagement to reactive responses to demanded spaces through
to more explicit commitments to formal ‘invited’ spaces for communi-
ty participation.” (Garvey/Newell 2005: 398)
In consequence, different companies may ascribe different degrees of legit-
imacy to local actors and therefore respond differently to their demands.
The third attribute, organization, is linked to the recognition “that stake-
holders who have mobilized themselves, created coalitions, initiated collec-
tive actions, and improved their position in the social network will have
access to more resources, and will have more power over the target firms.”
(Ali 2017: 161). Groups may have legitimate claims and might even have
some potential power; however, if they are not organized into a collective
voice their interests might simply not be heard (Ali 2017: 162). Just as power
and ascribed legitimacy, the degree of organization can change over time.
In combination, the three attributes present the stakeholder salience
model, as depicted in figure 3. Actors who are perceived to have all three
attributes will be ascribed the highest salience (Ali 2017: 164). Their claims
will trigger some reaction by the company. However, as has been de-
scribed in chapter 3.2.2 local communities often lack decisive power re-
sources and might furthermore lack the legitimacy in the eyes of business
managers. Michell et al. refer to this type as ‘demanding stakeholders’.
They “are the ‘mosquitoes buzzing in the ears’ of managers: irksome but
not dangerous, bothersome but not warranting more than passing man-
agement attention, if at all” (Mitchell et al. 1997: 875). However, when le-
gitimacy is added, this might well open up “access to decision-making
channels” (Mitchell et al. 1997: 870). Consequently, the stakeholder model
is not static and can help to conceptualize changes in stakeholder salience
of actors and the subsequent responses by companies.
Explaining legal mobilization success
Looking at the three perspectives, certain overlaps and relationships be-
come visible. I will discuss these relationships through the lens of bargain-
3.4
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ing power (chap 3.4.1), which will inform my understanding of three core
conditions, which I will conceptualize in a second step (chap 3.4.2).
Bringing the three perspectives together
All three perspectives make valid assumptions about the conditions under
which local actors will be able to s pursue legal mobilization successfully.
The legal perspective emphasizes the role of the legal opportunity struc-
ture. In contrast, a social mobilization perspective reminds us that local ac-
tors usually need some kind of support to access the LOS. The business
management literature finally stresses the role of company characteristics,
such as the corporate culture, in reacting to claims made by locals. I will
integrate these three perspectives into one framework through discussing
interactions and overlaps between the approaches using the lens of bar-
gaining power.
Three theoretical perspectives
The starting point is the legal opportunity structure. It presents locals with
different options for framing their claims and calling on institutions on
different levels. When adding a social mobilization view, it becomes appar-
ent that not all levels are accessible in the same way. Local actors are, for
example, most likely to hold knowledge about local and customary regula-
tions. Local authorities might be within reach and community members
might have contacts with local officials and politicians, which can help to
enforce rights and procedures. Locals, therefore, have more access to cus-
tomary law than to the national or international level. For these levels,
3.4.1
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they are more likely to depend on the support of national and internation-
al civil society actors. In consequence, the availability of a support network
becomes more critical for access to legal norms on the national or interna-
tional level.
At the same time, one can link different levels of the legal opportunity
structure to the business management perspective. According to the stake-
holder salience model, companies are most likely to react to efforts that ex-
ert considerable power or legitimacy. In consequence, companies are most
likely to react to formalized law, as legal sanctions and negative court deci-
sions can considerably hurt business or even lead to a complete failure of
the investment (Eesley/Lenox 2006: 772). Consequently, hard law provides
local actors with considerable bargaining power vis-à-vis TNCs.
Less formalized forms of rules and regulations can still present opportu-
nities for local actors through legitimizing their claims and demands. In-
ternational norms and principles are likely to be more effective in this re-
gard than customary rules, as company managers do not usually have a
good understanding of local customary law and might not consider claims
made in this regard as legitimate. It consequently seems likely that legal
mobilization attempts based only on customary law will fail. This consid-
eration underlines the need for support networks that are necessary if local
actors want to use national or international soft and hard law. If referring
to international soft law principles is helpful for local actors depends on
the receptivity of the company to these issues. If the company’s corporate
culture and identity is defined through adhering to certain international
norms, managers will regard credible claims based on these norms as more
legitimate and are consequently more likely to act upon them. Besides,
some international norms can also provide local actors with considerable
indirect power: For example, in the case of the IFC standards, future fund-
ing of a company might rely on its compliance with the standards. Local
actors might be able to use this indirect power to exert pressure on the
company and improve their bargaining situation. However, once again,
they are likely to rely on civil society support to do so.
These considerations show that there are different ways in which local
actors can improve their bargaining power through legal mobilization. On
the one hand, a favorable legal opportunity structure that provides them
with hard law can help them to make legitimate and powerful claims. On
the other hand, soft law can give local actors leverage, especially if a com-
pany is receptive to such claims, either because of the corporate culture or
their funding mechanism. In both cases, local actors are likely to rely on
some outside support network.
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Conceptualization of core conditions
To make the three perspectives usable for my empirical research, I concep-
tualize three conditions: the national legal opportunity structure (NLOS),
support networks of local actors (NET), and the company’s receptivity
(REC). Rather than defining single indicators, I discuss different ways in
which a condition can be fulfilled14. As the context of cases and legal mo-
bilization strategies can vary considerably, the conditions can take various
forms. My conceptualization here, therefore, only provides some guiding
questions instead of measurable indicators for my case studies.
The first condition derived from the legal perspective is the favorability
of the national legal opportunity structure (NLOS). As discussed in the previ-
ous chapter, hard law can provide local actors with the most bargaining
power. Legal norms that are precise, obligatory and delegated to an author-
ity for implementation and enforcement can be used to force companies to
change their behavior. In these cases, just the threat of action can be quite
effective. Research showed, for example, “that tight environmental regu-
lation causes manufacturing firms to attach more importance to environ-
mental activist groups and adopt more preventive approaches to pollution
management” (King 2007: 37).
I argue that only national law provides this kind of hard law hook in the
case of large-scale land deals. None of the international regulatory efforts
discussed in chapter 2.2 are legally binding for companies and states and
most of them lack accountability mechanisms15 (Johnson 2016). While hu-
man rights treaties are higher formalized instruments than the CFS-RAI,
the VGGT or private sector principles, locally applying human rights can
be very difficult due to “the realities of a technical culture of rights-applica-
tion” (von Bernstorff 2016: 72). In order to identify a right to food viola-
tion through large-scale land deals, detailed baseline data and extensive da-
ta gathering efforts are most likely needed. Some investments might
present apparent human rights violations, for example, forceful displace-
ment of people; many cases – especially in democratic countries – are,
however, in a grey area where the breach of social and economic rights is
3.4.2
14 Blatter and Haverland describe these as functional equivalents, which can often
only be defined in the context of the individual case study (Blatter/Haverland
2012: 64).
15 The certitifcation schemes might provide some accountability; however, as dis-
cussed they only apply to companies who actively decide to adhere to the princi-
ples.
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an issue of interpretation. In consequence, in most cases of large-scale land
deals, international regulation does not present the power of hard law,
which can only be provided by national legislation.
Therefore, identifying if a legal opportunity structure is favorable to lo-
cal demands is mainly tied to national law. How helpful the national legal
opportunity structure is for local actors depends on the demands they are
making and is specific to the issue area. The NLOS could be favorable in
labor rights protection but unfavorable when it comes to environmental
concerns. As my main research interests lie in land rights protection and
processes of negotiating land deals, I will focus on legislation in this re-
gard. Following the bargaining logic, a favorable NLOS would provide lo-
cal actors with a veto position over a land deal. The power to withhold
consent can be used to achieve one’s goals; yet, as described in chapter
3.2.2 the negotiation process if often perceived as very asymmetrical and
local actors might lack the expertise to make fully informed decisions.
Therefore, a favorable NLOS should contain further provisions to protect
the interests of smallholders, who can then call on these regulations.
In addition, the land tenure system needs to be included in the analysis,
as it might provide some actors with a veto right. Others, who might have
customary rights, might not have them formally acknowledged by the
state. These issues link back to debates about the regulation of large-scale
land deals presented in chapter 2.2.
I will analyze the NLOS not on the case level, as I will do for the other
two conditions; instead, I will evaluate the NLOS on the national level for
each of the case study countries. To ensure that the findings from my em-
pirical analysis link back to debates about international regulation, I will
construct a ‘collective optimum’ (chap 4.1.1) through referring to human
rights-based approaches to regulation. I will then use this collective opti-
mum to evaluate national legal opportunity structures in the empirical
analysis.
 
The second condition derived from the social mobilization perspective is
the strength of the support network (NET). There are different options of
what a strong support network might look like. In the case that the nation-
al legal opportunity structure is favorable towards local goals, local actors
still need help to claim their rights and trigger the enforcement of existing
rules. One possibility would be direct or indirect links to those state offi-
cials, who are powerful enough to enforce existing laws and are open to
helping local actors (O'Brien/Li 2008: 13). In other cases, local actors
might rely on the help of a lawyer or civil society organization to under-
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stand their rights and legal options or to access legal institutions. Civil so-
ciety pressure might also help to pressure government agencies in enforc-
ing regulations and finding solutions for local problems.
In the case of an unfavorable NLOS, a strong network can help local ac-
tors in framing their claims according to international norms and princi-
ples. International campaigns can provide visibility and legitimation for lo-
cal claims. In the case that the company commits to international volun-
tary guidelines, network actors can help local actors in accessing complaint
or grievance mechanisms and in generating pressure through holding the
company accountable to self-subscribed standards. ‘Naming and shaming’
is a well-known strategy to draw attention to companies ignoring industry
standards or human rights.
These are different ways in which networks support local actors in their
legal mobilization attempts. How strong or weak the network support is,
can, therefore, not be identified on an abstract level but only in the con-
crete empirical situation.
 
The third condition receptivity of the company (REC) is derived from the
business management perspective. It focuses on the characteristics of the
investor that define its openness to local actors as relevant stakeholders. If
the two conditions, NLOS and NET, remain stable, different companies re-
act differently, as many empirical examples show (Ali 2017: 156). What
kind of actors and what kind of claims a company regards as legitimate,
largely depends on the corporate culture of the enterprise. The literature
suggests various differentiations such as reactive/defensive versus accom-
modative/proactive (Ali 2017: 156), corporate egoist versus corporate
moralist (Waldron et al. 2013: 402) or socially responsible versus conven-
tional (McLachlan/Gardner 2004). While emphasizing different aspects,
the idea behind these differentiations is that some companies form their
corporate identities around social responsibility, whereas others first and
foremost have the economic value in mind.
However, even managers following a corporate egoist logic might em-
ploy social corporate responsibility instruments as long “as it contributes
to the externally perceived economic value of their firms” (Waldron et al.
2013: 402). The existence of some form of CSR measures or claims by the
company to adhere to best practice principles alone can, therefore, not be
regarded as a sufficient indicator for the receptivity of the company to lo-
cal claims. Instead, broader company behavior and communication have
to be taken into account. Possible indicators could be the amount of ef-
forts put into community relations and grievance mechanisms, open and
3. A multi-perspective framework on legal mobilization success
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transparent communication vis-à-vis local communities (Jahansoozi 2006)
or previous behaviors from other projects (King 2007: 36). Furthermore,
statements made by company personnel in regards to their general opinion
of local actors can provide further insights into their perception of the le-
gitimacy of claims made (Clarkson 1995: 97). Commitment to indepen-
dent social auditing such as through private sector certification schemes or
due to funding from banks following IFC rules can also be a sign for a
more serious dedication to international principles than the mere men-
tioning of best practices. Companies that seek certification or receive fund-
ing from IFC regulated banks can be pressured through these instruments,
as they can cause the company considerable economic costs.
Overall, there are two factors, which can be decisive for the receptivity
of a company: A corporate culture that puts a lot of emphasis on being re-
ceptive to local demands or a corporate structure that provides additional
leverage to local actors.
Conceptualization of core conditions
Condition Guiding questions for empirical research 
                         NLOS 
favorab                                   unfavorable 
Do local smallholders have the right to veto a large-
scale land deal? 
Does the legislation protect customary land rights? 
Are there government regulations protecting local 
actors from entering into unfair contracts? 
(see further in chap 4.1.1) 
                         NET 
strong                              weak 
Are local actors connected to administrative staff 
with the ability to enforce regulations and laws? 
Are local actors connected to lawyers who support 
them with legal advice or litigation? 
Are local actors connected to civil society actors who 
provide knowledge and resources to help them 
access legal arguments and institutions?  
Are local actors connected to civil society actors who 
create a broader campaign to pressure other actors 
such as governments, their agencies or banks to 
exert pressure on a company? 
                         REC 
receptive                                unreceptive 
Does the corporate structure make the company 
vulnerable to economic pressure (through 
certification schemes or funding from IFC banks)? 
How open and transparent is the communication of 
the company vis-à-vis local communities? 
Do statements of company’s managers imply an 
unreceptive or a receptive corporate culture? 
Are there previous examples in which the company 
acted unreceptive towards local demands? 
Table 4
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The table summarizes my conceptualization of my three core conditions.
As my concepts need to be broad enough to accommodate a variety of em-
pirical observations, the guiding questions only serve as a first orientation.
In the case studies, additional context-specific information might indicate
a condition as well and will be included in the research. For simplicity’s
sake, the conditions are presented as dichotomous; however, it makes sense
to perceive them as continua, for which the threshold is not easily objec-
tively defined.
Summary of the framework
This chapter will shortly summarize my framework and discuss its reach
and limits.
Overall, my analytical framework incorporates a multi-perspective view
on large-scale land deals. The underlying assumption is that local commu-
nities and investing TNCs find themselves in an interactive and ongoing
bargaining process even though power relations are often asymmetrical to
the advantage of investors. Legal mobilization in this relationship can be
viewed from three perspectives: a legal (focusing on the structure), a social
mobilization or a business management (focusing on either local actors or
the respective company) perspective. Bringing the perspectives together en-
abled me to deduce three core conditions: the favorability of the national
legal opportunity structure, the strength of support networks and the re-
ceptivity of the company. These core conditions will serve as the basis for
my empirical analysis, which will specify the relationship between them
and add possible additional conditions.
My analytical framework has the advantage that it is broad enough to be
adaptable to a variety of empirical cases. I developed it with smallholder
rights in large-scale land deals in mind, but it can be easily adapted to fit
other issue areas such as environmental or labor concerns. Even more, the
framework should also work in other kinds of company-community rela-
tionships, as long as some sort of interdependency between the actors is
there.
The framework is based on the premise of the rule of law in a country.
While this does not imply that laws get implemented automatically, it
does assume that administrations or courts will respect legitimate claims
based on legal rules and regulations in the respective country. Consequent-
ly, the framework might be of limited use in authoritarian systems.
3.5
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Apart from the adaptability of the framework, it is also able to accom-
modate new conditions. Additional theoretical perspectives or empirical
research can add conditions. My three core conditions can be seen as a
starting point. My empirical analysis will point to additional conditions,
which can be included in future research.
While my analytical framework is broad enough to apply to many em-
pirical contexts, it does have limits in regards to causal mechanisms and
predictability of outcomes. First, my three conditions can be linked
through different causal pathways, some of which I discussed in the previ-
ous chapters. In other words, my framework does not describe the process-
es that are linking the three conditions in a generalizable manner. Instead,
this is what my empirical research intends to do through tracing the pro-
cesses in individual cases. Second, my framework has limited predictability
due to the context-specificity and the interdependence of the three condi-
tions. However, it is not the aim of the framework to be able to predict
outcomes but rather to provide a systematic way of explaining the out-
comes of legal mobilization attempts of local actors, without neglecting
the empirical complexities of each case.
3.5 Summary of the framework
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Research design
The theoretical framework provides me with some first ideas of how the
legal opportunity structure is linked with a successful outcome for local ac-
tors in achieving their goals. Now, empirical research is needed to specify
the relationships between my core conditions and identify possible addi-
tional conditions. The empirical analysis will follow a three-staged ap-
proach, including an evaluation of the NLOS on the national level, process
tracing in four individual cases of large-scale land deals, followed by a
comparison of the findings within and across countries. These methods
will be explained in a first step (chap 4.1), before describing the case selec-
tion (chap 4.2) and the data collection (chap 4.3). I end this chapter by giv-
ing an overview of the course of the analysis (chap 4.4).
Methods
I combine three methods to apply my framework. My choice of methods is
guided by my research objective as well as my theoretical framework. I
take a rather pragmatic approach to these methods as their value “lies in
their usefulness in engaging with the real world” (Guthrie 2010: 45). In a
first step, I need to evaluate the NLOS of a country. As my primary re-
search goal is to contribute to the debate about regulating large-scale land
deals, it makes sense to include suggestions made during this debate in the
evaluation criteria. I construct a ‘collective optimum’, which can then be
used to evaluate the NLOS of a country (chap 4.1.1). In a second step,
causal process tracing (CPT) will be applied to find out how the NLOS of
a country enables or restricts local actors for successful legal mobilization
in combination with the other two conditions of support networks and
the receptivity of companies (chap 4.1.2). In this step, the focus shifts from
a top-down institutional view to a bottom-up lens focusing on the agency
of local actors and their networks. While the process tracing serves to show
the relationship of the three core conditions in practice, a cross-case com-
parison will add further validity to central findings (chap 4.1.3). The fol-
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Evaluating the national legal opportunity structure
How can we find criteria against which to evaluate an institutional setup?
One suggestion made in the literature is to use a ‘collective optimum’, the
best possible outcome:
“Using potential achievements as our point or reference, we would de-
fine a ‘perfect’ solution as one that accomplishes all that can be accom-
plished given the state of knowledge at the time.” (Underdal 1992:
231)
Underdal suggests turning to “independent expert advice” (Underdal 1992:
236) to create such a collective optimum. I will use my considerations
from chapter 3.4.2 and expert opinions – the 11 principles of the Special
Rapporteur on the Right to Food and the VGGT – to create a collective op-
timum for the NLOS. This ‘optimum’ NLOS will consequently reflect a
human rights approach.
As noted in chapter 3.4.2, the possibility to veto a foreign investment in
land is decisive for having bargaining power vis-à-vis foreign investment.
This assumption is shared by the 11 principles formulated by the former
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food Olivier de Schutter: “In princi-
ple, any shifts in land use can only take place with the free, prior and in-
formed consent of the local communities concerned.” (De Schutter 2009:
13–14). As discussed earlier, the FPIC principle did not make it into the
VGGT but is used as a yardstick by civil society actors and others to assess a
large-scale land deal. I, therefore, use the right to give or withhold consent
to a land deal as the most important criterium for a favorable national le-
gal opportunity structure. A veto right can be fulfilled via two ways: First,
formalized tenure rights provide affected smallholders with a de facto veto
position vis-à-vis investors. Second, countries can pass laws and regulations
in regards to large-scale land investments in which a veto right is granted
to affected communities or individuals (e.g., tenants or land users without
ownership rights) whether their tenure rights are formalized or not.
Consent is specified in the FPIC principle as being free of force, prior to
the investment and informed. The need for information and possibly assis-
tance through the state is also acknowledged in the VGGT:
“States and other relevant parties should inform individuals, families
and communities of their tenure rights, and assist to develop their ca-
pacity in consultations and participation, including providing profes-
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Part of the information is the conducting of independent social and envi-
ronmental impact assessments. Both the principles of de Schutter and the
VGGT suggest impact assessments “on the potential positive and negative
impacts that those investments could have on tenure rights, food security
and the progressive realization of the right to adequate food, livelihoods
and the environment.” (CFS 2012: 12.10). Smallholders entering into con-
tracts with investing companies should, therefore, be informed about their
rights, receive professional assistance if needed and learn from impact as-
sessments about the possible benefits and risks of an investment project.
Apart from FPIC, the recommendations of de Schutter and the VGGT
more generally demand that land is used to fulfill human rights to food or
development more broadly. Contracts should “prioritize the development
needs of the local population” (De Schutter 2009: 14). These regulations
have to be country-specific of and could for example be laws protecting
smallholders from exploitative contracts or ensuring that a certain amount
of local people are employed or trained. Such regulations could potentially
provide smallholders with legal arguments in case an investment did not
turn out to be as beneficial as expected.
Last but not least, oversight and grievance mechanisms should be de-
fined through the NLOS and be available for affected populations:
“States should take corrective action where necessary to enforce agree-
ments and protect tenure and other rights and provide mechanisms
whereby aggrieved parties can request such action.” (CFS 2012: 12.14)
Overall, these four elements, veto rights, information rights, protection of
economic rights and the installment of oversight and grievance mechan-
isms, make up the ideal NLOS in the context of my research question16.
16 As mentioned before environmental protection or labor rights are not at the fo-
cus of this dissertation and consequently not part of my ‘ideal’ NLOS.
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Collective optimum for the national legal opportunity structure
Elements of a collective optimum
1. NLOS grants smallholders a veto right through
– the existing formal land tenure system or
– special regulation in regards to investment projects
2. NLOS aims to ensure that smallholder can make informed decisions
through
– providing information on their rights and possibilities
– providing expert assistance
– social and environmental impact assessments
3. NLOS aims to ensure that large-scale land deals are beneficial to the
economic development of the affected population
4. NLOS aims to ensure oversight of large-scale land deals and grievance
mechanisms for affected populations
The collective optimum presents an ideal type for a favorable NLOS. A
threshold for real-world cases has to be somewhat lower. In terms of a bar-
gaining approach, the first and second element are the most important
ones as they help local actors to make informed claims vis-à-vis investors. I,
therefore, regard an NLOS as favorable if it provides smallholders with a
veto right (first element) and provides some assistance to them when nego-
tiating with foreign investors (second element) or safeguards in regards to
an investment being economically beneficial to locals (third element). The
degree to which the different items are fulfilled can vary and, as men-
tioned earlier, the favorability of the NLOS should be regarded as a contin-
uum. Nonetheless, this calibration helps me to identify if the national legal
opportunity structure tends towards being favorable or unfavorable.
Causal process tracing
After evaluating the legal opportunity structure of a country, I will use
causal process tracing (CPT) in two cases of large-scale land deals each, in
order to establish the causal relations between the core conditions. Causal
process tracing helps me to create internal validity – essentially providing
evidence for the causal connections between the conditions outlined in my
theory. Also, the process-tracing method helps identify additional condi-
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(George/Bennett 2005: 207). Finally, process tracing takes the complexity
of empirical cases seriously, while enabling me to create a causal story.
In using causal process tracing, I follow Blatter and Haverland (2012),
who link causal process tracing to a configurational approach:
“Configurational thinking, especially the assumption that explanations
should begin with the assumption that a plurality of causal factors
work together to create an outcome, is the first basic characteristic of
the causal-process tracing approach.” (Blatter/Haverland 2012: 81)
Another assumption configurational thinking shares with a CPT approach
is the fact that “causality plays out in time and space” (Blatter/Haverland
2012: 81). To this end, a large number of observations that are usually in-
terdependent are included in the analysis to tell a convincing story
(George/Bennett 2005: 207). In consequence, the researcher has to do some
“thorough ‘soaking and poking’” (Blatter/Haverland 2012: 105) to gather
the relevant material. His or her role can best be compared to that of a de-
tective (Blatter/Haverland 2012: 105; Gerring 2007: 207) who tries to re-
construct the sequences of events, decisions and motivations. CPT does
not aim to analyze the net effect of factors but rather to understand how
different conditions work together.
Three elements are used in causal process tracing: a comprehensive sto-
ryline, ‘smoking guns’ and ‘confessions’. A comprehensive storyline gives
an overview of the overall story and the main events in a case. “A major
goal of these comprehensive storylines is to differentiate the major se-
quences of the overall process and identify the critical moments that fur-
ther shape the process” (Blatter/Haverland 2012: 111). As such, it sets the
stage for ‘smoking gun’ observations – observations, which provide strong
evidence for causal inference. Central for these observations are temporal
and spatial contiguity, as well as additional information that provides fur-
ther evidence. ‘Smoking gun’ observations usually refer to critical mo-
ments when particular decisions were taken or certain actions took place,
which led to a specific outcome (Blatter/Haverland 2012: 115–116). Anoth-
er tool to support a convincing causal storyline are ‘confessions’ of actors,
who explain or reflect on their motivations in their statements. However,
as a researcher, one needs to be careful not to “take them at face value”
(Blatter/Haverland 2012: 118), as people usually want to present them-
selves in a particular light as well as rationalize their behavior ex-post.
Nonetheless, ‘confessions’ can be important complementary evidence in
causal process tracing, “because they reduce a problem of drawing causal
4. Research design
98
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748907602, am 02.12.2021, 19:08:03
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
inference on the basis of temporal succession” (Blatter/Haverland 2012:
117).
In my analysis, CPT will mainly serve to connect the legal opportunity
structure with legal mobilization processes and their outcomes. An empha-
sis is placed on the relationship between the NLOS, local actors and their
support networks and the characteristics of companies. I thereby put the
conditions from the theoretical framework into a convincing comprehen-
sive storyline, and support their relevance with ‘smoking gun’ observations
and were possible with ‘confessions’. In addition to illustrating the theoret-
ically deduced conditions, I identify the individual mechanisms in the spe-
cific settings, as well as additional conditions, which might be relevant in
other contexts too.
Case comparison
While I use causal process tracing to identify causal relations within indi-
vidual cases, cross-case comparisons focus on showing the external validity
of the different conditions across cases (Blatter/Haverland 2012: 211).
In my analysis, I will employ CPT as described in the previous chapter
in four cases of large-scale land deals – two each in two countries. I will
then use the findings of the CPT to compare the cases within each coun-
try. In this way, a most-similar setting (George/Bennett 2005: 165) is creat-
ed in regards to the national legal opportunity structure, which allows me
to focus on the conditions of the support network and the receptivity of
companies. In a second step, I will compare these findings between the
two countries, which will have differing legal opportunity structures.
In this way, the NLOS is the only condition I can control for, as I ana-
lyze it on the national level. The support network and the receptivity of
the company vary from case to case. In this regard, my empirical research
remains exploratory – providing further insights into the characteristics of
support networks and companies and their interactions with one another.
Overall, the choice and combination of my research methods allows me
to keep a balance between accepting case-specific contingencies but draw
some generalizations, as well as between illustrating my pre-identified con-
ditions and identifying new possible causal factors. Additionally, my “com-
bination of cross-case and within-case analysis greatly reduces the risks of
inferential errors that can arise from using either method alone” (George/
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veloped through my empirical findings, can, therefore, be regarded as
highly valid.
Case selection
The case selection is guided by my theoretical framework and my method-
ological considerations. However, there are serious limitations to a system-
atic case selection due to missing data on legal mobilization attempts and
their outcomes. Besides, networks supporting local actors as well as the
companies themselves are highly diverse and vary from case to case. There-
fore, my approach to case selection consists of a pragmatic compromise be-
tween controlling for similarities and differences and a certain degree of
randomization. I will identify two case study countries first (chap 4.2.1) be-
fore I find two cases of large-scale land deals within each country (chap
4.2.2).
Choosing case countries
I use the database of the Land Matrix as my starting point for case selec-
tion. Even though there are biases in reporting due to different regions,
countries, investors or sectors (Nolte et al. 2016: 5), it is the best available
source when it comes to global data on large-scale land deals. I treat the
database as my universe of cases, which I will reduce down based on theo-
retical and practical considerations.
First, as mentioned in chapter 1.1, I limit my research to developing
countries, defined as low income and lower-middle-income countries, as
categorized by the World Bank. I furthermore only include transnational
land deals, meaning that at least one foreign investor is somehow involved
in a land investment project.
In a next step, I limit my possible case selection to democracies17 for two
reasons. Theoretically, I have not considered state repression and missing
civil liberties, which would, however, be limiting to the legal mobilization
of local actors. At the same time, there are also practical considerations,
which support my choice to focus on democracies. Large-scale land deals
4.2
4.2.1
17 To identify ‘democracies’ I use the ‘Combined Polity Score’ of the Polity IV In-
dex. All countries with a score of 6 or higher are therefore categorized as demo-
cratic, using the latest available scores from 2017.
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are a highly political issue and researching them in repressive surroundings
can make access more difficult, as well as cause danger for potential inter-
viewees and research assistants (Schoenberger/Beban 2018).
In the last step, I only chose countries with at least 12 large-scale land
deals and which have English as one of their official languages. Both deci-
sions have rather practical reasons: Countries with a higher number of
large-scale land deals are more likely to have debates and civil society mo-
bilization around this issue. I also need a number of deals to choose from
for my within-country comparison. English as an official language pro-
vides me with a greater thickness of data oberservations, which is impor-
tant for causal process tracing (Blatter/Haverland 2012: 102).
Possible case study countries










After making these limitations, the countries listed in table 6 remained.
From the choice of the nine countries, I chose Sierra Leone and the Philip-
pines. Sierra Leone is known for its problematic national laws when it
comes to land tenure as well as a coexistence of customary and statutory
rules governing land tenure. This makes the country a ‘typical’ case (Ger-
ring 2007: 91) for a weak national legal opportunity structure, which can
also be found in other Sub-Saharan African countries such as Liberia, Zam-
bia or Ghana. The Philippines then serves as a ‘diverse’ case (Gerring 2007:
97) with a national legal opportunity structure that is very different from
Sierra Leone. In the following paragraph, I describe similarities and differ-
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Overall, national legislation in Sierra Leone is extremely weak in regard to
land tenure. Land tenure laws date back to colonial times and the land sec-
tor is described as “not only chaotic but also becoming increasingly unsus-
tainable” (Government of Sierra Leone 2015: 1). There are no legal provi-
sions so far for the consultation of people affected by a foreign land lease
or for investors to respect customary tenure rights, which account for the
majority of Sierra Leoneans (Davies 2015: 17). These weaknesses led to
Sierra Leone becoming one of the pilot countries for the implementation
of the VGGT and encouraged the government to adopt a new land policy.
In the Philippines, the constitution covers many provisions of the VG-
GT, especially with legal recognition of tenure rights and issues around the
transfer of rights (Quizon/Pagsanghan 2014: 21). The constitution further-
more demands the reduction of social, economic and political inequalities
and asks the state to “regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposi-
tion of property” (Republic of the Philippines 1987: Art XIII) to this end.
These provisions for social justice are mirrored in demands for agrarian re-
form and limits for land lease sizes. Several laws concretizes the provisions
of the constitution for different sectors (Quizon/Pagsanghan 2014: 23). At
this first glance, the national legal opportunity structure of the Philippines
is therefore favorable for affected people. In contrast, the NLOS of Sierra
Leone has to be regarded as unfavorable for local actors.
Apart from the national legal opportunity structure, a view on the func-
tioning of the judiciary and administrative institutions makes sense, as
laws have to be implemented and rights get claimed. To get a general
overview in both countries, I use the Rule of Law Index, which aims at
measuring the rule of law ‘in practice’ through representative household
surveys. The table below presents some of the core scores relevant to my
research question (The World justice project 2016: 15).
Rule of law in the Philippines and Sierra Leone
 Philippines Sierra Leone
Rule of law combined score (1.0 being the
optimum)
0.51 0.45
Absence of corruption (1.0 being the optimum) 0.48 0.30
Regulatory enforcement (1.0 being the
optimum)
0.51 0.35
Civil justice (1.0 being the optimum) 0.45 0.40
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The rule of law combined score shows that both countries are far from
having a high degree of rule of law, while the situation in the Philippines
is better than in Sierra Leone. A similar picture emerges regarding three
specific factors. Both the absence of corruption and regulatory enforce-
ment are highly relevant when it comes to the implementation of existing
laws and administrative regulations. Both factors are very weak in Sierra
Leone and point to high levels of corruption and weak state capacities. The
factor of civil justice refers to the degree to which “ordinary people can re-
solve their grievances peacefully and effectively” (The World justice project
2016: 12) with the help of the judiciary system. This factor is similarly low
in both countries with a score of 0.45 in the Philippines and of 0.40 in
Sierra Leone. Calling on courts might not be the best option for local ac-
tors in both countries. Compared to other countries in the respective in-
come group, both countries are fairly average: Sierra Leone for low-income
countries (The World justice project 2016: 133) and the Philippines for
lower-middle-income countries (The World justice project 2016: 125). I,
therefore, regard the two countries as typical for their income level.
Apart from the national legal opportunity structure and the rule of law
there are more differences in the countries’ contexts but also some similari-
ties. Table 8 gives an overview of some basic statistics related to poverty
and the agricultural sector.




Total land area in sq km 298,170 72,180
Total population 103 million 7.2 million
Rural Population in % of total population
(2016)
55.7 % 59.7 %




Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 a day (2011
PPP) (% of population)
8.3 % (2015) 52.3 %
(2011)
Poverty headcount ratio at $3.20 a day (2011
PPP) (% of population)
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 Philippines Sierra
Leone
Prevalence of undernourishment in % of
population (2015)
13.8 % 30 %
HDI rank (2016, total of 185) 116 179
Agriculture
Agriculture value added in % of GDP (2016) 9.6 % 59.4 %
Agricultural employment in % of total
employment (2017)
27.7 % 68 %
Agricultural land in % of total land areas
(2015)
41.7 % 54,7 %
Agricultural land in hectares (2015) 12.4 million 3.9 million
Source: Data retrieved from the World Bank Database: World Development Indica-
tors, 16/04/2018
Sierra Leone ranks among the last countries in the Human Development
Index and has an average GDP per person about one 5th of the GDP of the
Philippines. However, the Philippines also has a substantial ratio of poor
people with 33.7 % living with less than 3.20USD a day. And while fewer
people are undernourished in the Philippines than in Sierra Leone the
country is far from food secure, with 13.8 % of the population being un-
dernourished. In the Philippines, the macro-economic impact of the agri-
cultural sector has diminished and now only makes up 9.6 %. Nonetheless,
agriculture still employs about one third of the population and therefore
remains an essential source of income for many Filipinos. In Sierra Leone,
the majority of the people depend on agricultural activities for their liveli-
hoods and the sector contributes a significant share to the GDP.
Both countries have a considerable amount of small-scale farmers. How-
ever, the Philippines has had a long history of large-scale plantations, as
Spanish colonizers set up a hacienda economy similar to the one in Latin
America (Larkin 1982: 599). Even though the land reform of 1988 redis-
tributed a lot of agricultural land, transnational food corporations like Del
Monte, Dole, Chiquita and Sumitomo exert considerable control over
land, especially in regards to high-value export crops (Lockie et al. 2015:
125). In consequence, the Philippines has longstanding experience with
mechanized farming and agribusiness corporations. Sierra Leonean agri-
culture is largely non-mechanized with a bush fallow system for non-tree
4. Research design
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crops (Unruh/Turray 2006). There is hardly any precedence for large-scale
agribusiness, especially through foreign investors.
Despite these differences, both governments adopted policies to attract
foreign investment in agriculture with a focus on biofuels. To these ends,
both countries set up specialized agencies: the Sierra Leone Investment
and Export Promotion Agency (SLIEPA) and the Philippine Agricultural
Development and Commercial Corporation (PADCC). So, while the agri-
cultural contexts in which large-scale land deals take place in Sierra Leone
and the Philippines are quite different, the driving forces and government
support for foreign investments in agriculture are similar. I will discuss
these backgrounds in both countries in more detail in the empirical analy-
sis.
Choosing cases of large-scale land deals
For choosing the two case countries, I was able to rely at least on some
macro-level socio-economic data. Choosing cases within the two countries
was more difficult. Information on land deals, for example, if investments
ever went into production or are in operation made case selection extreme-
ly difficult. Two pragmatic criteria guided my selection process in the end.
First, I narrowed the search down to investments for biofuels or crops
that can potentially be used for the production of biofuels such as oil palm
or coconut. This focus helped to reduce context complexity, while at the
same time increasing similarity between cases. There is often specific regu-
lation in regards to biofuels production, while different laws might cover
food crops. At the same time, investments targeting biofuel or oil palm
usually need a large amount of land – often in the thousands of hectares.
As these investments include the construction of a processing mill or refin-
ery, a significant amount of crops are needed to use the processing facilities
to the maximum.
The second criteria was defined by methodological considerations:
“There is one overarching methodological principle that should guide
the selection of cases if the major technique for drawing descriptive
and causal inferences is process tracing: accessibility.” (Blatter/Haver-
land 2012: 102)
Good access to the cases and as many different sources as possible was the
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For Sierra Leone the Land Matrix listed 32 cases out of which 25 cases
saw the closing of a contract. Twelve of those deals intended to produce
biofuels or grow crops that are suitable for biofuels such as palm oil or sug-
ar cane. Looking into additional material from NGOs, media and com-
panies two investments stick out: The sugar cane investment of Addax
Bioenergy and the palm oil plantation of Socfin Sierra Leone. Represent-
ing the biggest plantations in the country – with around 12,000 ha each –
both investment projects received a lot of civil society attention but have
also been subject to academic research. I consequently have a considerable
amount of background information, which cen help me to triangulate my
interview data.
The search for two suitable cases proofed more difficult in the Philip-
pines. The Land Matrix reported 38 deals, of which only 14 were listed as
having concluded the negotiations. However, information on these invest-
ments was often extremely scarce – including among civil society actors in
Manila. I had to just ‘go and see’, leading me to include a case in my origi-
nal research design, which was in reality no longer in existence.
I initially chose two cases of foreign investment deals from the Land Ma-
trix, the case of Green Future Innovations Inc. (GFII), with the involve-
ment of a Japanese investor, and the case of Bio Energy Northern Luzon
Inc. (BENLINC), with a Japanese-British investor. Both cases fulfilled the
selection criteria and targeted the production of biofuel through sugar
cane or coconut. However, in the case of BENLINC upon arriving in the
region, where there should have been a coconut plantation at least the size
of 1000 hectares, I found out that the project had been abandoned a long
time ago. The case shows the difficulty of getting accurate data not just on
deals closed but even more so on the actual stage of implementation and
hectares under operation.
As the case of BENLINC was not usable for my purposes, I finally chose
the case of Agumil Philippines. It was cited to me by various interviewees
in Manila (interviews PH7, PH28) and I discovered quite some extensive
reporting on the case. I was furthermore able to verify the existence of
plantations through satellite imagery. However, the case did not show up
in the Land Matrix database, even though it did fulfill the criteria of the
database. For pragmatic reasons, I decided to include the case nonetheless.
The following table gives an overview of the basic facts of these investment
deals. I was able to identify legal mobilization efforts in all four cases.
There was one success and one failed case in each country.
4. Research design
106
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748907602, am 02.12.2021, 19:08:03
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
Selected cases of large-scale land deals
 Addax Socfin GFFI Agumil
Deal(s) closed in 2010 2011 2009 2007







No. of people affected18 13,500 25,000 - -




Legal mobilization success failure success failure
It should be noted that the case selection does contain a bias: The criterion
for sufficient material from different sources implies that only cases were
chosen that received considerable attention. These are more likely the
more problematic cases. The case studies in this dissertation should, there-
fore, not be regarded as representative of all large-scale land deals.
Empirical material
My empirical material used for the analysis stems from field visits to both
countries and documents such as NGO and media reports, company state-
ments, lease agreements, protest letters but also existing academic research.
I will discuss how I addressed challenges posed by field research and dur-
ing interviews first (chap 4.3.1), before describing the text material used
(chap 4.3.2).
Field visits and interviews
Field research is an incremental part of my empirical analysis. It helped me




18 As no social impact assessments were conducted in the two cases from the Philip-
pines, I do not have numbers of affected people. In the Sierra Leonean cases,
these numbers refer to the amount of people who were directly affected by the
plantations through losing access to land or living in close proximity.
4.3 Empirical material
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tors and their support networks as well as local dynamics such as the role
of local elites. As large-scale land deals often miss transparency, interviews
with various actors from the government, local authorities, companies, civ-
il society as well as local actors are an important aspect of getting relevant
information. These interviews also served to verify other data sources, such
as NGO or media reports. Last but not least, the field visits gave me the
chance to observe local conditions first hand. To experience the vastness of
individual plantations, the way the company presented itself locally or the
reactions of bike riders or taxi drivers when I talked about my research
interest provided me with invaluable impressions. I will use these impres-
sions occasionally in my analysis, even though the main focus is on the
content of the interviews.
Two visits were undertaken to both countries, totaling a time of 10 to 12
weeks spent in each country between November 2016 and November
2018. Interview partners were selected according to their organization’s
role in mobilizing around large-scale land deals and later on, also through
snowballing. National government agencies were targeted for interviews
later during the stay when specific questions arose. Research assistants
helped in facilitating community visits through organizing transport, un-
dertaking exploratory visits and translating during the interviews (Temne,
Mende and Krio for Sierra Leone, Tagalog for the Philippines). Apart from
community visits interviews with local civil society groups, the company
and local authorities in the wider region were conducted.
Especially in Sierra Leone local protocol had to be followed in order to
do the research: a visit to the Paramount Chief or his deputy, the Chief-
dom Speaker, was mandatory before speaking to other locals. In some vil-
lages, we talked to the village headman or section chiefs, whereas in other
cases, we met with individuals, we had previously contacted. Interviews,
therefore, took quite different forms, from individual private conversations
to village meetings in which several people spoke and many listened. Apart
from village elders, local activists were the focus of the interviews, as the
primary research interest was their mobilization, their strategies used and
their relationships with outside actors. Nonetheless, I also spoke to other
groups like women, youth or company workers, who were selected ran-
domly.
In the Philippines, local settings were different: Instead of whole com-
munities, individual farmers, who had some kind of relationship with the
company, or local activists were interviewed. Their homes were more dis-
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Apart from the field visits, a few interviews took place via Skype with in-
ternational civil society actors or former company staff. Overall, I conduct-
ed 54 interviews in Sierra Leone and 48 interviews in the Philippines (see
Appendix A).
 
My field research strategy paid attention to ensuring my independence.
Foreign large-scale land deals are a highly politicized topic on the global
level as well as in many countries. This can lead to biased research trough
implicit assumptions, for example, about the ‘bad’ outside investor versus
the ‘good’ local community (Oya 2013a: 515). At times, NGOs are in-
volved in framing land deals as ‘land grabbing’ and presenting local com-
munities as unitarily against an investment. For researchers, there is, there-
fore, the danger of getting the ‘NGO tour’ – only being introduced to cer-
tain community members (Gilfoy 2015). At the same time, an intense
politicization can complicate field visits, from being denied access to re-
ceiving threats by local actors or companies (Cramer et al. 2015).
To avoid partiality, I did not cooperate with NGOs to facilitate my visits
to local communities. The visits were organized by myself and my research
assistants, who I had found through contacts at local universities. None of
my research assistants had previous knowledge of the visited communities,
but they knew local customs and the language. We did use contacts pro-
vided by NGOs to find local activists but additionally found interview
partners spontaneously.
NGO reports, media articles and additional documents
Documents such as NGO reports, media articles or company material were
systematically collected and served several purposes.
First, an initial browsing through NGO and media reports gave me
some idea of the issues around specific land deals and helped me in my
case selection.
Second, these documents provided me with a rough timeline of events,
which helped me to put interviews in context. As some of the events, I was
asking about, happened more than five years before the interviews, it was
at times difficult to establish the exact chain of events. Establishing the
chain of events is an essential element of a comprehensive storyline in pro-
cess tracing approaches (Blatter/Haverland 2012: 81).
Third, documents from different sources help to corroborate claims
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triangulation (Guthrie 2010: 46). Information gathered through interviews
can be skewed by selective memory, social expectedness or outright lies to
protect one’s standing. At the same time, media or NGO reports are not
necessarily more objective. As NGOs usually aim to advocate for a specific
policy change, they tend to paint a rather drastic picture and focus on neg-
ative aspects of an investment. The opposite is usually true for the compa-
ny, who is keen on praising the benefits. Both, NGOs as well as companies,
use media articles for their aims. In these settings, data triangulation with
different sources becomes all the more relevant.
To source the relevant documents, searches were conducted through
search engines, farmlandgrab.org, a website collecting NGO and media re-
ports on large-scale land deals through crowdsourcing, and the most im-
portant newspapers in the country (Awoko in Sierra Leone and The In-
quirer in the Philippines). Additional documents provided through com-
panies’ and NGOs’ websites included MOUs, impact assessments, protest
letters, official state documents but also statements and letters from the
companies. The document search covered the time period between the
first news about the planned investments up to the periods of field re-
search – for Sierra Leone April 2017 and for the Philippines November
2018 – and therefore do not contain information on later events.
The following table gives an overview of the numbers of documents
found. It should be noted that the documents, especially the media re-
ports, were of varying relevance for the analysis and therefore did not all
play a significant role. Furthermore, many materials did not contain de-
tailed information on the legal mobilization attempt but were helpful in
understanding the overall investment.













Addax Bioenergy 183 19 22 11
Socfin Siera Leone 154 15 78 2
Green Future
Innovations
22 4 10 5
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Course of action of the analysis
Overall, the empirical analysis tries to strike a balance between advancing
the theoretical framework and providing case studies that are in them-
selves an empirical contribution to the literature. The selected cases have
been subject to scholarly research to a varying degree; however, none of
the published studies focused on reconstructing instances of legal mobili-
zation.
The analytical chapters will proceed in the same way for the two coun-
tries and for all four cases of foreign large-scale land investments. The
country chapters will begin with a general overview of the issue of large-
scale land deals in the country. I will provide input on numbers and trends
as well as the government policies attracting foreign investment in agricul-
ture. The chapter will furthermore provide an overview of the civil society
actors and their responses to the rise in large-scale land deals in the coun-
try.
The country-specific background is followed by the first part of the ana-
lysis: The evaluation of the national legal opportunity structure against the
criteria formulated in chapter 4.1.1. I will take into consideration the gen-
eral tenure system in the country before looking specifically into regula-
tions regarding decision making about foreign land investment deals.
The next two chapters then contain the specific case studies. All four
case studies will be structured into five sub-chapters: The first one provid-
ing some general information on the investment and the process leading
up to the lease or out-grower agreement. Against this background, the sec-
ond sub-chapter contains the comprehensive storyline about the specific
instance of legal mobilization and its outcome. The following two chapters
are then dedicated to explore further the conditions of the company’s re-
sponsivity and the contribution of the support network. The fifth and last
chapter will then summarize central findings in regards to the conditions
identified in the theoretical framework and discuss additional issues rele-
vant to the specific case study.
The country sections end with chapters comparing and discussing the
findings from the two case studies within the country. Apart from the
three conditions identified in my analytical framework and additional rele-
vant conditions will be discussed. Additional conditions are factors that are
relevant for explaining success or failure in individual cases but can be de-
scribed on an abstract level and fit in my analytical framework. Other is-
sues, which showed up in my case studies but are not directly related to
answering my research question, will be discussed as ‘additional issues’.
4.4
4.4 Course of action of the analysis
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They point to possible limits of my framework and further research
desiderata.
The analysis will be finalized in chapter 7 with a comparison and discus-
sion of findings between the two countries.
4. Research design
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Analysis I Sierra Leone
The first empirical chapter deals with Sierra Leone. The small West
African country is thinly populated, with an estimated 7.2 million people
living on 72 thousand km² (World Bank 2018b). The country is divided in-
to the Western Area, making up the peninsula around Freetown, and four
Provinces – the North-Western, Northern, Eastern and Southern
Provinces. They are, in turn, made up of 16 districts, which are divided in-
to 190 chiefdoms – the lowest administrative level in the country. Histori-
cally, the Western Area was a full colony of the British Empire, while the
Provinces had the status of a Protectorate. This division had consequences
for the regulation of land tenure, which plays a decisive role until today
(Conteh/Yeshanew 2016; Sturgess/Flower 2013; Maru 2006).
Local land conflicts are endemic in the country (Sturgess/Flower 2013;
Moyo/Foray 2009) and are regarded as one driving force for the 11 years of
civil war between 1991 and 2002 (Unruh 2008: 99). The civil war left con-
siderable devastation and the country still counts as one of the poorest in
the world, ranking 179th out of 185 countries of the latest Human Devel-
opment Index (UNDP 2016: 200). However, the political system seems to
be stabilizing: Since the end of the war in 2002, four rounds of parliamen-
tary and presidential elections (2002, 2007, 2012 and 2018) have taken
place, including peaceful transferals of power. While political tensions are
high around elections and a cause for violence at times, “the nation state’s
legitimacy is currently not questioned in principle by any relevant group
in Sierra Leone” (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2016: 6).
Before I apply my analytical framework, I will first provide some back-
ground information on large-scale land deals in the country (chap 5.1), in-
cluding the agricultural background, government policies attracting these
deals and reactions by the civil society. In a next step, I will begin with the
first part of the analysis looking at the national legal opportunity structure
in the country (chap 5.2). I will show that from a human rights perspec-
tive, local populations are insufficiently protected. This is mainly due to
the outdated nature of land legislation in the country, which leads to a gap
between customary and statutory law.
5.
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Addax 
Socfin 
Map of Sierra Leone (with districts)
(source of basic map: http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=4922&lang=en, last
visited 15/12/2017)
In the two following chapters, I will show the consequences of this weak
legal opportunity structure and the possibilities local actors still have in
two cases of large-scale land deals.
The investment of Addax (chap 5.3) is located in the districts of Bombali
and Tonkolili and involved 12,000 hectares of sugarcane plantation as well
as a bioethanol plant. When they started the investment, the company
hailed it as sustainable development and was certified by the Roundtable
for Sustainable Biofuels. My research suggests that this background made
the company more willing to listen to local demands, which they did in
the case of one community, which had the support of a pro-bono lawyer.
The second case is the investment of Socfin (chap 5.4), located in Puje-
hun district, in the South of the country. The company created an oil palm
Figure 5
5. Analysis I Sierra Leone
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plantation covering 12,500 hectares in Malen chiefdom. Protests against
the conditions of the land deal appeared early on in the project and local
actors appealed to the Sierra Leonean Human Rights Commission to inter-
vene. However, their mediation attempt failed as well as international ad-
vocacy campaigns. The case shows how difficult it is to influence a compa-
ny, which is not receptive to soft law arguments and has the support of the
local as well as the national government.
Finally, I will discuss overall findings for Sierra Leone (chap 5.5) by
comparing results from both cases.
Large-scale land deals in Sierra Leone
In this chapter, I will start by looking at the overall trends in large-scale
land investments in Sierra Leone (Chap 5.1.1). Chapter 5.1.2 takes a closer
look at government policies behind the investments, while chapter 5.1.3
gives an overview of the response by civil society actors in the country.
Current trends and agricultural background
According to 2016 Land Matrix data, 24 concluded and seven intended
deals were recorded since the year 2000, with a spike in interest in the
years 2010 and 2011. While the number of deals closed per year has de-
creased since 2011, interest in farmland by foreign investors remains un-
abated in Sierra Leone (interview SL32).
The size of the land deals varies greatly with 11 deals smaller than 5,000
hectares, while three deals range between 120,000 and 130,000 hectares.
Ten deals reach a size between 10,000 and 80,000 hectares (Land Matrix
2016: 3). However, only half of the concluded land deals entered into an
active production phase and the size currently under production is smaller
than the original leases. Investors come from 16 different countries with
companies from the UK being the most active – accounting for six invest-
ment projects. Sierra Leonean companies were involved in none of the
concluded deals (Land Matrix 2016: 5).
30 % of the land under lease is for palm oil production followed by
forestry (24 %), agrofuel (23 %) and food crops (19 %). Investment in food
crops usually entails smaller surfaces, whereas palm oil and forestry deals
cover bigger areas (Land Matrix 2016: 6). Former land use was only record-
ed for 11 of the concluded deals and was mainly subsistence agriculture.
5.1
5.1.1
5.1 Large-scale land deals in Sierra Leone
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Data for community negotiations, compensation paid, employment or
community benefits were mostly missing.
No. of intended/concluded deals in Sierra Leone












(Source: Land Matrix 2016)
The existing agricultural system in Sierra Leone is primarily based on
smallholder farms with sizes ranging between 0.5 and 2 hectares. The pri-
mary staple foods grown are rice and cassava followed by sorghum, maize,
millet, groundnut and sweet potato (Asenso-Okyere/Workneh Kebede
2012: 60). Sierra Leone was self-sufficient in rice production up until the
1970s; however, the agricultural sector suffered from government policies
that led to an underprizing of local products while subsidizing cheap im-
ports (Maconachie/Fortin 2013: 259). Structural adjustment programs fos-
tering the privatization of the agricultural sector in the 1980s did not im-
prove the situation, as prizes for farm products remained low and smug-
gling escalated (Keen 2005: 23). Rice production was profoundly affected
during the civil war and considerably reduced food security. After the war,
rice production rates increased but are not able to cover the consumption
in the country (Asenso-Okyere/Workneh Kebede 2012: 53–54).
Table 11
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Most of the farmers in Sierra Leone are subsistence-based, usually with-
out any kind of mechanization19 and often lacking access to credit, seeds
and fertilizers (PRSP II 2008–2012: 26). A bush fallow system is used for
non-tree crops; however, the time in between planting one field declined –
leading to a decrease in soil fertility. Other challenges include missing ex-
pertise on planting and stock-keeping methods, making the introduction
of new crops a challenge (interviews SL3, SL12, SL32). Against this back-
drop, the need to support agricultural development in the country be-
comes apparent.
Sierra Leonean agriculture is mostly based on smallholder farming and
does not – unlike the Philippines – have a lot of historical experiences with
bigger plantations. That does not mean that there are no plantations by
foreign investors. The best-known case is probably the Magbass Sugar
Complex set up as a Chinese development project in the 1970s. The farm
of 1,800 hectares of sugar cane and a sugar processing factory faced a multi-
tude of problems, including economic sustainability and conflicts with lo-
cal communities. Up until today, the project depends on financial and
technical aid from China (Cheng/Taylor 2017: 76–84). Consequently, the
Magbass Sugar Complex is usually regarded as a negative example for for-
eign investment.
Overall most Sierra Leoneans do not have previous experience with
large-scale agricultural plantations by foreign investors. Encounters with
transnational companies usually stem from the natural resources sector,
mainly iron ore, rutile, gold or diamonds. The experiences with these com-
panies are typically mixed: On the one hand, communities are excited
about the economic opportunities. On the other hand, environmental pol-
lution is often drastic, working conditions difficult, local livelihoods are
not improving and conflicts are simmering (Wilson 2013; Zulu/Wilson
2012).
The previous paragraphs show the following: The number of large-scale
land investments closed in the last decade means an unprecedented influx
of foreign investors in the agricultural sector in Sierra Leone – something
the population as well as the government does not have much experience
with. Apart from one or two exemptions, most experience with foreign in-
vestors stems from the natural resource sector, where the benefits for the
local population are at best mixed. Set against this background, the
19 Tractors are sometimes available for hire, but remain out of reach for most small-
holders. Reports indicate that this was different in the 1970s, when the govern-
ment provided the technical infrastructure (Unruh/Turray 2006: 16).
5.1 Large-scale land deals in Sierra Leone
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question of how the government manages the large-scale investments in
agriculture and how the population reacts to it gains relevance.
Government policies to attract foreign investment in agriculture
Agriculture is regarded as a central element for economic growth and
poverty reduction in Sierra Leone. The second Poverty Reduction and
Strategy Paper (PRSP) for the period 2008 to 2012 explicitly made agricul-
ture one of its four top priorities (energy, transport and human develop-
ment being the other three). Support for commercial agriculture – be it
small or large-scale – is seen as crucial for increasing productivity for the
domestic market as well as for export (PRSP II 2008–2012). In line with
these priorities, the Government of Sierra Leone (GoSiL) adopted the Na-
tional Sustainable Agriculture Development Plan for the period 2010–
2030. The Plan contains different sub-programs – among them support for
small-scale farmer commercialization, but also improving the investment
opportunities for medium and large-scale agriculture through a review of
land and investment policies. The overall idea is to encourage commercial-
ization through linking small-scale to large-scale agriculture, which is sup-
posed to open access to markets (NSADP 2010–2030: 29–33).
The two central actors in implementing these policies are the Ministry
of Agriculture Forestry and Food Security (MAFFS) and the Sierra Leone
Investment and Export Promotion Agency (SLIEPA). The MAFFS formu-
lated the vision to “[m]ake agriculture the ‘engine’ for socio-economic
growth and development through commercial agriculture” (Ministry of
Agriculture Forestry and Food Security 2009). To fulfill this vision, it creat-
ed incentives and rules for private investment in agriculture. Investors who
provide a Five-Year-Investment Plan are eligible for exemptions from im-
port taxes and duties for agricultural inputs as well as a general tax holiday
for five years. In individual land deals, more generous tax exemptions can
be granted, as I will describe in more detail when introducing the concrete
cases.
The MAFFS also determined the lease rent of 5 USD per acre per year,
which is then divided among landowners (50 %), district councils20 (20 %),
local administration (20 %) and the national government (10 %). In the
end, a landowner gets 2.50 USD per year per acre (Ministry of Agriculture
5.1.2
20 District Councils govern on the district level and are composed of elected offi-
cials and the Paramount Chiefs of the district.
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Forestry and Food Security 2009). Apart from these incentives, the MAFFS
also sets rules for the investors, which I will describe as part of the legal
opportunity structure in chapter 5.2.2.
The Sierra Leone Investment and Export Promotion Agency (SLIEPA) is
another central actor, as this often is the first government agency in con-
tact with investors. The agency was founded in 2007 with support from the
World Bank. It acts independently of the ministries, even though it is for-
mally attached to the Ministry of Trade (Oakland Institute 2011a: 13–14).
SLIEPA heavily advertises investment in agriculture by emphasizing the
availability of 5.4 million hectares of arable land, favorable climatic condi-
tions and duty-free market access to the European Union and the Unites
States21. SLIEPA promises a first-mover advantage as well as “[e]asy access
to land with smooth facilitation process” (SLIEPA website 2018).
More specifically, investment in palm oil and sugar cane are advertised
by emphasizing high government support combined with low costs for
land and labor. Furthermore, both commodities are suitable for energy
production – another focus of government policies, as only a small share of
the electricity needs in the country is met so far (SLIEPA 2010a, 2010b).
Apart from promoting investment in Sierra Leone, SLIEPA provides infor-
mation and support in the land lease process as well as predefines possible
concession areas (Oakland Institute 2011a: 14).
In 2010, a report commissioned by SLIEPA, claimed that agribusiness
investments would create income for 50,000 families, make the country
self-sufficient in electricity production and increase average household in-
come by $250 per year (Thomas 2/15/2010). The report further claimed
that 3 million hectares of land could be leased to investors without risking
food security in the country (Thomas 2/15/2010). These numbers show the
enormous expectations government authorities linked with large-scale
land investments, while concerns about food security were minimalized.
 
Critique of these government policies comes from civil society and aca-
demics.
First, critics question the availability of unused land. They point out that
the numbers used by the government are unreliable and do not mirror cur-
rent cropping systems. For many crops, a field rotation system is used in
which soil is left fallow for up to 25 years. During the fallow period, the
soil restores itself but is used, for example, for gathering building materials
or as hunting grounds. It is estimated that fallow periods reduced consider-
21 Granted to Sierra Leone as a least developed country.
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ably in the last decades (Oakland Institute 2011a: 16–17; Melsbach/Rahall
2012: 5) (interview SL3). In consequence, the narrative about ‘unused’
land is questioned.
Another, more general critique is the emphasis of the GoSiL on top-
down commercialization and the promotion of agribusiness in the agricul-
tural sector. This focus on the private sector is criticized as ensuring profit
for big business but not smallholder farmers. In this context, the role of
the World Bank is described as pushing for a pro-investment climate, land
privatization and investor protection (Oakland Institute 2011a: 14–15). In
fact, “[t]he Bank ranks Sierra Leone as number two in Africa and number
27 worldwide for investor protection” (Oakland Institute 2011a: 15). Other
authors link the government agenda to the ‘liberal peace project’, which
expects a ‘trickle-down peace’ through free markets and macro-economic
growth (Castañeda 2009: 237; Millar 2016: 570).
Civil society responses and network formation
The first civil society actors to warn of the detrimental effects of large-scale
land deals were international NGOs active in the country. Most likely in-
fluenced by the global outcry about the massive increase in large-scale land
deals globally, development NGOs started to pay attention to this issue in
the country. In some cases, their work was directly impacted by land deals,
as was the case for the German Welthungerhilfe, who was not able to im-
plement a planned livelihood project due to the Socfin land deal (inter-
view SL6). In other cases, NGOs learned about land investments from
their local counterparts (interview SL11) or reached out to local actors be-
cause they were from the country of origin of the investor (interviews
SL51, SL53). This is the case for the Swiss organization Bread for all, or the
Belgium section of FIAN International (FoodFirst Information and Action
Network). In addition, internationally specialized civil society actors like
the American Oakland Institute, a critical policy think tank that publishes
extensively on land grabbing, got interested in Sierra Leone.
Locally, these international actors cooperated with Sierra Leonean devel-
opment or human rights organizations, which already existed but usually
did not have a specific land rights focus (interviews SL19, SL34, SL51). The
Freetown based environmental organization Green Scenery became one
focal point for collaboration between international and Sierra Leonean civ-
il society actors (interview SL2). Several fact-finding missions and reports
(Melsbach/Rahall 2012; Rahall/Schäfter 2011; Oakland Institute 2011a; Ac-
5.1.3
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tion Aid 2013; Christian Aid 2013) were produced by these national and
international organizations. The criticized missing transparency, insuffi-
cient community consultations, inadequate compensation, broken promis-
es and warned of detrimental socio-economic effects, especially on food se-
curity.
In the beginning, cooperation between local Sierra Leonean civil society
actors and activists was limited. As land rights had not been a central issue,
there was no preexisting civil society network in that regard. Eventually,
local actors and organizations were brought together in April 2012 for the
first ‘Land Owners and Land Users Conference’, which was organized by
Green Scenery and the Sierra Leone Network on the Right to Food (SiL-
NoRF) and financed by the Oakland Institute. The conference led to a
joint communique and the foundation of the ‘Action for Large Scale Land
Acquisition Transparency’ (ALLAT) Network (Oakland Institute 2012).
The network comprises both national Freetown-based NGOs as well as lo-
cally-focused organizations throughout the country. Since its inception,
the network, which was set up as a watchdog for large-scale land deals, has
evolved considerably. (interview SL6). Funding comes from international
donors such as the Welthungerhilfe (through the German Ministry for
Economic Cooperation and Development), Search for Common Ground
or Christian Aid (interviews SL9, SL33). The network is regarded as an im-
portant way to exchange information, expertise and experience (interview
SL9). Regular national land conferences that provide space for sharing sto-
ries and disseminate information have taken place in the last years (inter-
views SL2, SL6). At the same time, the network funds project of individual
organizations that work on large-scale land deals and land rights issues (in-
terview SL9, SL19, SL48).
Most importantly, the network is regarded as a way to amplify the voice
of single organizations and to make issues around specific large-scale land
deals known to the national and international public (interview SL6).
“For us we think ALLAT came really at the right time. It's a blessing
for us. Because the government is taking us seriously now, because we
are together – a network. The companies are taking us seriously now
because they know, I mean, our voice does not only stay at the com-
munity level.” (interview SL33)
Apart from specific advocacy in regards to large-scale land investment,
Sierra Leonean civil society organizations and the ALLAT network more
specifically are involved in two interrelated policy processes: the imple-
mentation of the Voluntary Guidelines on the Responsible Governance of
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Tenure (VGGT) and the development of a new land policy. Sierra Leone
was chosen as a pilot country for the VGGT (Koch/Schulze 02/12/2017).
The process, which is led by the FAO in cooperation with five Sierra
Leonean ministries, grants civil society actors a permanent space for partic-
ipation with three seats in steering committees and working groups (inter-
view SL4). This access opens up a direct communication channel to rele-
vant ministries for the civil society (interview SL33).
Apart from the VGGT, a process to develop a new land policy has been
going on since 2009. This land policy is regarded as an essential step to re-
form outdated land legislation and create a coherent system for land gover-
nance. Civil society actors, as well as the VGGT working groups, were able
to comment on the drafts. Many of the suggested changes were accepted
by the government. In consequence, the National Land Policy, which was
launched in 2017, received a lot of positive feedback from civil society ac-
tors. The new policy provides CSOs with a new advocacy tool and is cur-
rently promoted extensively in the country (interviews SL4, SL19, SL26).
The issue of large-scale land deals seems to have fostered civil society ac-
tivism around land rights in Sierra Leone. Funded through international
NGOs, a broad network, including local and national-level organizations,
has developed. Civil society actors do not only organize around specific
land deals but also support the implementation of the VGGT and advocate
for a change of laws and policies on the national level.
National legal opportunity structure in Sierra Leone
The existing land governance system in Sierra Leone has received consider-
able criticism. The new National Land Policy, which aims to reform the
system, describes it as “not only chaotic but also becoming increasingly un-
sustainable” (Government of Sierra Leone 2015: 1).
This chapter will first take a closer look at the land tenure system with a
particular focus on the right to transfer use rights (chap 5.2.1). It will be-
come clear that national statutory law and customary law are not in line,
which leaves customary landowners without formal legal protection. In a
second step, I will turn to specific laws and regulations concerning large-
scale land deals (chap 5.2.2). The last subchapter (chap 5.2.3) will then use
this information to assess the NLOS against the criteria formulated in the
methods chapter. The current national legal opportunity structure has to
be regarded as mostly unfavorable to local concerns, a situation the new
National Land Policy tries to remedy in the future.
5.2
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Existing land tenure system and central laws
The land tenure system in Sierra Leone is usually described as bifurcated
or pluralistic (Conteh/Yeshanew 2016; Sturgess/Flower 2013; Maru 2006)
being ruled by statutory law and private land ownership in the Western
area, and by customary law in the Provinces. As all large-scale land deals in
the country are located in the Provinces, I will focus on the tenure system
and the relevant laws regulating land transfers there and exclude the West-
ern area from my discussion.
 
The Sierra Leonean constitution does not make any reference to the gover-
nance of land or the function of land in the socio-economic context of the
society (Republic of Sierra Leone 1991). Socio-economic human rights
such as the right to an adequate standard of living or the right to food are
not mentioned in the text, even though the country is party to all major
international human rights treaties. However, the protection of property
from unlawful expropriation is in the constitution (Davies 2015: 4–5). The
constitution does, however, acknowledg that the state should “place prop-
er and adequate emphasis on agriculture in all its aspects so as to ensure
self-sufficiency in food production” (Republic of Sierra Leone 1991: para
7.d). However, this stipulation is only meant to guide the government and
does not imply any rights or enforcement in court (Republic of Sierra
Leone 1991: para 14). Furthermore, the constitution acknowledges existing
customary regulations, which are mostly unwritten, as law of the country
but does not make any further provisions, for example, in case of conflic-
tive contents (Republic of Sierra Leone 1991: para 170). In consequence,
the constitution has to be regarded as weak when it comes to the protec-
tion of land rights in general and, in particular, of customary land rights.
The silence of the constitution on land issues is filled by the Provinces
Land Act Cap 122, which governs land transactions in the Provinces. The
law was signed in 1927 under the colonial administration and was simply
taken over by the independent Republic of Sierra Leone 1961. The law de-
fines that “all land in the Provinces is vested in the Chiefdom Council who
hold such land for and on behalf of the native communities concerned”
(Cap. 122: Preamble). Regarding land transactions, it is then the Chiefdom
Council22, under the chair of the Paramount Chief, who decide about rent-
5.2.1
22 ““Chiefdom Council” means paramount chiefs and their councillors [sic], and
men of note, or sub-chiefs and their councillors [sic], and men of note” (Cap.
122: sec 2).
5.2 National legal opportunity structure in Sierra Leone
123
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748907602, am 02.12.2021, 19:08:03
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
ing23 land to ‘non-natives’, which is “any person who is not entitled by cus-
tomary law rights in land in a Province” (Cap. 122: sec 2). Lease agree-
ments can be up to 50 years with a possible extension of 21 years. These
provisions of Cap 122 grant the main decision making power to the
Chiefs, making no provisions for the consultation of other stakeholders in
the case of foreign land investments (Davies 2015: 17). At the same time,
the law contains far-reaching competencies for the president of Sierra
Leone24, such as the right to fix the “settlers’ fees”, to prescribe “the terms
to be embodied in leases” or to define how the rents are distributed (Cap.
122: 16.).
Officially a concessions Act Cap 121 was put in place in 1931, regulating
land concessions larger than 5000 acres; however, it was never used and is
not applied today (SLIEPA 2010c: 4). The Provinces Land Act is, therefore,
the only statutory law regulating land transfers in the Provinces.
The Provinces Land Act largely ignores realities on the ground. Custom-
ary ‘landowning families’ control land in the Provinces. ‘Outsiders’ or
‘land users’, who are not a member of a landowning family, have to seek
permission to use a piece of land and usually pay rent in the form of parts
of the yield. The chiefdom authorities typically have to approve these ar-
rangements; however, their degree of influence over these questions varies
from region to region. Despite this variation, a household survey in seven
districts shows that in most regions, the central authority to control land
lies with the landowning families. In six out of the seven districts, the re-
spondents ascribed landowners more than 70 % of the power over land
(Conteh/Yeshanew 2016: 5–6). So, while the Paramount Chief has to ap-
prove all land matters, the main decision-making power lies with the
landowning families:
“The way it works under the customary tenure system is the following:
If I, as a stranger, want to use land, I go to the landowning family. I
have to meet the head of this family and sign an agreement with them.
The PC will then sign the agreement as well. It is a sort of control
function.” (interview SL36)
In this way, statutory law, as instilled in the Provinces Land Act, clearly
contradicts customary norms and disregards customary ownership rights.
Yet, even more, land users’ rights are neither mentioned by Cap 122 nor
23 Purchase of land is not allowed in the Provinces.
24 The law itself actually speaks about the “Governor in Council” referring to the
President today (SLIEPA 2010c).
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do they receive much protection in customary law. Land users make up be-
tween 20–40 % of the population in the chiefdoms and their use rights
vary considerably from region to region (Unruh 2008: 102). Sometimes
they are banned from making permanent improvements to the land such
as growing tree crops (Unruh 2008: 102). Similarly to land users, women
have relatively little control over land in many regions, even if they belong
to landowning families (Conteh/Yeshanew 2016: 6).
Local grievance mechanisms in the case of tenure disputes do exist. In
most cases of local land conflicts, the population calls on the chiefs to me-
diate and arbitrate25. Yet, the fairness of these processes is regularly called
into question (Conteh/Yeshanew 2016: 23–24). A formalized mechanism
are local courts, which use both customary and statutory law and are part
of the formal judiciary in the country (Conteh/Yeshanew 2016: 8). How-
ever, the jurisdiction of local courts is limited to ‘native’ parties, excluding
cases against companies (Kabbah 2014). If local actors have complaints
about large-scale land deals, they can not file it with a Local Court but are
restricted to chiefdom or district authorities.
Regulations regarding foreign land investments and grievance
mechanisms
Apart from the characteristics of the land tenure system in the country,
specific laws and guidelines exist regarding foreign investors in agriculture.
The most relevant law is the Environmental Protection Agency Act, which
creates an oversight agency equipped with authority. Other policies create
some guidelines for investors but are not clear in their consequences. The
new National Land Policy, sets out an ambitious reform of the land tenure
system, but has only been developed lately and not yet been implemented.
One of the laws relevant for large-scale land deals is the Environmental
Protection Agency Act of 2008, which created the Environment Protection
Agency (EPA) and defined its mandate. The act requires investing com-
panies to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment prior to the in-
vestment, for which the EPA will then provide a license (Davies 2015: 17).
The EPA can react to complaints and investigate individual cases. It does
have the power to change or withdraw a license in the case of environmen-
5.2.2
25 Other customary means of solving land disputes are the calling on family heads,
religious leaders, or secret societies, which receive high respect in rural Sierra
Leone (Conteh/Yeshanew 2016: 23–25).
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tal misconduct (Conteh/Yeshanew 2016: 16). The agency, therefore, has
possibilities to sanction companies, making these provisions ard law ac-
cording to my definition. Yet, these competencies only refer to environ-
mental issues (Conteh/Yeshanew 2016: 16).
In addition to hard laws like the EPA Act or the Provinces Land Act,
soft law policy documents formulate rules specifically for foreign large-
scale land-based investments. Especially interesting are the investment pol-
icies formulated by the Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Food Security
(MAFFS) and the guidelines for investors by the Sierra Leone Investment
and Export Promotion Agency (SLIEPA).
Apart from describing investment incentives, the document of the
MAFFS makes some recommendations for large-scale land-based invest-
ments, which are meant to ensure socio-economic benefits for the local
population. For example, land targeted for biofuels production should not
be land used for food growing, investment plans should contain provisions
for youth employment, 5–20 % of company shares should be offered to
Sierra Leoneans and every investment should contain an out-grower
scheme (Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Food Security 2009). How-
ever, it is not clear how these provisions are implemented, translated into
technical procedures or monitored. In fact, it seems that investors simply
ignore these recommendations (Kaindaneh 2015: 73).
In addition, the policy of the MAFFS describes the option that the Gov-
ernment can act as an intermediary and lease land from the communities
for the investors (Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Food Security 2009:
para 7). Interestingly, the consultation of local communities or even just of
landowning families is not mentioned in the policy26. Overall, the policy
has the main aim to attract investors and only contains some provisions in
regards to ensuring socio-economic benefits for local communities. Yet,
those provisions remain unspecific and enforcement unregulated.
In contract to the MAFFS policy, the guidelines for investors by SLIEPA
go into more detail about the actual leasing process: They specifically men-
tion landowners and recommend that they be included in the lease pro-
cess. The document furthermore spells out that the Environmental, Social
and Health Impact Assessment (ESHIA) requires that the process is adapt-
ed to the needs of the communities whose free, prior and informed con-
sent (FPIC principle) is necessary. In making these provisions, the docu-
26 The only time agreement of communities is mentioned is in regards to the devel-
opment of social responsibility packages (Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and
Food Security 2009: para 14).
5. Analysis I Sierra Leone
126
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748907602, am 02.12.2021, 19:08:03
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
ment refers to the Equator Principles. However, the far-reaching FPIC
principle only applies to the ESHIA process and not the lease agreement,
which is supposed to be signed with the Chiefdom Council and ‘represen-
tatives’ of landowners (SLIEPA 2010c). The SLIEPA guidelines, therefore,
go further than the MAFFS policy when it comes to the inclusion of
landowners and other community members. Especially the ESHIA is re-
garded as a way to inform and receive the consent of affected communi-
ties. However, the process is suggested as ‘best practice’ and does not
present enforceable rules (SLIEPA 2010c).
Overall, both policy documents are designed to attract investors and the
provisions they provide for the protection of the local population seem to
be mere guidelines with no oversight and enforcement procedures.
 
Another policy document, which is a lot more far-reaching, is the new Na-
tional Land Policy, which was adopted in 2015 and officially launched in
March 2017. The process of developing the new policy was very inclusive
(interviews SL4, SL26). The document mirrors many recommendations of
the VGGT and is therefore not only described as a significant step for land
reform in Sierra Leone but also a best practice example for the implemen-
tation of the VGGT (Koch/Schulze 02/12/2017). The Land Policy suggests
substantial changes such as streamlining statutory and customary law, pro-
tecting customary tenure rights and creating land committees on the na-
tional, district and local levels (Government of Sierra Leone 2015).
Regarding foreign land investment, the National Land Policy limits the
lease for non-citizens to 50 years and a size of 5000 hectares. Local land
banks are supposed to be developed with the participation of the local pop-
ulation, to identify suitable land for investment. The Land Policy further-
more demands that the “free, prior and informed consent of communities, land
owners and users” (Government of Sierra Leone 2015: 67) has to be ob-
tained for a planned land investment. Also, legal assistance should be
made available to local communities through a special fund. Grievance
mechanisms should be set up by the company but also by the government.
Impact studies, including expected effects on food security, need to be con-
ducted before an investment as well as monitoring of ongoing projects
(Government of Sierra Leone 2015: 66–67).
The National Land Policy is undoubtedly an important step in the direc-
tion of better protection of local tenure rights; however, the implementa-
tion process is just beginning. While the Land Policy can play a role in the
revision of existing leases (Government of Sierra Leone 2015: 67) in the
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next couple of years, it was not yet of relevance in the cases studied in
chapter 5.3 and 5.4.
From the discussion of the existing law and policy documents produced
by the MAFFS and SLIEPA it becomes clear that formal grievance mechan-
isms for local actors affected by large-scale land deals are limited. The only
hard law mechanism is the EPA and the possibility to file a complaint,
which is then processed through an investigation and can lead to the im-
position of fines or the withdrawal of the environmental license (Conteh/
Yeshanew 2016: 17). The policy documents do not prescribe clear responsi-
bilities and enforcement possibilities. In consequence, different govern-
ment agencies do get involved in mediating or arbitrating in conflicts be-
tween local communities and companies, for example, the Ministry of
Lands27, the Office of National Security chaired by the President, the Hu-
man Rights Commission or District Councils (Conteh/Yeshanew 2016:
14–19). However, these agencies often act in an ad-hoc manner and are li-
mited to mediation and fostering dialogue. In many instances, local com-
plainants did not receive any responses from administrative officials (Con-
teh/Yeshanew 2016: 29). Overall, both formal, as well as informal
grievance mechanisms, do not receive a lot of trust form large shares of the
population, who regard them as unfair and corrupt (Conteh/Yeshanew
2016).
Evaluating the national legal opportunity structure
Set against the background of the previous two chapters, I will now turn to
evaluating the national legal opportunity structure against the criteria for-
mulated in chapter 4.1.1. It will become clear that Sierra Leone presents an
unfavorable legal opportunity structure for local actors affected by large-
scale land deals.
The first element of a veto right for smallholders is fulfilled neither
through the statutory land tenure system, which omits customary rights in
the process of land transfers, nor through additional policy documents spe-
cific to foreign investment in land. While the SLIEPA guidelines explain
the importance of including customary landowners, they are not binding
but rather ‘best practices’ for investing companies. Smallholders, be they
members of landowning families or land users, do not have a formalized
veto right.
5.2.3
27 Full name: Ministry of Lands, Country Planning and the Environment.
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The second element of ensuring that smallholders can make informed
decisions is only fulfilled to a limited degree. The EPA does require in-
vestors in land to submit an Environmental, Social and Health Impact As-
sessment (ESHIA) before they receive an environmental license. SLIEPA
furthermore makes some recommendations on how the ESHIA process
should be organized, including the translation into the local language
(SLIEPA 2010c). Yet, affected communities usually do not receive any kind
of legal advice or assistance in order to make an informed decision:
“In fact, no relevant provision can be located in the legal framework
on professional assistance to ensure that men and women are aware of
their tenure rights and can participate in related consultation.” (Davies
2015: 17)
The third element of ensuring that land investments are economically ben-
eficial is nearly wholly absent. The policy document of the MAFFS makes
some provisions as described in the previous chapter. Yet, as pointed out
these provisions are not very specific and lack any kind of implementation
and enforcement rules. Even more, incentives for companies as described
earlier led to a situation in which the country can hardly profit at all:
“There seems to be no government policy to ensure that the public
captures benefits arising from changes in permitted land use. On the
contrary, investors are given subsidies in the form of tax holidays. Agri-
cultural investments benefit from 10-year corporate tax holidays and
zero import duty. The country allows 100 percent foreign ownership
of enterprise ownership in all sectors; there are no restrictions on for-
eign exchange, no limits on expatriate employees and full repatriation
of profits, dividends and royalties.” (Kaindaneh 2015: 71)
Similarly to the third element, the fourth element is mostly absent. Apart
from the Environmental Protection Agency, which overlooks environmen-
tal concerns and has the mandate to enforce legislation in this regard, most
government agencies and administrators only act on an ad-hoc basis.
While these mechanisms are often easier and cheaper to access than the
formal judiciary system, “these institutions do not have clearly defined
processes for receiving and resolving disputes and have not consistently
documented processes and outcomes” (Conteh/Yeshanew 2016: ix). At the
same time, no ministry seems to have an explicit mandate for oversight
over all large-scale land investments in the country and there are, for exam-
ple, no official statistics about how much land has been leased in the
Provinces (Kaindaneh 2015: 70).
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Overall, the NLOS does not present favorable opportunities for local ac-
tors affected by large-scale land deals. Statutory land law does not explicitly
recognize customary ownership and use rights and therefore does not give
smallholders a possibility to veto an investor. Furthermore, there are no
binding regulations that would ensure that the local population profits
from an investment. Local actors, therefore, will have difficulties to draw
on the law in achieving their goals. I will show this in the next two chap-
ters, in which I analyze legal mobilization attempts in the case of the Ad-
dax and the Socfin investment.
Case I: Addax Bioenergy – success through legal representation
The large-scale land investment by Addax Bioenergy28 was considered a big
win in the attempts of the Sierra Leonean Government to attract foreign
investment in biofuels. Its goals overlapped with the second PRSP (2008–
2012) and the investment received widespread support as a private devel-
opment project (African Development Bank Group 2011b). The invest-
ment was hoped to be a “model for sustainable investment in Africa” (Addax
Bioenergy 2013) and the company went beyond national legal obligations
in securing the consent of local landowners (Addax Bioenergy/FAO).
In the case study, I argue that this picture of a responsible and sustain-
able investment following international standards created some space for
local actors to achieve their demands. One community – the community
of Masethleh29 – did so successfully. Nonetheless, they relied on outside
support to get their voice credibly across to the company. The case, there-
fore, shows that international market-based instruments can create some
leverage for local actors if locals have the necessary outside support. How-
ever, the case also shows the limits of these instruments. The degree of
what the community was able to decide about, was minimal – mainly due
to the insufficient national legal framework in place at the time.
In a first step, I will provide an overview of the investment of Addax
Bioenergy with a focus on the consultation stage leading up to the signing
5.3
28 In 2016 the majority shares of the project were sold to Sunbird (Awoko
3/10/2016). However, as I focus on the phase leading up the signing of the lease
agreements I refer to the investment project as the Addax case in my analysis.
29 In some reports the name of the village is spelled Masethele (Conteh 2015) or
Masetheleh (African Development Bank Group 2011a: 20), I did however stick to
the spelling used by the local NGO (SiLNoRF 2013), which corroborates the
spelling my translator used.
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of the agreements (chap 5.3.1). These elaborations provide the necessary
background to understand the story of the community of Masethleh,
which was able to negotiate their own agreement with the company (chap
5.3.2). In a next step, I will show the relevance of the conditions identified
in the analytical framework. I argue that the company’s reputation as a
poster child for responsible biofuels investment in Africa and the stan-
dards set by development banks created a space for local agency (chap
5.3.3). However, support by NGOs and a pro bono lawyer was a necessary
condition for local actors to make use of that space (chap 5.3.4). The case
can be seen as an example of possible positive impacts of private soft law
regulation, but also shows limitations of what can be achieved. I will dis-
cuss these chances and challenges in chapter 5.3.5.
Overview of the investment of Addax Bioengery
The Swiss company Addax Bioenergy invested 400–500 million USD30
(Lanzet 2016: 27) in a 12,000-hectare sugarcane plantation, a bioethanol re-
finery and a power plant in the North of the country. The investment
reaches across the three Chiefdoms of Makari Gbanti, Bombali Shebora
and Malal Mara, located in the districts of Bombali and Tonkolili. The
project intended to export bioethanol to Europe, produce electricity for
the national grid and employ between 3000 and 400031 people (Memoran-
dum of Understanding and Agreement 2010). The Environmental, Social
and Health Impact Assessment prepared in 2011 estimated that about
13,500 people living in 60 villages were affected by the investment project.
While only 77 people needed to be directly resettled, other affected peo-
ple faced economic displacement due to the loss of access to land (African
5.3.1
30 There are no exact numbers of how much money was invested by the company
and its successor to date, however, it could be as much as up to 500 million USD
(Lanzet 2016: 32) – a number which was also confirmed in an interview with a
former staff member from the management level (interview SL54).
31 These numbers do of course vary and include different forms of employment. In
2015, 3850 Sierra Leoneans were employed of which 132 had fixed monthly
salaries, 1472 had permanent contracts but were payed on a daily basis and 2243
causal workers, which were only contracted for three to six months (SiLNoRF
2016: 13). In one interview frustration was expressed about the way workers were
counted: The official numbers were the total amount of people who got a con-
tract throughout the year, even though most people only had short-term con-
tracts and were not employed at the same time (interview SL13).
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Development Bank Group 2011b: 7). To adequately compensate for the
loss of farmland, the company set up a Farmer Development Program,
which included the provision of land, seeds, farmer’s training and farm
services (African Development Bank Group 2011b: 11; SiLNoRF 2016: 14).
Apart from these mitigation measures, the company implemented a stake-
holder engagement program including village level committees, grievances
and community liaison officers as well as a multistakeholder-forum. Dur-
ing forums meetings, senior management staff inform chiefdom councils
and influential landowners about the company’s actions (interview S15).
Despite efforts to create a ‘socially responsible’ project, the company re-
ceived considerable criticism in regards to the consultation process (Action
Aid 2013), insufficient compensation payments, unfair recruitment
practices (interview SL15), lack of training and job opportunities (inter-
views SL13, SL14, SL17), problems with the Farmers Development Pro-
gram (Action Aid 2013: 7) and issues around the change of watercourses
and drinking water contamination (SiLNoRF 2016: 20–21). Addax reacted
to criticism and usually tried to solve the problems, which was positively
acknowledged by a monitoring NGO (SiLNoRF 2016: 12). Nonetheless,
the project got under extreme pressure from international NGOs, and was
labeled a ‘land grab’ by some (FIAN Österreich 2015; Action Aid 2013: 3).
Between 2009 and 2011, consultations and negotiations took place at the
government level, with Chiefdom Councils and with local landowners
leading to the signing of three types of agreements (African Development
Bank Group 2011b: 2). In February 2010, a Memorandum of Understand-
ing was signed with the Government of Sierra Leone, in which the project
was roughly outlined and certain guarantees and tax incentives were grant-
ed. Apart from some vague language regarding possible benefits for the lo-
cal population through the creation of infrastructure and jobs in the
recitals of the contract, no obligations of the company towards the local
population or in regards to customary land use rights were defined in the
document (Memorandum of Understanding and Agreement 2010).
Besides the MoU, the lease agreement was signed with each of the three
Chiefdom Councils, who are the decisive land authority as defined in the
Provinces Land Act Cap 122 (as described in chap 5.2.1). Initially, 57,000
hectares were leased for 50 years, but Addax surrendered most of the land
not needed in the first five years of the lease (African Development Bank
Group 2011b: 2) and now holds 23,500 hectares (SiLNoRF/Bread for All
2017: 4). The rent was set at 5 USD per acre per year as defined by the rec-
ommendations of the MAFFS (Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and Food
Security 2009). The lease agreement does not only cover land used for
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plantations but the villages and surrounding environment as well. The
agreement guarantees the company sweeping rights such as the right to
change any watercourse or restrict access to certain areas (Land Lease
Agreement: para 4.4 & 4.6).
In addition to the lease agreement, Addax also signed so-called Acknowl-
edgement Agreements (AA) with landowners, thereby recognizing the cus-
tomary tenure system. According to the company, “[t]his is the first time
that landowners’ rights are contractually confirmed by a company in Sierra
Leone” (Addax Bioenergy/FAO: 3). In addition to part of the lease money,
the landowners, who signed an AA with the company, receive some extra
annual payments. The explanatory note of the lease agreement stipulates
that the wishes of the landowners will be respected even though that is not
guaranteed:
“If a traditional landowner is unwilling to acknowledge ABSL's lease
rights, then no amount will be paid directly to that landowner and it is
likely that ABSL will surrender that area back to the Chiefdom Coun-
cil (so no rent will be payable).” (Land Lease Agreement: explanatory
note para 1.4)
Essentially, these three types of agreements, the Memorandum of Under-
standing, the Lease Agreement and the Acknowledgement Agreements
(AAs), constitute the legal ground for the investment. In a next step, I take
a closer look at the local consultations surrounding the lease agreements
and AAs.
The company described the local negotiation and consultation process
as follows:
“The land lease draft was discussed and negotiated in several meetings
over a period of eleven months. It was first introduced to the Districts
and Chiefdom officials and traditional landowners, who in turn were
tasked with discussing the document further with their communities.
Meetings were subsequently held with affected villages. Invitations to
meetings were sent out to landowners and transport costs were provid-
ed to attend meetings. During the period following the meetings,
stakeholders were encouraged to send their questions and comments
relating to the lease agreement to their lawyer for further discussion
with Addax Bioenergy.” (Addax Bioenergy/FAO)
This process seems very thorough at first sight. However, the actual process
appeared more problematic. The mentioned lawyer was paid by Addax,
which arose the suspicion of affected people that he would not work in
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their interest (interview SL14). Some communities do not seem to have ev-
er been in contact with the assigned lawyer (interviews SL13, SL14). In
consequence, chiefdom authorities and landowning families did not re-
ceive proper legal advice (Conteh; SiLNoRF 2013: 14). At the same time,
community members were told during village meetings that the govern-
ment, as well as the chiefdom authorities, stood behind the investment
project. It seems that the Member of Parliament for the region also made
promises about boreholes, schools and clinics – something the company
had never agreed on (SiLNoRF 2014: 6). This combination of a missing
understanding of the details of the agreements and the social pressure built
up through local elites seems to have led to a situation in which landown-
ers often did not understand what they were signing. A member of the Un-
versity of Makeni, who mediates between communities and the company,
described the process in these words:
“So communities looked at community leaders and ended up signing
those documents without having a proper understanding. And, in
some isolated cases, they would even be given instructions by mem-
bers of parliament, or maybe the paramount chief. They said: go ahead
and sign.” (interview SL10)
Apart from the social pressure, the potential compensation paid as well as
the outlook of having salaries was something that convinced local farmers
to agree. However, they often had no clear understanding of how much
value they generated for their own consumption through the land (Anane/
Abiwu 2011: 37). In consequence, the process leading up to the signing of
the lease agreements was criticized as not fulfilling FPIC standards by in-
ternational NGOs (Action Aid 2013; Oakland Institute 2011b).
In the end, all communities signed the Acknowledgement Agreements
without any further negotiation – apart from one: the village of Masethleh.
Legal representation for the village of Masethleh
The story of the village of Masethleh stands out in the overall investment
project of Addax. Unlike all other communities, the landowners of the vil-
lage refused to sign the Acknowledgement Agreement. Through the sup-
port of a pro bono lawyer organized by a local NGO, the community nego-
tiated with the company and achieved the outcome they had wanted: The
agreement contained a smaller portion of their land than initially envis-
aged.
5.3.2
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The community of Masethleh consists of 66 houses and lies in the mid-
dle of the project area. The community name means ‘enough’ in Temne,
the local language, and was given to the village, as food was abundant (in-
terview SL14). When the company first approached the community, an
Addax representative explained to them about the planned sugar cane
plantation in two subsequent meetings in the village. Some of the villagers
also attended outside meetings where community members from all three
chiefdoms were present. In these meetings, the Paramount Chiefs told
them that they had agreed to the investment and that the company would
now be approaching the landowners.
At one particular regional gathering, the community members learned
that a lawyer had been hired by the company to represent the affected
landowners. According to one interviewee, this news was not well per-
ceived as the community members did not believe that the lawyer would
act in their interest, as the company paid him. They furthermore never had
any personal contact with the lawyer (interview SL14).
In the meantime, the project went ahead with Addax using GPS to sur-
vey the land and identify landowning families, of which there are seven in
the community (interview SL27). Company representatives tried to con-
vince the landowners to sign by explaining to the community that they
would pay lease for all of the land but only use a small part for the planta-
tion (interview SL14). This arrangement was used in all communities: The
whole land, including the villages themselves, was leased, while only parts
of it were used for the actual plantation (interview SL54)32. However, this
plan seemed to have made community members suspicious, and they de-
cided not to sign.
One community member described the decision in the following way:
“We don’t have money neither education, all we have is the land. So if we
see people are coming to take away the only thing we have, we would not
accept” (interview SL27). The community was furthermore worried about
the prospects of future generations, who would not have land left to work
on. The villagers also consulted with community members living in the
city and overseas. They advised them to lease only a smaller portion of the
land (interview SL27).
At the same time, the company, as well as chiefdom authorities, repeat-
edly asked the community to sign. The people in the community felt that
32 According to an interview with a former company employee, this was done to
make planning of surrounding infrastructure such as water-pipelines easier (inter-
view SL54).
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they could not wholly reject the agreement, as the government and the
chiefdom authorities were behind the deal. They furthermore wanted to
profit from the company in terms of jobs, the Farmer Development Pro-
gram and other possible benefits (interviews SL14, interview SL27). How-
ever, they felt uncomfortable with what was presented to them. Through a
radio show (interview SL 28) community members learned about the local
NGO Sierra Leone Network on the Right to Food (SiLNoRF), which is
based in Makeni and monitored the investment project right from the start
(interview SL11). Staff members of the NGO came to the village to find
out more about the issue and promised to help. In the meantime, all the
other communities in the region had signed the agreements and Addax
representatives revisited Masethleh to convince the community to agree
and to pay them their lease money (interview SL14). Amidst this mount-
ing pressure, SiLNoRF connected the villagers with a lawyer from the legal
empowerment NGO Namati. The lawyer presented much needed legal
support for the community:
“We are not educated, so in that respect, we want somebody who is
legally grounded to represent us. We have some issues of land with Ad-
dax and they have been all along asking us to sign an agreement with
them; but we told them that we cannot just sign like that, we need to
understand the details of the agreement before we sign, but unfortu-
nately, none of us can read.” (interview SL14)
SiLNoRF, together with staff from Namati, organized various community
meetings. One aim was to find out what the community wanted and if the
community was united in their opinion. Another aim was to educate the
community about the content of the lease and the acknowledgment agree-
ments and their rights (interviews SL26, SL28). Meetings were held with
different groups within the community, such as women and youth, to in-
clude not only the landowners but everyone. NGO staff also tried to iden-
tify the possible impacts of the investment (Conteh 2015: 166). At the
same time, the NGOs were aware of the legal limitations in this case:
“We advised the community to give them something, because legally
the company controls all the land in the whole area anyway – even the
houses and the villages, legally it’s all theirs and they know that.” (in-
terview SL29)
In the end, the community decided to lease 622 acres of their land instead
of the envisaged 2622 acres the company had wanted (interview SL14).
However, conflicts arose, as some of the leaders of the community, who
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were also landowners, wanted to sign away more land. Leasing more land
meant more lease money for the landowning families – and especially the
elders in those families. This situation created considerable confusion as
the lawyer of the community recounts:
“You had some of the community leaders, who allowed the company
to get through to them. […] after they would have agreed in the meet-
ing that this is what we will do and then once we leave, come back to
Freetown and go back to our offices, you would begin to hear com-
plaints […] the Addax guy would call me: Your clients are not really
sure of what they want.” (interview SL51)
The NGO staff addressed this issue openly in a meeting with the whole
community. Community members stood up against their leaders to de-
fend the decision they had taken together:
“[T]he community was quite forthright in addressing those leaders:
‘Listen, what we've agreed on here is the way forward, and if you don't
like it we'll remove you as the leader, because you're not seeking the
interest of the community […].’ So that was quite amazing, the fact
that the community could stand up, men and young folks, they actual-
ly said no, we do not want this, what we've said is what we've said.”
(interview SL51)
With all the back and forth, the negotiations had been dragging on for
over two years, before the community of Maselthleh and Addax finally
agreed on the lease area of 622 acres (interview SL14). The agreement was
signed during a meeting in the village, witnessed by the lawyer from Na-
mati and representatives from SiLNoRF. The lawyer read the deal to the
present community members and showed a map of how the land would
be accorded (Poindexter 3/14/2013). The landowners then thumb printed
the agreement, and representatives from SiLNoRF signed as a witness (in-
terview SL27). To this day, the community seems very content with the re-
sult of the negotiations. They were able to keep most of their land while
profiting from the company through the Farmer Development Program as
well as employment for some of the young men33 (interview SL27).
33 This does not mean that there were no complaints raised in the village. Village
members demanded an extension of the Farmer Development Program beyond
the three years, skills training, more jobs, a hospital and a school (interviews
SL14, SL27).
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The success of Masethleh in protecting their interests can be ascribed to
two elements: First, it was the setup of additional Acknowledgement
Agreements, which opened up the possibility for local actors to voice their
interests. Even though in most cases affected communities were not aware
of their option, the community of Masethleh used the opportunity to raise
their concerns. Essentially, the AAs recognized local landowners as rele-
vant stakeholders, something not done by national law. Second, outside
supporters of the community did not only help to enter into negotiations
with the company but also facilitated joint decision-making and unity
within the village. The role of NGO staff was, therefore, broader than that
of mere legal representation and included inner-community mediation.
The Addax project: a poster child for responsible investment
Right from the beginning, the project was supported by the African Devel-
opment Bank, which meant that AfDB’s environmental and social policies
were applied as well as IFC Performance Standards. Fulfilling these stan-
dards was essential to secure further funding from developing banks,
which covered over half of the initial financing (FIAN Österreich 2015: 2).
A total of seven development banks issued individual loans of up to 25
million Euros, and two banks, the Swedfund and the Dutch FMO, even
became shareholders (Lanzet 2016: 27).
Together with national laws, IFC standards presented the framework for
the Environmental, Social and Health Impact Assessment (ESHIA)
(African Development Bank Group 2011b) and the Comprehensive Reset-
tlement Policy Framework (African Development Bank Group 2011a), the
two documents outlining the Social and Environmental Management Pro-
gram of the investor. One of the main socio-economic concern was the
“loss or reduced access to livelihood assets” (African Development Bank
Group 2011b: 10). To mitigate against the issue of land loss and possible
economic displacement, the Acknowledgement Agreements, which in-
clude direct payments to landowners, were regarded as one instrument.
Together with the Farmers Development Program, skills training, lease
payments and crop compensation the AA payments were hoped to “ade-
quately deal with impacts related to food and livelihood security” (African
Development Bank Group 2011b: 19).
The idea for the Acknowledgement Agreements arose when company
managers had concerns about the district authorities’ capacities to pay out
the lease shares to landowning families properly. In consequence, Addax
5.3.3
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decided to make direct payments to landowners in the communities, for
which they needed a legal basis (interview SL54). In a way, the AAs repre-
sent the company’s willingness to take seriously IFC Performance Stan-
dard 5 for the mitigation and compensation for possible loss of livelihood
and economic displacement (IFC 2012: 33).
Similarly to the funding from development banks, the certification of
the Roundtable on Sustainable Biofuels required the company to keep cer-
tain standards. As discussed in chapter 2.2.2 the RSB principles demand
that all land rights, including land-use rights, need to be determined be-
fore an agreement is closed, for which the FPIC principle needs to be ap-
plied (RSB 2016: principle 12). Addax Bioenergy fulfilled the first part by
surveying and mapping the land of all affected communities and landown-
ers (African Development Bank Group 2011b: 2). As described in chapter
5.3.1 the company also led extensive community consultations. Even
though it remains doubtful whether the process of signing the lease and
acknowledgment agreements included the full free, prior and informed
consent (FPIC) of all landowners and users, the project received certifica-
tion by the RSB in February 2013 as the first African biofuels project
(Awoko 1/3/2013).
The local NGO SiLNoRF and the Swiss NGO Bread for all launched a
complaint against the RSB certificate amongst others on the grounds that
FPIC had not been present (SiLNoRF/Bread for All 2013). The complaint
led to a follow-up evaluation, which was, however, not able to find enough
evidence to verify the accusations. As a consequence, the certificate was up-
held34 (Sierra Express Media 12/5/2014).
International standards did play a considerable role in the way the com-
pany tried to handle community relations and let to the picture that Addax
was doing a lot more than other investors. A former international staff
member put it this way:
“[…] but the idea that all investors are bad guys doesn't hold. The
difference between Addax and other investors is that they had all these
DFIs pouring all over them the whole time. And they had the RSB as
well to watch out for.” (interview SL54)
34 The follow up evaluation in 2014 was limited by the Ebola outbreak and noted
the need for further verification in future on-site visits (SCS Global Services Re-
port 2015). Based on the report the certification was extended until March 2017
when it expired. The operation under Sunbird has not been certified yet accord-
ing to the RSB website (RSB 2019).
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The former employee voiced considerable frustration about the ‘bad press’
the investment project got and the criticism raised by international NGOs,
even though social affairs were managed ‘by the book’ (interview SL54).
Similarly, a local staff member pointed out that the investor went beyond
national law, which need to be changed:
“We were expecting the civil society to have mounted pressure on the
policy makers, rather than on the business people. What is available as
a legal instrument is what the country will go by. But if the legal in-
struments are so old [...], what do you expect the investor to do? […]
So what we have done on our own, it’s far more what the NGOs are
even expecting.” (interview SL15)
The picture of Addax being rather cooperative was repeated by local civil
society members (interviews SL10, SL11). The main difference, for exam-
ple, to mining companies in the country was better communication:
“My own personal opinion is that the relationship of Addax and the
community is better than with those mining communities. That’s my
own opinion. […] several companies are even not talking to people
[...]. They tell you I have relationships with the government, and not
you. (interview SL10)
Addax also tried to regularly share information and numbers with SiL-
NoRF, the leading local critic of the company (interview SL54). The trans-
parency was appreciated by the NGO, whose relationship with the investor
improved as a consequence35.
All in all, the central characteristics of Addax Bioenergy incentivized the
company to introduce the Acknowledgement Agreements. First, the com-
pany relied largely on funding from development banks to make the in-
vestment possible. It had to comply with IFC standards. Second, export to
the European market had been a goal of the investment right from the
start, which led Addax to seek RSB certification. Third, the company was
regarded from outside actors but also identified itself as a poster child for
responsible investment. There were, therefore, financial, economical but
also ideational incentives for the company to go beyond national law and
introduce the Acknowledgement Agreements. Once they had been put in
35 However, this more cooperative relationship was disturbed by the scale-down
and sale of the project. At the time of research, the relationship with the new in-
vestor seemed less open and cooperative, possibly because the new investor
blames SiLNoRF for the failure of the project (interview SL29).
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place, it would have been impossible to simply ignore the missing consent
of the community people of Masethleh.
The support network: SiLNoRF and Namati
Without the support of SiLNoRF and Namati, the community would not
have been able to enter into negotiations with the company on an equal
footing. At the same time, the NGOs’ interventions seemed to have helped
in solving within-community conflicts and creating unity among commu-
nity members. It, therefore, makes sense to take a closer look at these two
organizations and their contribution to the negotiation success for Maseth-
leh.
The Sierra Leone Network on the Right to Food was founded in 2008 as
a response to the global food price crisis. The impetus to form a network
on the right to food came from the 2007 World Social Forum in Nairobi,
where civil society organizations decided to create an African Network on
the Right to Food. The focal point for Sierra Leone then became the na-
tional coordinator of what became SilNoRF. The organization is both a
network with local member organizations as well as its own NGO (SiL-
NoRF 2018). Interestingly the first funding came in 2011 from the Swiss
NGO Bread for All (interview SL11), which had followed the investment
of the Swiss company right from the start (Bread for All). The develop-
ment of SILNoRF can, therefore, be in part explained by the Addax invest-
ment. Other funding comes from Bread for the World, Cordaid and Ac-
tion Aid as well as capacity training through organizations like FIAN.
These trainings seemed to have immense influence on the work of SiL-
NoRF:
“We too – I have to be honest – had very little knowledge about food
and land rights issues at the time. […] But the workshops and semi-
nars we attended at the international level actually paved the way […]
for us to get a better understanding of what was actually going on in
the country and that pushed us into the advocacy we are doing today.”
(interview SL11)
With this support, SiLNoRF started to monitor the investment project of
Addax (SiLNoRF 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016) and built up relationships with
communities, company representatives as well as politicians and govern-
ment officials. The organization tries to keep in touch with all the commu-
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nities affected by Addax through identifying focal points36. Apart from
training and supporting local communities, advocacy on the national level
is done in cooperation with other civil society actors and the ALLAT net-
work. In the last years, SiLNoRF grew considerably from 4 to 15 staff
members (interview SL11).
Similarly to SiLNoRF, the Sierra Leonean office of Namati worked on
foreign large-scale land deals right from its inception. Namati is a legal em-
powerment NGO with headquarters in the United States but originating
from an earlier Sierra Leonean organization – Timap for Justice. The NGO
is funded by various foundations and donor organizations, amongst others
Open Society Foundation, DFID or UNDP (Namati). Even before the
founding of Namati in the country in 2012, the later director was already
involved in the Addax case. Bread for All had asked him to do a legal audit
of the draft lease agreement and present it to the investor in Switzerland.
However, even though the company’s CEO promised to address some of
his concerns, this was not done and the final lease agreement was pretty
much the same as the draft (interview SL51).
Namati itself mainly works with paralegals who are based throughout
the country and are in regular contact with communities. They engage pri-
marily in cases where foreign investors come in for agriculture or mining.
At the same time, the organization only starts acting once landowning
families have agreed to be legally represented by them. The preferred
mode is dialogue; litigation rarely takes place (interview SL26). The aim of
the work of Namati is legal empowerment:
“We go to radio stations, we hold community meetings. In every meet-
ing we hold, we have to pass on our education. That's what we stand
for. We are not just voicing out things to people. We want – wherever
we work – that by the end of the day the people are empowered, that
they know the law and that they are prepared to take actions and deci-
sions for themselves.” (interview SL26)
Both NGOs developed considerably due to international funding to sup-
port their work around supporting local communities affected by foreign
36 However, not everybody in the regions seems to appreciate the work of the NGO:
While community members in Masethleh and other communities were apprecia-
tive of SiLNoRF (interviews SL27, SL17), chiefdom elders in one of the affected
chiefdoms were rather skeptical: “They don’t do anything for us here, they just
try to sabotage the company” (interview SL13). These were however chiefdom
authorities, who profit substantially from the lease payments which go in part di-
rectly to them.
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investments. Both organizations helped the village of Masethleh to negoti-
ate with the company successfully. Two elements seemed relevant for their
success:
First, SiLNoRF and Namati provided the necessary information about
the lease and acknowledgment agreements as well as potential benefits and
costs of the investment project (interviews SL26, SL28, SL29). This enabled
community members to decide what they wanted to do.
Second, the NGOs included everybody in the community in the deci-
sion-making process and intervened when there were signs of some leaders
going behind the back of the community. They helped community mem-
bers to hold their leaders accountable. What seemed to have been crucial
in that phase was to have regular phone contact with different community
members, not just the leaders:
“Long periods of no communication can create openings for com-
panies to negotiate bad deals with communities or for leaders to make
decisions that are not in their community’s interest. If advocates have
an ongoing relationship with a diversity of community members, in-
cluding women and youth, it is possible to receive more frequent and
more representative updates on a community’s situation” (Conteh
2015: 168)
Also, the engagement of the NGOs and especially the lawyer from Free-
town might have helped the community to be taken seriously by company
representatives. That was at least the impression left behind in the commu-
nity:
“We benefited a lot from them [referring to SiLNoRF and Namati],
and we believed Addax did other things as a result of their involve-
ment. Had it not been for them, Addax would have treated us the way
they wanted.” (interview SL27)
Community members also recounted that company representatives ac-
cused the NGOs of negatively influencing them, which they were adamant
in denying. One of the interviewees in Masethleh emphasized their agency
in making decisions about what and when to sign: “We were the ones who
used to tell them [the NGOs] what we wanted – out of which they advised
us or guided us” (interview SL27).
Summarizing the role of the NGOs in the Masethleh case, two elements
stick out. The NGOs did not only provide needed information and educa-
tion but also facilitated the unity of the community. Both aspects were
central for the success in the negotiations as they enabled the community
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to make an informed decision about what they wanted, but also to be tak-
en seriously by the company.
Discussion and additional issues
The case of Addax investment in general, and the community of Masethleh
in particular, show the relevance of all three core conditions identified in
my theoretical chapter as well as a couple of additional issues.
First, the case shows the limitations of the Sierra Leonean national statu-
tory law regarding land. As discussed in chapter 5.2.1, only the chiefdom
authorities have to agree to a large-scale land deal; the customary landown-
ers are entirely excluded from this arrangement. Only because the compa-
ny introduced the Acknowledgement Agreements did the landowning
families get an indirect voice. At the same time, there was no possibility for
landowners to negotiate, for example, the lease price, which was set ac-
cording to MAFFS guidelines, or set concrete limits for the company in
terms of land use. The negotiation in the village of Masethleh was, there-
fore, only about the amount of land which would be used by the company
and no other terms.
Second, the best-practices approach by the company, which followed in-
ternational soft law standards like the IFC standards or the RSB principles,
led to the introduction of the Acknowledgement Agreements. They, in
turn, opened the space for community members to voice their concerns.
Nonetheless, negotiations with landowning families and land users about
the actual terms of the lease were not expected – meetings seemed to have
a rather consultative and informative character. Only the community of
Masethleh had more extensive negotiations about one part of the agree-
ment.
Third, outside support for the community of Masethleh was central for
them to understand the lease and the AAs. Both Sierra Leonean NGOs are
supported and funded by international partners. The NGOs did not only
provide information but supported the decision-making process among
different groups in the village and the creation of unity. This unity was es-
sential in speaking to the company with one clear voice.
 
Apart from these findings regarding the three core conditions, two addi-
tional issues regarding the overall investment of Addax deserve some atten-
tion.
5.3.5
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One issue, which has not been mentioned yet, is the distribution of the
rent payments among landowners and land users. As described in chapter
5.2.1, landowning families have the right to allocate land for use to so-
called land users. The lease money further engraved this differentiation.
The elders of the landowning families receive rent payments, and it is up
to them if and how they share it within the family but also with land users.
Especially youth and women receive very little – between 10 000 and 30
000 Leone (1,20–3,60 USD) per year – which does not make a big differ-
ence for them (interview SL10). The land users who are not members of a
landowning family can be even worse off:
“If you are a stranger and a piece of land was given to you to work, no
matter the number of years you have worked on it – if it happens that
it is part of the land given to Addax you will not benefit from the lease
fee paid by Addax for that piece of land. The money goes to the origi-
nal owner.” (interview SL16)
These accounts are confirmed by data from a household survey, which
shows that the amount of lease money people receive varies considerably
(Hansen et al. 2016: 14). This issue displays the limits of customary law
when it comes to tenure rights of certain parts of the population – especial-
ly land users but also women, youth and others who are possibly marginal-
ized by the heads of a landowning family. These findings show that relying
on customary law to regulate large-scale land deals and distribute benefits
can reinforce existing inequalities and power imbalances.
Another issue worth discussing is the economic failure of the initial in-
vestment project. While the investment project focused on getting social
and environmental standards right, the commercial side went downhill.
The company had to scale down production in the middle of 2015 and lay
off significant parts of its workforce (SiLNoRF 2016: 28). The yields of the
sugarcane had only reached one third of the initial projection. At the same
time, infrastructural difficulties and theft had driven up the costs (inter-
view SL54). Falling market prices for bioethanol might have also con-
tributed to the decision of Addax Bioenergy to give up the project (Lanzet
2016: 30). In the following year, the takeover of 75,1 % of the operations
by Sunbird Bioenergy Africa Limited meant the continuation of the
bioethanol project (Awoko 3/10/2016). However, at the time of research
(in spring 2017), the investment project did not seem economically stabi-
lized yet. During a stakeholder meeting, the company described successful
experiments using the elephant grass, which grows naturally in the region,
to produce ethanol. Sunbird/Addax also had to delay lease payments. The
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plan of the company was at that time to create a cassava out-grower
scheme in which local farmers will produce the cassava and deliver it to
the bioethanol plant (Sunbird Bioenergy Africa 01/07/2017).
 
Overall, the case study showed the usefulness of international private gov-
ernance standards in incentivizing companies to go beyond what was re-
quired by national law. This opened up the possibility for local actors to
raise their concerns. To do so, the local community needed the support of
NGOs to understand their options and to facilitate negotiations with the
company. However, the options of what could actually be negotiated were
limited by the structure of the overall agreement defined by national law.
The case study, therefore, shows the positive effects of international best
practice standards but also shows its limitations. International standards
furthermore do not pay attention to local distribution issues or possible
safeguards for the case of economic failure.
Case II: Socfin Sierra Leone – unsuccessful legal mobilization
The investment of Socfin, located in the South of Sierra Leone, received a
lot of attention, similar to the Addax case. The deal was closed around the
same time – in spring 2011. The land investment in the Chiefdom of
Malen, in the district of Pujehun, became well known for creating local
conflict – especially between chiefdom authorities and the local popula-
tion (interview SL36). A local protest group, the Malen Landowners and
Users Association (MALOA), tried to use legal mobilization to enforce a
renegotiation of the lease agreement as well as a stop to local oppression.
They involved the Sierra Leone Human Rights Commission, who tried to
mediate but failed to achieve an outcome (interview SL42). At the same
time, supporters of the Socfin investment have used the legal system of
Sierra Leone to stop the local protest group. The case, therefore, not only
represents a case of unsuccessful legal mobilization but also shows how the
law can be used to counter the activism of affected people.
I will start this chapter by giving an overview of the investment of Socfin
(chap 5.4.1) before I turn to processes of legal mobilization (chap 5.4.2). I
will then turn to the characteristics of the company (chap 5.4.3) and the
role of the outside support network (chap 5.4.4) before discussing my
main findings (chap 5.4.5).
5.4
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Overview of the investment of Socfin Agricultural Company
In 2011, Socfin Agricultural Company Sierra Leone Limited (thereafter
Socfin), belonging to the Belgian-Luxembourgian Socfin Group, leased an
initial 6500 hectares of land in Pujehun district, in Malen chiefdom.
SLIEPA had explicitly promoted the district of Pujehun as one of the areas
fit for palm oil investment in the country (SLIEPA 2010a). In March 2011,
a land lease was signed between the Paramount Chief, section chiefs and
some landowners on one side and the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry
and Food Security (MAFFS) on the other side. The MAFFS subsequently
leased the land to Socfin in a sublease37. The lease lasts for 50 years, and
annual lease payment per hectare is 12.50 USD (five USD per acre) as rec-
ommended by the government. It was planned from the start to enlargen
the lease later on (Melsbach/Rahall 2012: 11–12).
By 2016 12.000 hectares of land had been planted and the construction
of the oil mill was finished. An estimated amount of 25,000 people live in
Malen Chiefdom (Star Consults 2011: 129), which is mostly covered by
plantations today, as can be seen in satellite imagery. Once in full opera-
tion the company employed 2460 seasonal and 1091 permanent workers
(Socfin Agricultural Company Sierra Leone 13/04/2016). While exact num-
bers about the investment are not available, it seems that at least 300 mil-
lion USD were invested over the years (Fofana 1/19/2015). In the begin-
ning, an out-grower scheme had been planned but did not materialize to
the time of research. The company promised and fulfilled many social re-
sponsibility projects such as building toilets in all communities, solar
streetlights in the main town, the extension of the local hospital, an ambu-
lance, a mosque, water wells, school furnishing and a scholarship program
(interview SL37) (John 2/20/2014). Nonetheless, severe criticism and local
conflict arose around the investment.
Soon after the start of the project in spring 2011, criticism was raised by
affected locals and civil society actors, who argued that local consultations
and information about the project had been insufficient. The German
NGO Deutsche Welthungerhilfe paired up with the Sierra Leonean NGO
5.4.1
37 Even though the land was officially leased by the government, they do not seem
to have been involved in the local process leading up to the lease. Furthermore,
the rent payments are not channeled through the government but are made di-
rectly to local people. It appears that the arrangement through the government
was mainly made on paper, whereas the company was in direct communication
with local authorities.
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Green Scenery to conduct a fact-finding mission (Rahall/Schäfter 2011)
and an in-depth study (Melsbach/Rahall 2012). The findings from both re-
ports, as well as findings from my interviews, drew a rather problematic
picture of the local consultation process: Some early meetings took place
in 2010, during which the Paramount Chief informed people living in the
chiefdom about an investor coming to start a plantation.
However, it seems that most people had not been aware of the size and
the extent of the investment. Many thought that it concerned mainly an
earlier palm oil plantation, which had been run by the state-owned Sierra
Leone Production and Marketing Board and included about 1200 hectares
of land (Melsbach/Rahall 2012: 12). The experiences with this previous
plantation had been positive and were mentioned as a point of reference
(interviews SL38, SL40, SL41). After the 50 years lease had expired, the
used land had been returned to the landowning families, who saw the new
investor as a chance to repeat the experience. However, the size of the in-
vestment of Socfin was wholly different and today covers almost the whole
chiefdom. It seems like most landowners only started to understand the ex-
tent of the deal during a chiefdom meeting in February 2011. Landowners
reportedly refused to give up all their land, which is used in this region for
cash crops such as palm oil, cocoa, coffee, groundnuts and kola nuts (Mels-
bach/Rahall 2012: 10).
The Paramount Chief (PC) reacted with threatening people that their
land would be taken anyway, whether they give it up voluntarily or not
(Rahall/Schäfter 2011: 7). In the end, the lease agreement was signed by
the Paramount Chief as well as section and town chiefs, who could have
been dismissed had they not followed the order of the PC (interview
SL41).
During the meeting for the signing of the lease agreement on March 5th,
2011, company representatives presented the first rent payments for the
whole chiefdom on a table – an amount of 40 000 USD, 173 million
Leones at the time. Armed forces guarded the money, a situation that
seems to have intimated landowners further (Melsbach/Rahall 2012: 14;
Rahall/Schäfter 2011: 7).
After the signing of the lease agreement, landowners and users received
a one-time compensation of one Million Leones per acre of planted land,
an amount which was considered too low to make up for the lost income
accumulating over the years (interview SL41). At the same time, consider-
able confusion and conflict developed over who would receive lease mon-
ey. Some critical landowners never received any rent money (interviews
5. Analysis I Sierra Leone
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SL38, SL41), while it seems that other people profited. An interviewee de-
scribed the process:
“There was no consultation; there was no transparency, no account-
ability. They just did this because they have the political power or in-
fluence. They did it with force. […] According to the protocols, you
have to consult the family. We have to call family meetings and do
other things, consult our elders, consult those who are outside. But
what they did […]. They came at night, fish out some people, take
them to the headquarter, give them an amount that they had never
had before. […] A lot of people, who signed these agreements are not
landowners. They are not even the heir of their families.” (interview
SL41)
Comments like these, as well as the NGO reports, show that the land deal
was closed with insufficient consultations and transparency.
Faced with the criticism raised by locals and the NGOs, the Paramount
Chief and his speaker assured that sufficient consultations had been held
and that all landowners had received enough information (Melsbach/
Rahall 2012: 13). They instead blamed the Member of Parliament (MP) for
the region for being behind the accusations and for instilling disgruntle-
ment among the people (Moiguah 5/4/2011).
However, even looking at formal documents it looks like consultations
were at best superficial. The Environmental Social and Health Impact As-
sessment (ESHIA) prepared for the company recorded one public disclo-
sure meeting in the main town of Malen chiefdom in November 2010 at-
tended by 30 people. The ESHIA report, which also includes data gathered
from three neighboring chiefdoms38, further mentioned that people were
excited about the prospect of the investment. They agreed that “as long as
adequate arrangements are reached with local authorities and landowners,
the project can take off” (Star Consults 2011: 94). There seems to have
been initial excitement about an investor coming in; however, even in the
early stages, locals demanded proper customary procedures, which should
have been part of the overall consultation process.
The ESHIA, which was published in January 2011 – before the actual
signing of the lease agreement – does not make any provisions on how
38 The project was originally planned to eventually include a size of 30 000 hectares
in four Chiefdoms. The ESHIA conducted three group discussions in each Chief-
dom (Star Consults 2011).
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consultations with communities should take place. Instead, the report
refers to the Provinces Land Act Cap 122:
“It is important to note that the Act makes no express reference to land
owners; therefore a lease under the Act must be made between the
chiefdom council and the non-native. SAC in this case is considered as
the non-native. The general public approval of the project appears to
cover all segments of the communities including the Chiefdom Coun-
cils which provide good prospects that the current land negotiation be-
tween SAC and the Malen communities in progress, at the time of this
study, will be successful.” (Star Consults 2011: 185)
This quote shows two things: First, despite referring to international guide-
lines, the relevant legal framework identified in the ESHIA is national land
law: In the end, only the chiefdom authorities matter. Second, some gener-
al approval about welcoming an investor in the region by three communi-
ties visited in the Chiefdom during the ESHIA process is equated with con-
sent to the specificities of the investment by Socfin. This shows a rather
broad understanding of what consultations mean.
Apart from the ESHIA consultancy company and the customary authori-
ties, company staff had communicated directly with communities in the
Chiefdom since 2009. According to company information, landowners
had the option not to lease their land (Environmental Resources Manage-
ment 2015: 6); however, I couldn't verify this information. At the same
time, there are reports that Socfin tried to buy off critics of the investment.
The local MP, who had warned people of accepting the deal, claimed com-
pany representatives offered him 2000 USD if he would stay quiet (Mels-
bach/Rahall 2012: 13). Other critics of the investment supposedly did drop
their resistance after they had received jobs at the company (interview
SL42). While it is unclear what role precisely the company played in the
process leading up to the signing of the agreement, it seems as if they did
not take a lot of effort to ensure a transparent and open consultation pro-
cess.
To this day, the investment of Socfin in Malen is overshadowed by the
missing consent of local landowners. The project has gained prominence
as a case in which an investment has created local conflict and led to the
oppression of activists. Other Sierra Leonean communities who are faced
with incoming investors cite it as a negative example that they do not want
to happen to them (interview SL36).
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Calling on Sierra Leonean legal institutions – whose side is the law
on?
As described in the previous chapter, criticism about missing local consent
and transparency ensued as soon as the lease agreement was signed. The
dispersed voices by critical landowners were united in autumn 2011 when
the Malen Affected Landowners and Users Association (MALOA)39 was
created. On October 3rd, landowners and community members blocked
the road to the nursery and halted operations of Socfin. They demanded
renegotiations of the lease agreement, higher compensation and more so-
cial programs (Bah 7/10/2011). After a failed mediation attempt by the Dis-
trict Council Chairman, the blockage was dispersed by the police and 39
people were arrested (Akam 12/10/2011). Fifteen protestors were charged
and remained in custody for weeks (interview 42).
The incident can be seen as the starting point of the mobilization efforts of
MALOA. They began to organize themselves under the leadership of the
local MP, mentioned in the previous chapter (interview SL38). The MP later
became the spokesperson of the group, which is organized by an executive
committee,  a  chairperson,  a  secretary  and  section  and  village  speakers
(interview SL34). The group has about 1300 (interview SL2) to 2000 (inter-
view SL38) individual members. Apart from some early protests and resis-
tance vis-à-vis the company, the main activity of the group is the writing of
complaint letters to different levels of the administration (interview SL38).
The goal of MALOA is the renegotiation of the land lease agreement with the
proper  inclusion of  all  landowners  and users.  They are  not  against  the
investment per se, as this female member of the organization summarizes it:
“We do not want the company to leave because it is development. We
only want to sit and dialogue with them on an agreement that will
make us and them happy. […] We want them to put demarcations be-
tween the palm trees, […] to revisit the agreement and to give us some
portion of the land for our private farming.” (interview SL38)
MALOA’s activism was answered harshly by chiefdom authorities, which
prohibited the group from holding any meetings inside the chiefdom.
Group members have been imprisoned on several occasions and complain
about harassment by the local police and chiefdom authorities (interview
SL33, SL34, SL42, SL43). There are reports that people were sacked for
5.4.2
39 It seems that the name of the organization in the beginning only included
landowners, ‘users’ were added later.
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criticizing the company vis-à-vis NGOs or the media and there seems to be
an atmosphere of fear of the company and the chiefdom authorities (inter-
view SL53). While it is challenging to verify different accounts, Table 12
gives an overview of all cases of police presence and arrests, which were
recorded in NGO or media reports and were related to the conflict around
the Socfin investment.
Overview of police incidences in Malen Chiefdom related to the invest-
ment
Date Incidence Sources
10/2011 Police disperses roadblock and arrests 39; 15





2012 Police arrests four persons, who fought com-
pany workers in trying to protect their land;
the accused are fined 200 USD or jail time
(Green Scenery
10/15/2013)
06/2012 Police oversees the destruction of local plan-
tations to make way for a road
(Green Scenery
6/27/2012)
10/2013 Six high-ranking members of MALOA are ar-
rested for allegedly destroying oil palm





12/2013 Police fires shotguns into a protesting crowd
of people, who the police claims were armed;





01/2015 11 MALO members are arrested after 2 inter-






09/2015 Arrest of 7 MALOA members for “writing
down names of people in the town without




2016 Clashes between community members and
security personnel of Socfin over the alleged
theft of palm oil kernels
(Green Scenery
18/08/2016)
The overview shows that MALOA members were targeted by the police on
a number of occasions. The incidence that stands out the most, is the case
of the ‘MALOA 6’ – six high-ranking members of the organizations who
Table 12
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were sentenced to high fines under dubious circumstances. The six ac-
tivists, among them the spokesperson and the secretary of MALOA, were
arrested in October 2013 for allegedly having destroyed 40 palm trees. In
what seems to be a politically motivated process, the six were found guilty
of conspiracy, destroying the plants and incitement by the High Court of
Sierra Leone (Green Scenery 10/03/2016). The fines added up to 36,000
USD or half a year of imprisonment each. The penalties followed the eval-
uation of the company and seemed exceptionally high:
“Despite the fact that Socfin only paid 1 million Leones (less than
$200) for each acre of 60 palm trees including the land on which they
grew, they valued the 40 destroyed trees minus the land at 200 mil-
lion Leones ($36,000). What can I say? I have the feeling, the rules of
the game have been made by someone else.” (spokesperson of MALOA
in Green Scenery 10/03/2016)
Through national and international fundraising by Sierra Leonean and in-
ternational NGOs the money was raised and all six convicted MALOA
members could be freed after spending weeks in prison (FIAN Belgium
16/06/2016b). Nonetheless, the organization continues its work and meets
either in secret or outside the chiefdom (interview SL34, SL43).
 
In the following, I will go into detail into one example of legal mobiliza-
tion by the group by calling on the Human Rights Commission of Sierra
Leone.
In December 2012, MALOA wrote a letter to the Human Rights Com-
mission of Sierra Leone (HRCSL) demanding its intervention. The letter
shows the legal references used by MALOA to argue their case. They claim
that their land hand been taken unlawfully and that their human rights
had been violated, as the letter starts:
“I hereby write for and on behalf of the land holding families of Malen
Chiefdom […] to complain to you about the blatant disregard and
abuse of our fundamental human rights to wit unlawful occupation of
our family land by the Socfin agricultural Company” (MALOA 2012)
Two issues are emphasized in the letter: One, it is made clear that the cus-
tomary landowners had not given their consent to the lease agreement and
that the operation of Socfin is therefore unlawful. While it is not explicitly
mentioned, this clearly refers to customary law and not to national statuto-
ry law as discussed in chapter 5.2. Second, the group lists cases of police
harassment and intimidation of MALOA activists by the Paramount Chief.
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Both, the taking of the land and the repression of activism, are framed as
human rights violations and the Commission is asked to intervene. At-
tached to the letter are three resolutions signed by 80 people. In the resolu-
tions, MALOA members distance themselves from the lease agreement and
announce their resistance to the investment project: “[…] we shall no
longer allow the Socfin Agricultural Company personnel and or their ma-
chines to enter upon and operate on our land” (MALOA 2012). In the final
resolution, MALOA reiterates its willingness for dialogue. Overall, the let-
ter, therefore, not only contains accusations towards chiefdom authorities
and the company but also justifies the landowner’s actions of resistance,
while at the same time calling for dialogue.
In a first step, the legal mobilization attempt of MALOA was successful:
The Human Rights Commission did intervene with an effort to mediate
between the different parties: MALOA, chiefdom authorities and the com-
pany. The Human Rights Commission visited the Chiefdom on three fact-
finding missions between January and May 2013 before holding a two-day
mediation meeting in June. “Representatives from MALOA, SOCFIN
Agricultural Company, the Paramount Chief and his Chiefdom Council,
the Police, CSOs and other stakeholders attended the meeting at the
Malen Chiefdom Court Barry” (Human Rights Commission of Sierra
Leone 2014: 36). During the meeting, 19 issues were discussed and solu-
tions were found for 14 of them. The HRCSL decided to come back for a
second round of negotiations to resolve the outstanding five issues and
sign a final agreement (interview SL42). However, when the next meeting
took place in November 2013, the Paramount Chief, the Minister of Agri-
culture and the Minister of Justice, who were all supposed to attend, never
showed up, leading to the failure of the meditation attempt (Human
Rights Commission of Sierra Leone 2014: 36). Without the Paramount
Chief, as a central figure to the conflict, no agreement was possible. A
member of MALOA recalls from the meeting:
“I think, that was going to be the final day and things were going to
work out in other ways of what he [the Paramount Chief] wanted. So,
he kept himself out. Like the agricultural minister too. The land minis-
ter came and declared himself […]. According to him, he has got no
documents in his office concerning the land issues for this company.
That he declared openly.” (interview SL42)
It seems telling that the Minister of Agriculture as the one having signed
the lease agreement with the chiefdom authorities was not present and
that the Minister of Land openly admitted to have no documentation of
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the lease. The Ministry of Land should generally be involved in all land in-
vestment projects by foreign investors (interview SL32).
For the mediation attempt by the Human Rights Commission the meet-
ing in November 2013 meant the end. A MALOA member claims that the
HRCSL wanted to continue its efforts in resolving the issue but was
stopped ‘from above’40 (interview SL42). However, I was not able to verify
this impression.
In the end, the legal mobilization attempt by MALOA was not success-
ful. They were not able to change the general conditions of the lease agree-
ment, nor did they get any of the land back. Nonetheless, members did ac-
knowledge the benefits of legal arguments:
“They don't listen to us. Socfin doesn't listen to us – personally. Except
when we infer rights, anything legal […] like the Human Rights Com-
mission. They worked together with us for peaceful negotiation.” (in-
terview SL42)
Essentially the case of MALOA and the mobilization of the Human Rights
Commission of Sierra Leone shows two things: On the one hand, even
though the statutory law is not on the side of the landowners, they had a
formal institution to call on with the HRCSL. Human rights, therefore,
served as an entry point to create space for possible renegotiations with lo-
cal authorities and the company. On the other hand, the case clearly shows
the influence of customary authorities and state officials in stopping local
legal mobilization efforts, especially in a rather soft-law process such as the
mediation attempt by the HRCSL. The Paramount Chief (and most likely
the Minister of Agriculture) were able to derail the process by simply not
showing up. Furthermore, the PC regularly uses his power to suppress lo-
cal mobilization efforts. Overall, Socfin seems to rely on local and state-lev-
el officials to silence critics, instead of dealing with them in an open dia-
logue.
Socfin, the chiefdom authorities and the Sierra Leonean state
Unlike Addax, the investment project of Socfin did not receive funding
from any DFIs and was not certified by any private sector scheme. I argue
5.4.3
40 However, the HRCSL still follows the case, regularly includes updates in their
general reporting and calls on the government to help resolve the conflict (Hu-
man Rights Commission of Sierra Leone 2017: 48).
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that in regard to the land lease process and proper consultations with local
communities, the company only pays lip service to international standards.
Instead of engaging with critics, they resolve to delegitimize them or using
legal measures to silence them. The company relies on customary authori-
ties to ensure the smooth setup and operation of the plantation. They
thereby condone repression of local activists and possible human rights vi-
olations. Finally, the company enjoys the support of high-ranking Sierra
Leonean government officials – at least to a certain degree.
 
Socfin Sierra Leone is part of the Socfin Group, which manages nearly
200.000 hectares of palm oil and rubber plantations in 10 developing
countries. It regularly emphasizes its commitment to sustainability stan-
dards (Socfin Group 2018: 14). One of its subsidiaries, the Indonesian
based Socfindo is a member of the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil
(RSPO) and has all its plantations there certified. The Socfin Group plans
to certify all other estates in the future – including the one by Socfin Sierra
Leone (Socfin Group 2018: 22). However, at the time of research it has not
been certified.
Socfin frequently assures its compliance with international standards. In
the ESHIA, several standards are listed, among them the RSPO and IFC
principles, as well as the United Nations International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights and the United Nations Declaration on
Rights of the Indigenous Peoples (Star Consults 2011: 39). However, while
the ESHIA lists these international standards and conventions, it is not
clear how it applied them in detail to the land leasing process. The RSPO
Principles, for example, are clear on requiring a documented FPIC process
(RSPO 2013: No 2.2 & 2.3); yet, the ESHIA does not even mention the
principle of free, prior and informed consent in regard to the lease agree-
ment41.
In 2015, the IFC seemed to have considered funding Socfin’s operations
in Sierra Leone as they commissioned a report identifying gaps in regards
to both IFC as well as RSPO standards. The report listed several gaps but
did not go into more detail regarding the land lease process42, as the com-
41 The principle is briefly mentioned in the context of possible resettlement activi-
ties (Star Consults 2011: 187). However, nobody was resettled over the course of
the project so the provision was never applied.
42 The report makes it clear that it is not a full impact assessment nor a proper au-
dit, but rather “an evaluation of the Company’s current and planned environ-
mental and social management practices” (Environmental Resources Manage-
ment 2015: 20).
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pany did not intend to lease additional land (Environmental Resources
Management 2015: 6). Nonetheless, concerns seem to have been big
enough at the IFC, as it has not funded the investment project so far. As of
today, no independent audit in regards to the IFC standards or the RSPO
principles has taken place and the commitment of the Socfin Group to in-
ternational standards seems unclear. In the case of the Cameroonian sub-
sidiary SOCAPALM, a complaint was filed with the OECD National Con-
tact Points of France and Belgium due to environmental and labor rights
concerns. However, the process was not successful due to the unwilling-
ness of Socfin to cooperate and fully implement a negotiated agreement
(OECD Watch). The Socfin Group does not have a positive track record
that would show a commitment to international voluntary standards.
Locally, the company’s reactions to the criticism raised by MALOA and
civil society actors ranged from denial and emphasizing social projects to
delegitimizing and openly accusing NGOs of destroying the country’s
economy and threatening legal measures. Criticism is usually discredited
as being untrue, while numerous newspaper articles list the social responsi-
bility projects of the company (John 2/20/2014). From the perspective of
the company, protesting activists only represent a minority (Akam
12/10/2011) and are politically motivated:
“We’re seen as land grabbers, but it was actually all done through con-
sent. […] There will always be some opposition, like Sama [the local
MP] and his followers, but those are muddy water because he has po-
litical motives” (Socfin Manager cited in Acland 3/29/2017)
While officially, the company argues that only a few people were against
the investment, they did seem to feel threatened. When the country man-
ager of Socfin left the country in summer 2016, he was bitterly pitted
against national and international NGOs involved in the case. He men-
tioned that a loan he had secured from a bank failed because of complaint
letters written by the NGOs (Daramy 5/7/2016). He subsequently blamed
civil society actors for destroying the Sierra Leonean economy through dis-
crediting the country:
“The NGOs are destroying this country…No serious investor in the
agribusiness sector will come to Sierra Leone again…The government
has allowed NGOs (like Green Scenery and FIAN-Belgium) to give the
country a bad name…” (Socfin Country Director cited in Daramy
5/7/2016)
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Representing himself as the victim of denunciation, he ends with what
seems to be a call for limiting the space of civil society: “I hope that in the
long run the government will review the NGO policy and make it more
responsible” (Socfin Country Director cited in Daramy 5/7/2016).
The backlash against NGOs and local activists is not refined to Sierra
Leone but also reaches NGOs abroad. FIAN Belgium, the Belgian branch
of the FoodFirst Information and Action Network, has been threatened
with a lawsuit for denunciation on a couple of instances (interview SL52).
This is not an unrealistic threat, as the Socfin Group, together with Bol-
loré, a major shareholder of the company43, has filed a total of 20 defama-
tion lawsuits against various journalists and media outlets reporting on op-
erations of the Socfin Group between 2009 and 2018. One complaint was
filed in Sierra Leone against the Sierra Leonean NGO Green Scenery as
well as the American Oakland Institute (GRAIN 25/01/2018).
Attempts to delegitimize and stop critics can also be found on the side
of local chiefdom authorities. In many instances, the attempts are based on
the accusation that MALOA and involved NGOs do not represent the in-
terests of affected communities as this citation shows:
“[…] Chief Moiguah was also cheerful to make known to the public
that the so-called Malen Affected Land Owners Association (MALOA)
does not have any recognition in the chiefdom, and the public should
give them deaf ears. ‘80 % of this individuals posing to be land owners
are not, they are doing monkey business in the chiefdom’” (Showers
4/15/2014)
The chiefdom authorities furthermore warned of the Sierra Leonean NGO
Green Scenery, which supports MALOA:
“[…] the local Chiefs are left with no option but to call on all law
abiding residents of Malen Chiefdom to henceforth stop from attend-
ing meetings and doing business with Green Scenery with the view of
putting an out all end to illegal activities perpetrated by Green Scenery
[…]” (press release local chief in Socfin Agricultural Company Sierra
Leone 05/04/2014)
Criticism of NGOs was not only raised through media reports but also
through a protest as well as a petition by local chiefs, who warned Green
Scenery and FIAN Belgium to stay out. In photos of the rally, posted on
43 According to their own data the Bolloré group holds 38.8 % of the Socfin Group
(Bolloré).
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Facebook by the company, people were holing up signs, which read “To
FIAN Belgium and Green Scenery Stop Interfering in our Business”
(Socfin Sierra Leone 2016/06/27). However, the protest seemed to be or-
chestrated: During my interviews in Malen Chiefdom, most people, in-
cluding the chiefdom speaker had never heard of FIAN.
As another strategy, the Paramount Chief formed a local organization,
the Malen Youth and Development Union, to counter MALOA and to rep-
resent it as the voice of the people in Malen Chiefdom (interview SL38,
SL45, SL52).
Overall, the chiefdom authorities seem to follow a strategy of delegit-
imizing MALAO, intimidating people from collaborating with NGOs and
inhibiting the activists from meeting and organizing. All these strategies
show that the chiefdom elites are highly supportive of Socfin. At the same
time, chiefdom authorities cooperate closely with the company: The
Paramount Chief is, for example, the chair of the grievance committee
through which affected people have the possibility to channel complaints
to the company (Environmental Resources Management 2015: 7). The PC
is furthermore reportedly the one choosing other members for the
grievance mechanism (interview SL48). At the same time, the Paramount
Chief and section chiefs control the lease money and seem to decide who
receives what (interviews SL43, SL53). In return, the PC received a car
from the company as “he had to move and talk to people if there were any
issues” (Socfin manager cited in Acland 3/29/2017). Therefore, the
Paramount Chief seems to profit personally to quite a considerable extent
from the investment.
In addition to local chiefdom authorities, Socfin also enjoys the support
of the Sierra Leonean government. Right from the start, acting president
Koroma repeatedly underlined his support for the investment (Awoko
9/18/2012), as well as for the Paramount Chief44 (Sama 12/29/2017). Gov-
ernment support also became visible when a fact-finding mission to the
district of Pujehun of Green Scenery and FIAN was stopped by order of
the Sierra Leonean police in March 2016. As a formal reason a visit of the
president to the region and the risk of international terrorism was named;
44 The Paramount Chief belongs to the same party as President Koroma, the All
People’s Congress, which is traditionally rather weak in the South of the country,
which is usually dominated by the Sierra Leone People’s Party. The PC was at the
time also a member of parliament as he held one of the 14 seats reserved for tradi-
tional leaders.
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however, no clear conditions for future travel plans were ever formulated
(interviews SL2, SL52, SL53).
At the same time, government officials45 do not seem to want to support
Socfin at all costs. In 2017, the new Minister of Agriculture called for a re-
view of the agreement. He suggested that lease payments were not high
enough and that it could be a possibility for the company to share some
proportion of their profits with the local population (Awoko 12/6/2017).
The statement came, as attempts of the Office of the President were under-
way to mediate in the conflict, which did however not result in any tangi-
ble outcome (interview SL52).
Summing up, the company seems only to pay lip service to international
standards instead of making provision for an FPIC process. The company
does react to criticism by local activists and NGOs by discrediting their le-
gitimacy or threatening legal procedures. It seems that as long as Socfin
has the support of Chiefdom elites and the government, this will not
change. The company, therefore, has to be regarded as mainly unreceptive
to local claims.
The support network: Green Scenery and FIAN Belgium
As mentioned in the previous chapters, MALOA has the support of the
Sierra Leonean NGO Green Scenery and several international NGOs,
among them FIAN Belgium. I will take a closer look at the contributions
of these two actors to the activism of the local group. I will, however, take
a quick look at the capacities of MALOA itself first.
MALOA was able to establish itself as an important critic of Socfin be-
cause of the leadership of Shiaka Sama, who was a Member of Parliament
until 201246. He was the initial person to connect MALOA to Green
Scenery (interview SL34) but also to bail out some of the imprisoned
members (interview SL38) and get a lawyer for the group (MALOA 2012).
At the same time, he was well known in the Chiefdom and was able to
mobilize people and consequently acted as the spokesperson of the group.
While the role of the MP was crucial in setting up MALOA and in con-
necting the group to outside support, his role as a politician made it easier
for the chiefdom authorities and the company to question the legitimacy
5.4.4
45 It is also likely, that different people in different ministries and in the parliament
also have different opinions on the investment.
46 He was re-elected as MP in 2018 after my field research was already finished.
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of the group. Yet, apart from Shiaka Sama, there are a couple of other lead-
ing figures within MALOA who are well educated. Right from the start,
the group wrote letters to different levels of authority and asked for their
intervention (MALOA 2011, 2016). In addition, the organization was for-
mally registered in Freetown as a community-based organization (inter-
view SL43). MALOA showed considerable capacities in reaching out to of-
ficials in the administration; nonetheless, outside support was necessary in
terms of resources, capacity training and bringing advocacy efforts to the
national and international level.
One of the biggest supporters of MALOA is the Sierra Leonean NGO
Green Scenery, based in Freetown. Initially founded in 1989 to fight defor-
estation, they focused on peacebuilding in the post-war years and started
working on the issue of large-scale land deals in 2010 when a number of
massive deals became known in the country (interview SL2). Green
Scenery supported the local MP and MALOA right from the beginning.
Green Scenery supports MALOA in various ways: First, local activists are
regularly invited to civil society workshops, trainings and conferences in
Freetown or other cities in the country (interview SL2). Second, The NGO
regularly pays lawyers for the defense of imprisoned activists, most notably
for the ‘MALOA 6’. Third, Green Scenery acts as a link between interna-
tional NGOs and the local group. During the hot period of the ‘MALOA 6’
campaign, regular skype calls with updates took place between Green
Scenery and international civil society actors such as FIAN Belgium,
GRAIN or the Oakland Institute (interviews SL2, SL53). Fourth, Green
Scenery engages in advocacy on the national level, regularly putting out re-
ports and press releases on the Socfin case and the MALOA activism
(Green Scenery 18/08/2016; Rahall/Schäfter 2011; Green Scenery
10/15/2013). Apart from the specific case of Socfin, the NGO is heavily in-
volved in the process of formulating and disseminating the new land poli-
cy (interview SL2, SL4). In this context, Green Scenery works closely with
the Ministry of Lands, where employees value the inputs and expertise of
the organization (interview SL 50).
A number of international NGOs have supported MALOA, especially
during the case of the ‘MALOA 6’, when 42 international civil society or-
ganizations submitted a letter to the Sierra Leonean president (FIAN Bel-
gium 2016). Nonetheless, there are only a few central players who have
continuously supported MALOA – the most important one probably be-
ing FIAN Belgium. The NGO first took up the case in 2012 as they were
looking into large-scale land investments with the involvement of Belgian
companies. They heard first reports about local conflicts and got in touch
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with Green Scenery, who connected them with MALOA (interviews SL52,
SL53). As FIAN always commits long term to activist groups, they support
MALOA in an ongoing process (interview SL53) through a variety of
methods. First, they provide information to the public through releasing
press statements on the situation of MALOA and background information
on the case on its website (FIAN Belgium 20/03/2017, 16/06/2016a). Sec-
ond, FIAN Belgium engages in advocacy vis-à-vis the Sierra Leonean gov-
ernment, European governments or banks in order to garner support for
the case of MALOA. Third, the organization stages public protest events in
front of Socfin headquarters and invited the spokesperson of MALOA and
the director of Green Scenery to Europe, where they talked to a number of
institutions. Fourth, FIAN Belgium does not provide direct funding to ei-
ther MALOA or Green Scenery; however, they helped both actors to re-
ceive funding from other institutions such as the International Federation
for Human Rights or the European Union (interview SL53).
Overall, the support by NGOs is highly appreciated by MALOA mem-
bers:
“I mean it's very important because we do not have resources. And
members cannot pay membership contribution because things are very
difficult. So, for example FIAN Belgium raised funds for us to travel
and we gained a lot from travelling meeting people. And we are get-
ting training and capacity building from Green Scenery and from AL-
LAT. So, and whenever we are arrested the partners will put up with
an action alert.” (interview SL34)
The collaboration in raising the fine for the ‘MALOA 6’ is regarded as the
biggest success of the coalition between the organizations. The money was
raised locally, on the national and the international level, making it a
transnational effort (interviews SL2, SL8, SL34). After the failed mediation
attempt of the Human Rights Commission, the international civil society
coalition tried to revive the dialogue process in a letter to the President:
“[…] the mediation work on the case initiated in 2013 by the Human
Rights Commission of Sierra Leone (HRC) could be revived and serve
as starting point. However, given the previous difficulties experienced
in the mediation process, we believe that the work of the HRC needs
to be reinforced in order to ensure sufficient capacities and strong in-
dependence of the procedure.” (FIAN Belgium 2016)
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This passage shows the role of international civil society in supporting the
process from the outside and encouraging international involvement in
the process. However, so far, these calls have been left unheard.
Summing up, MALOA itself has some capacities in formulating com-
plaints and reaching out to lawyers. Yet, they are also dependent on out-
side support, especially when it comes to finding resources and raising in-
ternational awareness. One of the main contributions of national and in-
ternational civil society actors it to help keep MALOA members out of jail,
such as the fundraising efforts for the fines of the ‘MALOA 6’. However,
the support has not changed the situation in favor of the local landowners
and users represented through MALOA.
Discussion and additional issues
The case of Socfin and the failed legal mobilization attempt by MALOA
show a number of things. I will first take a look at the three core condi-
tions derived from my theoretical chapter before discussing additional in-
hibiting factors that could be relevant beyond this case.
First, the case shows, once again, the weak legal opportunity structure
presented by Sierra Leonean statutory law. Landowners, who should have
had the option to give or withhold their consent according to customary
law, were not systematically involved in the consultations to the lease
agreement. The process did follow statutory law, which gives the
Paramount Chief as the custodian of the land the right to make the deci-
sion. The Sierra Leonean legal system, therefore, only offered limited op-
tions for the affected local population, who did end up calling on the Hu-
man Rights Commission of Sierra Leone. In this way, human rights pro-
vided an entry point for MALOA to call on the intervention of a state insti-
tution. However, in the process, the Commission seemed to miss the back-
ing of some parts of national state and local authorities, which derailed the
process.
Second, the operation of Socfin Sierra Leone has not undergone any in-
dependent auditing. The company has neither received any funding from
the IFC nor been certified by an international roundtable. Company’s
public commitments to these standards have, therefore, to be treated with
caution. At the same time, Socfin receives considerable support from local
authorities who help them in delegitimizing and silencing dissent. While
it is difficult to determine what kind of role company managers play in the
oppression of activists, they do at least condone it. Also, so far, the investor
5.4.5
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has enjoyed the support of the Sierra Leonean government. This backing
by both local and state authorities has possibly reinforced an unreceptive
position by the company.
Third, MALOA itself possesses considerable capacities, for example, in
terms of involving state authorities; however, they also have a strong civil
society network with national and international links. This network was
crucial, for example, in raising funds to free imprisoned activists. In conse-
quence, I consider the support network as strong.
 
The Socfin case hints to one additional condition that needs to be dis-
cussed. As described in the previous chapters, the chiefdom authorities
played an essential role in this case. They were the ones who signed the
lease agreement without sticking to proper customary procedures. Further-
more, they tried to silence local contestation through repression and dele-
gitimizing strategies. At the same time, they control which complaints by
locals get channeled to the company through the grievance mechanism. Fi-
nally, the Paramount Chief was able to derail the mediation process by the
HRCSL by not showing up.
The case, therefore, demonstrates the power customary authorities, espe-
cially Paramount Chiefs, have in Sierra Leone in the shaping large-scale
land investment deals. This observation was shared by some of my intervie-
wees, who describe the problematic role of some chiefs in the country:
“They just do not want people to be educated about their own rights.
When you educate people, their dubious deals will be unearthed.
Some chiefs just want the money and they don’t want to talk to their
own people.” (interview SL36)
This finding is in line with existing research from Sierra Leone, which em-
phasizes the power of customary authorities over many community mat-
ters (Acemoglu et al. 2014). The issue deserves further attention as a possi-
ble addition condition. I will discuss this on a more abstract level in chap-
ter 5.5.
Another somewhat related issue is the negative role the legal system
plays in this case. The case of the ‘MALOA 6’ showed the use of the Sierra
Leonean judiciary system to the disadvantage of local activists. The impris-
onment and the high fines seem to have been politically motivated (Green
Scenery 10/03/2016). As this was not the only case in which MALOA mem-
bers faced prosecution (International Federation for Human Rights
09/02/2016), it seems like legal measures are used as a threat to intimidate
activists and to stop local mobilization activities. This form of legal repres-
5. Analysis I Sierra Leone
164
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748907602, am 02.12.2021, 19:08:03
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
sion (Ellefsen 2016: 444) can substantially hamper local actor’s activities
and question their legitimacy in the eyes of outsiders. So far, the repression
was not able to stop the mobilization by MALOA; yet, their activities in
the Chiefdom are severely limited (interview SL42). In consequence, the
question remains what would have been possible without the oppression.
The long term effects of legal repression are certainly an important point
for future research (Ellefsen 2016).
Overall, the case of Socfin represents a case in which the company is not
receptive to local demands and is protected through local customary au-
thorities and, to a certain degree, the government. In consequence, the le-
gal mobilization attempt of the local protest group MALOA failed. The na-
tional legal opportunity structure did not provide them with laws that suf-
ficiently protected their customary ownership and use rights.
Within country comparison and discussion of findings
I now turn to compare the two cases in regard to the three pre-identified
conditions and additional issues, which appeared during the research
(chap 5.6.1). Chapter 5.6.2 will then provide a summary of my findings
and discuss them on a more abstract level.
Comparison between the cases of Addax Bioenergy and Socfin Sierra
Leone
In this chapter, I will discuss commonalities and differences between the
two cases, Addax Bioenergy and Socfin Sierra Leone. I will take a closer
look at the three core conditions identified in the theoretical framework
and how they played out in the two different investment projects. I will
not only draw on the evidence described in the two case studies but also
on some data from a comparative survey. Apart from the three core condi-
tions, I also discuss one possible additional condition and other issues
identified in the case analyses.
 
The problematic legal opportunity structure for local smallholders in Sier-
ra Leone became apparent in both cases: Landowners and land users had
no veto possibility concerning the investment. Legally binding lease agree-
ments were signed with the respective Chiefdom Councils. However, in
the case of Addax, additional agreements with landowners opened a space
5.5
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for negotiation for local communities. These acknowledgment agreements
were legally not necessary but were the result of the company’s commit-
ment to international best practice standards. In the case of Socfin, most
landowners and users were not consulted and did not have any possibility
to influence the signing of the agreements. They, therefore, called on the
Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone to interfere. Yet, the involve-
ment of the HRCSL was not able to solve the conflicts. In consequence,
both cases show the limited possibilities of local actors to achieve their
goals through legal mobilization, even though small gains could be made
in the case of the company receptive to local demands.
Support networks played an essential role in both cases. In the case of
the community of Masethleh, who entered into negotiations with Addax,
the support of a local NGO and a pro-bono lawyer were important condi-
tions for them to understand the agreement and identify their goals. In the
case of Socfin, the local network MALOA itself has considerable capabili-
ties for voicing demands and getting authorities involved in the case. How-
ever, they also profit from national and international NGO support, espe-
cially when it comes to defend local activists and keep them out of jail.
Both cases, therefore, fulfill the condition of strong support networks.
The biggest difference between the two cases was the role of the com-
panies, which vary in their approach towards local communities. Addax,
on the one hand, was committed to international best practice principles
and presented the investment as a ‘development’ project. In consequence,
they put a lot of effort and resources into developing a good relationship
with communities and, at times, also with civil society (interviews SL10,
SL15, SL54). Socfin, on the other hand, claims to keep international stan-
dards; however, this seems to be mere lip service. The primary response to
criticism seems to be the delegitimization of critics and the use of legal
threats against them. Interestingly, the company fulfilled several social re-
sponsibility projects such as the extension of the health center, the con-
struction of toilets for all communities or the overhauling of water wells.
Yet, these CSR projects do not seem to be able to replace proper grievance
mechanisms and transparent negotiations.
A comparative survey between affected populations of large-scale land
investments, including both the Addax and the Socfin project, provides
some interesting data in this regard (Bandabla 2014). Over 80 % of the re-
spondents in the Socfin case mentioned the construction of toilets as a
CSR project, compared to only 2 % in the Addax case (Bandabla 2014: 9).
At the same time, 80 % of Socfin affected respondents answered that the
Paramount Chief made the decisions about which community projects to
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implement. In communities affected by Addax, only 7 % gave that answer.
In comparison, 65 % mentioned community meetings (7 % in the Socfin
case) and 54 % needs assessment surveys (0 % in the Socfin case) (Bandabla
2014: 31), showing the different approaches towards CSR projects and
community participation by the two companies.
When asked about land conflicts, 95 % of people in Pujehun (Socfin
case) reported hearing about them in the last three months, whereas this
number is 49 % for Bombali (Addax case). Most of the reported conflicts
were between communities and investors (Bandabla 2014: 24). These num-
bers underline the findings that the investment by Socfin was more con-
tested and conflictive than the Addax project. Finally, impressions on
grievance mechanisms also diverged considerably between the two
projects: 66 % of respondents in Pujehun versus 9 % in Bombali thought
that platforms “to ensure citizen’s participation in the decision making
process” (Bandabla 2014: 30) were not functioning.
Overall, these comparative findings underline the company’s approaches
towards local communities: Socfin mainly deals with the Paramount Chief
and surrounding elites, whereas Addax tries to involve communities direct-
ly47. In consequence, local actors in the Addax case have better chances to
have their demands heard and responded to.
In addition to the three core conditions, one possible additional condi-
tion and additional issues came up in both cases.
One possible relevant condition is the role played by local elites. In the
case of Socfin, local authorities considerably support the company and
profit from it at the same time. They oppress and delegitimize local ac-
tivism and therefore protect the company from having to reply to criti-
cism. Yet, it is difficult to estimate the extent of this ‘protection’. Would
Socfin react positively to local demands if these were not delegitimized
and suppressed by the Paramount Chief? My data does not show Socfin as
very receptive to local demands generally, but would they have to give in if
they lost support by local and national authorities? Unfortunately, evi-
dence from Addax is not helpful in that regard. As the company decided to
interact with landowners and the affected communities directly, chiefdom
authorities did not play such a big role. Nonetheless, chiefdom authorities
strongly supported the investment as did the national government.
47 This does not mean that the survey did not raise critical points in regards to the
Addax investment too. For example 76,5 % of respondents felt that the compensa-
tion system was not functional (90 % in the Socfin case) (Bandabla 2014: 29).
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Provisions of rent sharing by the government further increase the power
of customary authorities. According to MAFFS guidelines, district councils
and chiefdom authorities each receive 20 % of the rent payments, which
amounts to large sums considering the large sizes of land rented. And
while the MAFFS guidelines demand that these sums should be spent for
‘community development initiatives’ (Ministry of Agriculture Forestry and
Food Security 2009: para 9), it seems to be unclear in most cases how the
money is actually used. In the case of the Addax investment, one intervie-
wee, for example, voiced considerable frustration about chiefdom elites,
who in his view profit personally from the payments:
“He [member of the Chiefdom Council] is one of the people who eats
the money, which Addax has given for the chiefdom. That is why he
was praising Addax […] he was defending Addax because that is how
he is enjoying the proceeds that are coming from the company.” (in-
terview SL16)
In essence, the rent sharing of the MAFFS guidelines creates considerable
incentives for district and customary authorities to support companies
even against the will of the local population (Melsbach/Rahall 2012: 19).
 
Aside from the possible additional condition, other issues appeared in the
case studies. In the Addax case, I noted the problem of differences between
landowners and land users in customary law. The case shows the difficulty
of using customary rules for the allocation of lease money. While the ar-
rangement ensures that customary owners do receive a share of the rent, it
further engraves existing inequalities and marginalizes land users. This
shows the complexity in setting up ‘socially responsible’ investments in
contexts that have not previously seen this kind of monetarization of land.
The differences between landowners and land users also affect relation-
ships in the case of Socfin. However, in that context, both landowners and
land users lost land and are equally dissatisfied with the negotiation pro-
cess. Their interests therefore align, and both landowners and users are
members of MALOA. However, the question arises how the differences
would be dealt with in the case that a deal with the company would be
struck. Would the interests of land users be respected, for example,
through receiving a share of the rent money?
The second issue noted in the case of Addax was the issue of the econo-
mic failure of the company. This does currently not apply to Socfin. How-
ever, the Addax case can provide a lesson for the formulation of future na-
tional laws and international guidelines of what should happen in such a
5. Analysis I Sierra Leone
168
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748907602, am 02.12.2021, 19:08:03
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
case. If the legal provisions would be in place, this situation could, for ex-
ample, be an opportunity for communities unhappy with the current
agreement to renegotiate the deal.
Another issue shown by the Socfin case is the use of legal measures
against local actors. The case shows the negative side a legal system can
have for local activists. So far, I only portrayed the law as providing local
actors with opportunities; however, on the downside, the legal system can
and is often used by companies to stop or intimidate criticism48 (Garvey/
Newell 2005: 396). The short and long-term effects of such tactics should
be scrutinized further. Interestingly, legal action was never threatened by
Addax against its critics and can be understood as one indicator for a will-
ingness to listen to and deal with criticism.
 
Summing up, the two cases from Sierra Leone underline the need for legal
reform in the country. The discrepancy between customary and statutory
law leads to a situation in which most smallholders do not have a say in
large-scale land deals, let alone a veto right. In consequence, legal mobili-
zation attempts can only be based on soft law regulations, or on general
norms such as human rights. In consequence, legal mobilization was only
successful in the case of the company open to such arguments. However,
one additional condition could be relevant in explaining the outcome: Lo-
cal and national level support for Socfin might not make it necessary for
the company to respond to local demands.
Summary of findings from Sierra Leone
Overall, my findings from Sierra Leone illustrated the usefulness of my an-
alytical framework and created new insights. I will shortly summarize this
analytical chapter before I will discuss my results and the possible addi-
tional condition on an abstract level.
This chapter started by giving an overview of the issue of large-scale land
deals in Sierra Leone. It became clear that the influx of a number of for-
eign investments in agriculture was a new phenomenon in the context of
Sierra Leone. This rush for land in the country was not only caused by
global drivers but also by incentives and promotion activities set by the
5.5.2
48 Strategies of companies to intimidate critics through lawsuits, even if those might
not be successful, have been described as SLAPP tactics: Strategic Litigation
Against Public Participation (Garvey/Newell 2005: 396).
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government. Civil society activities, funded through international NGOs,
formed quickly around the issue and a network of different organizations
helped to link local to national and international actors. In this way, the
issue of large-scale land deals brought the topic of land rights on the politi-
cal agenda and highlighted problems with the land governance system.
The legal system around land tenure issues has been notoriously prob-
lematic in the country. The main Sierra Leonean law regulating land trans-
fers in the Provinces has bestowed the decision making power on Chief-
dom Councils, omitting customary land ownership and use rights. Other
elements of the collective optimum formulated in chapter 4.1.1 were not
fulfilled either, showing the unfavorability of the national legal opportuni-
ty structure in the country when it comes to the rights of smallholders.
The two cases of Addax and Socfin then demonstrated the effects of an
unfavorable NLOS: In both cases, only the Chiefdom Council under the
chair of the Paramount Chiefs had to agree in principle to the lease agree-
ments. Yet, in the Addax case, the company also signed additional agree-
ments with landowning families and thereby opened up the space for ma-
neuver for local communities. This opportunity was taken up by one com-
munity, which negotiated successfully with the company. In the case of
Socfin, local actors mobilized to no avail. The local activist group MALOA
called on the Human Rights Commission of Sierra Leone to intervene.
However, their mediation attempt failed due to the behavior of the
Paramount Chief and national politicians.
Breaking the findings down into a truth table summarizes the two cases
on a very abstract level.






Addax unfavorable strong receptive success
Socfin unfavorable strong unreceptive failure
Viewed in such a way, the relevance of the receptivity of the company be-
comes apparent under the same legal circumstances and similarly strong
support networks. However, the relevance of another condition needs to
be discussed: The role of local and national elites in hindering legal mobi-
lization attempts and suppressing local dissent. On an abstract level, the
question is how such a condition relates to the receptivity of the company:
Does it change the receptivity of a company? Does it make the condition of
Table 13
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the receptivity obsolete? Or is the role of local authorities only relevant in
certain contexts? The material from the Socfin case is not conclusive in this
case, as local authorities and the company seem to cooperate closely. It
could be that unreceptive companies, who are supported by local and na-
tional authorities, become even less receptive towards local demands. This
would be in line with the following observation from a Sierra Leonean civ-
il society member:
“But we also have very stubborn companies. Yes, they think, because
they have connections, they have powers from above, so they think
they are so protected, so fearful, so big that they do not need to listen
to us.” (interview SL26)
This quote shows that unreceptive companies tend to use their connec-
tions to not have to answer to local demands. However, what about the re-
ceptive companies? As discussed in chapter 5.5.1 Addax also enjoyed the
support of local and national authorities, yet the company did choose to
communicate directly with landowners because they wanted to fulfill in-
ternational best practices. They, therefore, did not purely rely on local au-
thorities to deal with customary right-holders. This would imply that the
receptivity of the company made the behavior of local authorities less rele-
vant for the specific case of individual communities negotiating with the
company. It could be that the role of political elites (local and national) be-
comes more relevant in the case of unreceptive companies.
5.5 Within country comparison and discussion of findings
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Analysis II Philippines
The amount of arable land in the Philippines is rather small. The country
is spread across over 7000 islands with mostly mountainous interiors and is
densely populated (Quizon/Pagsanghan 2014: 18). Administratively, the
country consists of 81 provinces, which are subdivided into municipalities.
The smallest administrative form is the barangays, of which there are over
42.000 (Loewen 2018: 83).
Historically, land has been distributed highly unequal – the causes dat-
ing back to Spanish colonialization (Borras 2007: 147). Since then, land
distribution has been a highly contested issue in the country, from early
peasant revolts against the colonizers (Borras 2007: 147) to the armed con-
flict in Mindanao (Vellema et al. 2011) and countless civil society cam-
paigns (Curry 2013). The Comprehensive Land Reform of 1988 tried to ad-
dress the distribution issue, but if its outcome should be regarded as suc-
cess is highly debated (Borras 2006). Transnational companies investing in
agriculture are not a new phenomenon in the country. Yet, the govern-
ment policies of the early 2000s encouraged a lot of interest by additional
investors. However, several intended land deals did not materialize – I will
argue partly due to the legal system, which tries to protect local land own-
ership. Nonetheless, there are also a number of deals that were closed suc-
cessfully – many of them through contract growing systems. I will take a
closer look at two of those investments: Green Future Innovations in Is-
abela, located in Northern Luzon and Agumil in Palawan.
I will start this chapter by taking a closer look at large-scale land deals in
the Philippines on a national level (chap 6.1). My discussion will include
the agricultural background, including the agrarian reform, government
policies to attract investment as well as civil society responses. In a second
step, I will focus on the legal opportunity structure in the country (chap
6.2), which means reviewing the land tenure systems as well as specific reg-
ulations in regards to foreign investors.
6.
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Green Future Innovations 
Agumil 
Map of the Philippines (Cutout)
(source of map: http://d-maps.com/carte.php?num_car=5600&lang=en, last visited
15/06/2018)
The first case (chap 6.3) considers the investment of Green Future Innova-
tions in a sugar cane plantation in Isabela. Initially, the joint-venture com-
pany acquired land through lease in different barangays in San Mariano;
however, it turned out that some of the property leased was contested in its
ownership. Through national networks local smallholders called on the
Provincial government but also on Congress to intervene. These calls were
Figure 6
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seconded by an attack of a national rebel group active in the region. It
seemed that this mix of strategies led to a successful solution of the issue.
The second case study (chap 6.4) looks at an investment in palm oil by
Agumil through lease and contract-growing. The project was set up in a
way that put most of the economic risk on cooperatives, who had signed
contract-growing deals with the company. As the debts started to accumu-
late, the cooperatives realized their problematic situation and were able to
initiate a congressional investigation. Yet, at the time of research, no solu-
tion had been found. The case points to a failure of existing support and
oversight mechanisms and the missing civil society support for the cooper-
atives.
Overall, the two cases show the difficulties of implementing and using
an existing favorable legal opportunity structure and the relevance of vary-
ing networks. I will discuss these findings in chapter 6.5.
Large-scale land deals in the Philippines
Large-scale land deals with the involvement of foreign investors have not
reached the same dimension in the Philippines as in Sierra Leone. This is
mainly due to a large amount of agreements that did not materialize so far.
Nonetheless, large-scale land deals have received considerable attention
and contestation (de la Cruz, Rosselynn 2011: 6). The debate about them
has to be regarded against the background of the extensive agrarian reform
covering more than half of the country’s agricultural land (Borras 2006:
80).
I will first describe the current trends set against the historical back-
ground (chap 6.1.1) before I turn to government policies attracting foreign
investment (chap 6.1.2). The last part of the chapter will focus on the civil
society involved in agrarian issues in the Philippines (chap 6.1.3).
Current trends and agricultural background
In this chapter, I will describe current trends of foreign large-scale land-
based investment by taking a closer look at the data provided by the Land
Matrix. These numbers by the Land Matrix provide some impressions
about the role of foreign investors. However, it should be noted that a lot
of direct investment in plantation agriculture in the country comes from
national companies, even if they often cater to and are closely linked with
6.1
6.1.1
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global brands such as Dole, Del Monte49 or Cargill (Lockie et al. 2015: 125;
Salerno 2015). Furthermore, smallholders in the Philippines are often
threatened by investments by local businesspersons, which are smaller
than 200 hectares and are therefore not covered by the Land Matrix
database (interview PH3). The focus on foreign large-scale investment con-
sequently only covers one particular aspect of the agrarian system in the
country. It is, therefore, important to situate information on large-scale
land deals in the broader agricultural context of the country and the exten-
sive land reform.
No. of intended/concluded land deals in the Philippines
year Biofuels* Food crops**









No year 7 2
Total 23 15
(Source: Land Matrix 2018)
Looking at the data of the Land Matrix, the high number of failed agree-
ments stands out. Out of 38 planned large-scale land-based investment in-
tended for a size of 4,8 million hectares, contracts were closed in only 14
deals covering around 610 000 hectares (Land Matrix 2018). It is not clear
why many of these deals never materialized, but public contention and le-
gal concerns played a role, at least in some of the most prominent cases. A
one-million-hectare concession for a Chinese investor was, for example,
Table 14
49 These companies do also have their own plantations; however, those are usually a
lot older and have been established before the year 2000, the starting point for
the Land Matrix.
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canceled by the Philippine Department of Agriculture “following massive
public outrage, a series of Congressional inquiries and a case filed before
the Supreme Court raising grounds of unconstitutionality.” (de la Cruz,
Rosselynn 2011: 6). It is not clear how many cases failed because of exist-
ing land laws. As I will discuss in chapter 6.2, land legislation is regarded
as rather progressive in the country and it could well be that legal concerns
weighed too heavy when more concrete plans for investments were negoti-
ated.
Another explanation for the failures could be that envisaged projects
were driven by a ‘rush mentality’ and were not always rooted in realistic
economic and managerial decisions. There were, for example, two intend-
ed deals with a size of one million hectares each – one with a British, one
with a Malaysian investor. In both cases, the deal never materialized. There
is a spike in interest in land between 2007 and 2008, which seems to be
mostly driven by an interest in biofuels investment, as the table 14 shows
(interest in food production seems to remain rather constant). The Biofu-
els Act was passed by Congress in 2006, explaining the sudden interest. In-
vestors rushed in quickly to secure themselves a ‘first-mover’ advantage,
which did not, however, lead to successful investment projects.
Still, even though many deals never materialized 11 out of the 14 ‘con-
cluded’ contracts reported by the Land Matrix had plans to produce biofu-
els mainly through sugar cane (Land Matrix 2018).
 
The original plans to use 4,8 million hectares for large-scale land deals have
to be understood against the availability of land. Only 12.4 million
hectares of the approximately 30 million hectares landmass is agricultural
land (World Bank 2018b), and practically all of it is used. Rice, corn, co-
conut and sugarcane are the major crops in terms of used area, while some
other high-value crops such as banana, pineapple and mango are essential
as export commodities but take up less land (Philippines Statistics Authori-
ty 2017).
Even though rice is the number one crop in the country, the Philippines
imports rice to cover the needs of the population. The missing self-suffi-
ciency in the national staple food is explained, among other reasons, by li-
mited land resources in the country (Koirala et al. 2016: 372).
The amount of land available for investment in other crops, including
rubber and palm oil, is not at all clear – official numbers range between
100,000 and nearly 9 million hectares of ‘idle’ land (Montefrio/Dressler
2016: 120). This discourse of plenty ‘idle’ lands, which should be put to
productive use, seems to be one of the driving forces for the interest of
6. Analysis II Philippines
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many foreign investors. However, it is questionable if this discourse paints
a realistic picture of the highly populated island state (Montefrio/Dressler
2016).
Agriculture plays a vital role in the country in terms of poverty reduc-
tion, as it employs about one third of the workforce in the Philippines. It
continues to play a big role in the lives of the rural population, which ac-
counts for nearly half of the total population (World Bank 2018b). At the
same time, poverty remains at high levels in rural regions. Farmers are
poorer than the average population, with 34,3 % living below the national
poverty line (Philippines Statistics Authority 30/06/2017). The high preva-
lence of rural poverty is associated with historical path dependencies in
land ownership started during colonial times:
“The current agrarian structure can be traced from this period when
landownership started to become concentrated in the hands of Span-
ish conquestadores, the mestizos, their local Filipino collaborators, and
the Roman Catholic Church. More and more local people lost their
formal claims of ownership, control or rights, over these lands, and
have become share tenants, landless rural (semi)proletariat, and
(sub)subsistence farmers. As late as the 1980s, it was estimated that
about 70 percent of the peasant population work on lands that were
not theirs.” (Borras 2007: 147)
This situation of a highly unequal agrarian system with wealthy landown-
ing elites and a poor landless workforce was to be changed by the agrarian
reform of 1988, which has not been fully completed to this day. Anchored
in the post-Marcos constitution of 1987, the Comprehensive Agricultural
Reform Programm (CARP) sought to redistribute land to those who
worked on it (Curry 2013: 68). Landlords, having more than five hectares,
were compensated for the land they could give up voluntarily or which
would eventually be expropriated. Peasants who received land had to pay a
subsidized price, which was to guarantee ‘affordability’ (Borras 2001: 551–
552).
Especially in the first years, implementation of the reform was slow and
highly contested, leading to an extension in 2009 for another 5 years but
also to the downgrading of expectation of areas covered (Adam 2013: 234).
As of today, 4.8 million hectares have been redistributed to 2.8 million
beneficiaries according to official numbers (Cahiles-Magkilat 1/21/2018).
However, if the agrarian reform should be considered as success is highly
debated and depends on the criteria used (Feranil 2005; Adam 2013; Borras
2006; Vista et al. 2012). Even though reform beneficiaries do now have ac-
6.1 Large-scale land deals in the Philippines
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cess to land, they are struggling to survive as farmers because of missing
support systems, for example, in terms of agricultural inputs (interviews
PH3, PH6). Furthermore, in many cases, agrarian reform beneficiaries
(ARBs) struggle to pay the amortization rate for the land they received.
 
Considering the background of the extensive land reform is important in
order to understand foreign large-scale land investments and mobilization
around them. I can make three observations:
First, civil society actors fear that large-scale land deals might reverse
some successes of the land reform. There are reports about CARP benefi-
ciaries being approached by companies to lease their lands, which might
be tempting given the oftentimes-precarious economic situation that they
are in. At the same time, creating new large-scale plantations will exactly
lead to land concentration or new dependencies – essentially those dynam-
ics that the land reform tried to tackle (de la Cruz, Rosselynn 2011: 10).
Second, institutions, rules and dispute resolutions mechanisms created
during the land reform are also relevant for the setup of large-scale land
deals. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), for example, has to be
informed about lease agreements of reform beneficiaries (Government of
the Republic of the Philippines 2008: chap. 3, sec. 2.3) and is an important
institution for land tenure dispute resolution (Franco 2008a).
Third, the civil society in the agricultural sector in the Philippines has
mobilized extensively around the land reform. NGOs and local peasant or-
ganizations cooperated in many occasions to fight adamant landlords
(Franco 2008a; Diprose/McGregor 2009). At the same time, CARP revealed
substantive differences within the civil society between organizations en-
gaging with the state to implement the reform and those who opposed the
land reform completely (Curry 2013).
Government policies to attract foreign investment in agriculture
As mentioned, part of the rise of foreign interest in farmland in the Philip-
pines was driven by government policies encouraging biofuel production
in the country. This policy is part of a broader plan of green economy de-
velopment (Montefrio/Dressler 2016). I will take a look at these policies
before addressing the government agencies involved in large-scale land
deals.
In 2006, the Philippine Congress passed the Biofuels Act, which requires
that all gasoline sold in the country contains 10 % of bioethanol. To this
6.1.2
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end, incentives such as tax exemptions and financial assistance are granted
to bioethanol producers (Republic of the Philippines 7/24/2006: sec. 6).
The rationale behind the law was to reduce dependence on imported fuels,
develop renewable energy, decrease greenhouse gas emissions while in-
creasing employment in the rural regions (Republic of the Philippines
7/24/2006: sec. 2). At the same time, the Biofuels Act had been pushed by a
strong business coalition (Montefrio/Sonnenfeld 2011: 37–38).
In 2008, final implementing rules and regulations were laid out through
a joint administrative order by numerous government agencies. The ad-
ministrative order exempts land areas under 25 hectares used for biofuel
production from the land reform (Government of the Republic of the
Philippines 2008: chap. 1, sec. 3). This exemption incentivizes bigger
landowners to invest in bioethanol as a means to protect their land from
redistribution (interview PH3). Overall, the Biofuels Act and its imple-
menting guidelines are just one part of the broader policy project of
achieving ‘inclusive green growth’, which is regarded as a tool to curb ru-
ral poverty as well as fight climate change (Montefrio/Dressler 2016).
These ‘green economy’ policies have pushed plans to develop up to 8 mil-
lion hectares of ‘idle’ land for bioethanol production and attract foreign
investors to support this development. Since then, the area planted for
palm oil or rubber has grown substantially (Montefrio/Dressler 2016: 119).
As another consequence interest in foreign large-scale land deals for the
production of biofuels increased – especially in the years 2007 and 2008 –
as shown in table 14 in the previous chapter.
 
Different government agencies are relevant for the facilitation of large-
scale land deals in the country. The Philippine Agricultural Development
and Commercial Corporation (PADCC) was founded to attract investors,
to identify available land and facilitate land deals between investors and lo-
cal governments (de la Cruz, Rosselynn 2011: 7; Aquino 2011: 2). Accord-
ing to interviewees from a national NGO, the PADCC had identified
about one million hectares for biofuels production and was overseeing all
foreign investments in biofuels. However, records such as the Memoranda
of Understanding with the Philippine government were not accessible (in-
terview PH3). In 2014, the PADCC was dissolved due to corruption by a
presidential order (Esguerra 3/3/2014).
The PADCC had been housed at the Department of Agriculture (DA),
which still plays a central role in facilitating investments. Investors leasing
land for biofuels production need to obtain certificates from the DA, the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Department for Environ-
6.1 Large-scale land deals in the Philippines
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ment and Natural Resources (DENR) as well as from the National Com-
mission on Indigenous Peoples. This complicated process was supposed to
be simplified by the creation of a one-stop-shop housed at the National
Biofuels Board (Government of the Republic of the Philippines 2008);
however, it seems like this one-stop-shop never materialized. In conse-
quence, a plethora of actors is involved in facilitating, closing and oversee-
ing foreign investment in biofuels production – making retracing of land
deals difficult. At the same time, local government units play an important
role in facilitating land deals and connecting companies to possible lessors,
adding another layer of complexity (delos Reyes: 1). On civil society mem-
ber described this confusing picture:
“[…] there's no clear mechanism where these investments would be
discussed. I mean, investors can directly go to a local government or to
the community or to a Philippine private entity.[…] So, given all these
things happening, it's really difficult to know what is really going on.”
(interview PH4).
Civil society networks
The Philippines has not only a strong history of peasant mobilization, dat-
ing back to colonial times but also a passionate, vibrant and broad NGO
community. Civil society activities in response to large-scale land deals are
usually undertaken by those actors, who were engaged in or campaigned
against the agrarian reform program. Similar networks are used and act
with similar strategies around large-scale land deals. At the same time, the
civil society in the agricultural sector is marked by an ideological divide be-
tween center-left and radical-left networks.
 
Peasant revolts have had a strong history since Spanish colonial rule: Since
one of the first peasant uprisings against unjust land distribution took
place in 1745 (Curry 2013: 66), the country has experienced multiple
waves of peasant revolts. The Philippine government had made only small
concessions, so “unrest remained an important part of rural politics
throughout the twentieth century.” (Borras 2006: 79). During the 70s and
80s, these peasant insurgents became part of the National Democratic
Movement led by the Communist Party of the Philippines, one of the
main opposition groups against the Marcos dictatorship (Borras 2001:
560). The Peasant Movement of the Philippines (Kilusang Magbubukid ng
Pilipinas = KMP) became the biggest and most well-known peasant organi-
6.1.3
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zation of the far-left. Apart from the peasant movement, worker unions,
church-based organizations and city-based civil society groups formed a
broad coalition against the autocratic rule and overthrew the Marcos
regime in the ‘people power’ revolution – also referred to as the EDSA50
revolution – in 1986.
The civil society actors involved in the revolution were so heterogeneous
that the coalition quickly fell apart (Loewen 2018: 157–158). The same was
true for the peasant movement, where the ideological differences became
apparent during the Comprehensive Agricultural Reform Programm.
More moderate groups campaigned for a reform of the reform and later
helped in the implementation, whereas the KMP stayed in total opposi-
tion51 (Borras 2001: 560–561). This pattern was repeated when center-left
peasant organizations, NGOs and church actors campaigned for the exten-
sion of the land reform beyond 2009. The radical left, foremost the KMP,
dismissed this campaign and instead demanded their own model of a
‘Genuine’ Agrarian Reform Program (Curry 2013: 70; Feranil 2005: 269).
This main division between center-left and radical left organizations, does
not only lead to non-cooperation between the groups (interviews PH8,
PH28), but also to different strategies in dealing with conflicts around
land.
The center-left coalition involves a number of organizations that work
in close collaboration. The central peasant movement organization in this
bloc is PAKISAMA (Pambansang Kilusan ng mga Samahang Magsasaka).
The organization represents the interests of agrarian communities on a na-
tional level, supports local struggles of local peasant organizations and pro-
vides services for its members (Curry 2013: 72). PAKISAMA is a member
of the Asian Farmer’s Association and the network organization AR Now!.
Both network organizations have taken up the issue of large-scale land
deals and published reports on it (Bernabe 2010). These membership-based
organizations cooperate with the NGO ANGOC (Asian NGO Coalition
for Agrarian Reform and Rural Development). ANGOC has been one of
the main actors of implementing the VGGT and produced a number of
studies on the issue (Quizon 2017; Quizon/Pagsanghan 2014). Other actors
in the network are legal aid organizations such as KAISAHAN, which fo-
50 EDSA (Epifanio de los Santos Avenue) is the most important city highway of
Manila and was the main location of the mass protests.
51 During the process the communist National Democratic Movement as well as
parts of the KMP themselves split into different ideological groups (Borras 2001:
561).
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cuses on legally supporting potential agrarian reform beneficiaries (inter-
view PH6).
These are just some of the biggest organizations. Still, many more can be
counted to this center-left part of the agrarian civil society, especially at the
regional and local levels. These networks link local peasant organizations
to national advocacy and legal aid NGOs and are regarded as an important
component for the partial success of the land reform with examples from
all over the country (Borras 2001: 563–566; Feranil 2005: 272–278). The
main strategies used by local peasant groups involve pickets, demonstra-
tions but also dialogues (Borras 2001: 565). National organizations support
them through “making public statements; calling on support groups, en-
couraging student activism, building advertising campaigns, lecturing, and
conducting workshops, as well as teaching requisite entrepreneurial skills”
(Curry 2013: 72). At the same time, rights-based campaigns and the use of
legal avenues to push the implementation of CARP are important strate-
gies for these networks:
“It took an encounter with a rights-advocacy organization willing and
capable of (re)interpreting state agrarian reform law as a potential re-
source for excluded groups in hostile farms for the peasants to move
beyond inertia and individualized resistance, toward collectively claim-
ing their rights.” (Franco 2008a: 1013)
Another important strategy are congressional inquiries. Civil society actors
closely work with senators and house representatives to have specific land
deals discussed in congressional committees:
“In the Philippines, the congressional inquiries are an effective tool.
Either to push advocacy or to prevent or to stop or to delay. In recent
experience, we utilized congress in three things: First, to advance our
advocacies. Second, if we want to investigate or to stop, or to delay cer-
tain programs or deals that will affect the farmers. Third, to influence
or to pressure the Executive through legislative inquiry to act on spe-
cific land cases.” (interview PH27)
While congressional inquiries do not create binding decisions, reports are
used to pressure administrators of different departments and local politi-
cians into taking action in favor of local farmers (interview PH27). In
many instances, civil society actors cooperate with and support local DAR
officials, who are often blocked in their work by powerful local politicians
(interview PH27). Overall, these center-left civil society organizations com-
bine moderate street actions like demonstrations with classic advocacy and
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political-legal strategies. At the same time, they often collaborate closely
with national and local officials to ensure the implementation of the agrar-
ian reform and related programs.
 
Civil society actors that are associated with the radical left follow similar
strategies, but also go one step further through including militant forms of
action. One of the central actors of this bloc is the above mentioned KMP,
which claims to represent 1,3 million rural people through 65 provincial
chapters (KMP). The peasant movement organization closely associates it-
self with the far-left wing of Philippine politics, referred to as Bayan, while
at the same time distancing itself from the revolutionary National Demo-
cratic Front (interview PH8). The National Democratic Front is linked to
the National People’s Army (NPA), a maoist-communist rebel group with
an estimated 4500 members throughout the country (Walch 2018: 342).
Despite efforts to distance itself from the NPA, the KMP frequently gets as-
sociated with the rebel group (Jimenez 2003: 282).
The central goal of the KMP and other far-left organizations is a ‘Gen-
uine Agrarian Reform’, which would force the redistribution of all land
for free. The existing CARP is described as ‘bogus’ and ‘fake’ and conse-
quently not supported (interview PH8). Instead, the organization under-
took a number of land occupations, especially in the beginning of the land
reform process (Borras 2001: 560). Apart from land occupations, rallies and
camp-outs are a part of the militant action of the organization (interview
PH8) and often take somewhat confrontational forms (Jimenez 2003: 236).
Nonetheless, the KMP also uses advocacy, fact-finding missions and cam-
paigning to push their issues on the political agenda. Furthermore, they
cooperate with sympathetic congressional representatives such as from
Anakwapis, the associated party list (interview PH8). Overall the radical
left wing strongly defines itself in its opposition to CARP and its more
‘militant’ forms of actions. At the same time, they do employ ‘traditional’
forms of advocacy and campaigning and are connected to sympathetic po-
liticians.
Apart from the differences in ideology and strategies employed, interna-
tional support networks vary between the two blocs. Support from NGOs
and International Organizations is mainly channeled to the moderate left
bloc of the civil society through project-based funding. Donors include Ox-
fam, Misereor, various development agencies, the European Union, the
FAO, and the International Land Coalition, of which a number of organi-
zations are a member (interviews PH2, PH3, PH4, PH6). Projects often fo-
cus on research reports, local capacity building and advocacy campaigns.
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The far-left bloc around the KMP is mostly funded through its members
and local fundraising efforts (interview PH8). However, they also have in-
ternational links to other militant peasant organizations and anti-globaliza-
tion movements (Jimenez 2003: 253–254). The KMP is a founding mem-
ber of the biggest global peasant organization La Via Campesina; however,
it does not engage with La Via Campesina anymore, due to ideological dif-
ferences (Borras 2008: 278). Instead, the KMP focuses on the Asian Peasant
Coalition, of which it hosts the secretariat. Through the Asian Peasant
Coalition, KMP members also participate in international fora such as the
Civil Society Mechanism of the Committee on World Food Security (inter-
view PH8)
The standing of civil society activists in the Philippine state seems to
have two faces: On the one hand, activists often work closely with the po-
litical and administrative system. Furthermore, staff members of NGOs
but also farmer’s movements frequently find their way into government
positions (Lewis 2013). A remarkable example in this regard is the appoint-
ment of a former chairman of the KMP as Secretary for Agrarian Reform
by President Duterte, even though Congress later rejected the appoint-
ment (Jesus 6/9/2017). On the other hand, farmer-, environmental- or hu-
man rights- activists, lawyers and journalists are regularly targets of repres-
sion and considerable violence. Private militias and the Philippine army
are considered to be behind killings of activists, which often happen with
impunity (Franco et al. 2014: 7). In the year 2017 alone, the international
NGO Global Witness reported the killing of 48 land and environmental
defenders in the country (Global Witness 2018: 15). Land rights activists,
therefore, often oscillate between cooperating with authorities and being
targets of violent repression and retaliation by state and non-state actors.
National legal opportunity structure in the Philippines
The Philippines has a number of laws and policies that regulate foreign
large-scale land deals, leaving the country better off than other Southeast
Asian countries. At the same, time the land governance system is fractured,
which creates complicated tenure relations on the ground. Yet, I argue that
for smallholders, especially agrarian reform beneficiaries, the national legal
opportunity structure can be regarded as favorable.
In a first step, I will take a look at national-level legislation, including
provisions made by the constitution as well as specific laws regulating land
ownership (chap 6.2.1). In a second step, I focus on national policies gov-
6.2
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erning foreign land investments, concentrating specifically on the rights of
agrarian reform beneficiaries (chap 6.2.2). In a final step, I use this infor-
mation to evaluate the national legal opportunity structure (chap 6.2.3)
with the help of the criteria developed in chapter 4.1.1.
National land laws and tenure system
Access to land as a means for social equality plays a vital role in the consti-
tution of 1987. Laying out the basic principles of the Philippine State the
constitution requires the state to “promote social justice” (Republic of the
Philippines 1987: Art. 2, Sec.10) and to this end “promote comprehensive
rural development and agrarian reform“ (Republic of the Philippines
1987: Art. 2, Sec.21). Against this background, the constitution recognizes
that “[t]he use of property bears a social function” and is “subject to the
duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the
common good so demands” (Republic of the Philippines 1987: Art. 12,
Sec.6). The reduction of social, economic and political inequalities should
be given the highest priority to ensure human dignity through regulating
“the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its incre-
ments” (Republic of the Philippines 1987: Art. 13, Sec.2).
These broad provisions of the constitution, which demand equal distri-
bution of property to ensure social justice, are concretized in subsequent
laws such as Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, the Fisheries Code and the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (Quizon/Pagsanghan 2014: 22).
Taken together with the Forestry Code and the Civil Code, these laws cre-
ate the basis for the land tenure system, which is rather complicated.
On the most basic level, there are two different categories of land in the
Philippines: Alienable and Disposable (A&D) land and protected forest-
lands, which both make up roughly half of the 30 million hectares of land.
65 % of A&D land is privately titled. The rest is publicly owned (but often
informally used). While in principle all A&D land is open for private own-
ership, the category of forest land is formally owned by the state and ad-
ministered by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) (Koirala et al. 2016: 372). Forestlands can, however, be leased and
used by small-scale farmers. Farmers and communities, who have cultivat-
ed this category of land for an extended period cannot be evicted and can
apply for different certificates – some awarded individually, some awarded
to community-based organizations. These certificates are usually awarded
for 25 years and include agreements on forest use, agriculture and environ-
6.2.1
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mental protection. A special certificate is the Ancestral Domain Title,
which is awarded to indigenous communities and protects their land
rights52 (van der Ploeg et al. 2016: 150).
Generally, land ownership can be claimed through registered land titles,
deeds of sale and certificates received during land reforms53 or from the
DENR. Taxes paid on land improvements are often also accepted as proof
for ownership; it is, however, a less formal way. What gets accepted as a
legitimate claim for ownership is highly dependent on the reference legis-
lation used: Basically, the Agrarian Reform Law accepts ownership
through cultivation. However, older legislation, specifically the Civil Code
of 1950, only accepts formally documented proofs. As older laws are usual-
ly not repealed in the country, a situation developed in which different
contradictory legislations exist (Quizon/Pagsanghan 2014: 23; Franco
2008a: 999). In consequence, solving conflicts around landownership can
become a complex undertaking:
“In practice, then, jurisdictional lines in agrarian reform and related
disputes remain blurred even today, leaving it up to better-equipped
litigants and individual judges to determine where and how a case will
be processed.” (Franco 2008a: 999)
Tenure arrangements of Philippine farmland
Tenure arrangement % of farmland
Formal ownership 48 %
Owner-like possession 17 %
Tenancy (shared or leased) 19 %
Other arrangements (certificates) 10 %
Lease 6 %
(based on Philippine Statistics Authority 2012: 39)
Looking at available numbers, the Agricultural Census of 2012 counted 5.6
million farm households with a total size of 7.3 million hectares (Philip-
Table 15
52 As mentioned in the introduction I largely exclude indigenous people’s rights
from my analysis. I will therefore not go into more detail into the laws and regu-
lations specific to indigenous communities.
53 Before the major land reform of 1988 certificates were handed out during earlier
more limited reform programs and can still be used as claim of ownership
(Koirala et al. 2016: 372).
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pine Statistics Authority 2012: 11). Of the whole area, 48 % are formally
owned, while 17 % are held informally in owner-like possession. 19 % are
tenanted, while 6 % are leased and 10 % account for other arrangements
such as different certificates54 (Philippine Statistics Authority 2012: 39). In
the local context, owner-like possessions are usually respected by surround-
ing communities and local officials:
“Farmers know that they do not formally own the land, but informal
land claims, so-called ‘possessions’, are generally respected, also on fal-
low land. Possessions are sold, mortgaged or temporarily leased to oth-
er farmers. Such transactions—‘agreements’—are recorded by the
Sangguniang Barangay, the elected village council.” (van der Ploeg et
al. 2016: 151)
Consequently, even informally closed rent agreements can provide local
tenure security. Research shows that farmers equally invest and produce on
informally leased land as they do on formally owned land, pointing to the
stability of relational contracting in the rural Philippines (Michler/Shively
2015: 166). However, in the context of foreign investors coming into a re-
gion, this security is challenged. It seems likely that the categories of own-
er-like possession and tenant farmers are the most vulnerable in cases of
outside investments, as their access to land is often based on informal and
oral agreements.
 
As mentioned above, there are different ways to claim ownership or use
rights to agricultural land through different government agencies. Agrari-
an reform beneficiaries (ARBs) usually have certificates from the Depart-
ment of Agrarian Reform; others have certificates of the DENR, while only
some have registered land titles. The payment of land taxes usually hap-
pens locally, so tax certificates are issued by Local Government Units
(LGUs). While this system creates a number of opportunities to proof a le-
gitimate title for land-users55, it also creates a considerable degree of chaos
– especially since there are no complete cadastral maps:
“Several agencies and LGUs issue different tenure instruments, but
there is no consolidated information on the tenure status of land
54 Percentages based on own calculation based on the numbers from the Agricul-
ture Census (Philippine Statistics Authority 2012: 39).
55 Of course, this system is also susceptible to exploitation. In some instances people
paying land taxes a are middle class families, who live in cities but want to secure
themselves the access to land in villages (Franco/Borras 2007: 73).
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parcels; each agency maintains separate land records with different sys-
tems of recording and mapping.” (Quizon/Pagsanghan 2014: 29)
In consequence, it can become challenging to identify the tenure status of
a specific parcel of land. Overlapping land claims and unclear boundaries
are, therefore, a considerable problem in the country. To solve this frac-
tured approach to land governance a National Land Use and Management
Act has been proposed in Congress but has not been enacted (Lopez/
Demaisip 2014).
Rules and regulations regarding foreign large-scale land deals
No overall rules and guidelines have been developed for large-scale land
deals specifically; they are, however, governed by “overall policies on land
ownership and tenure” (Quizon/Pagsanghan 2014: 71).
The constitution does have a strong focus on protecting the country’s
economic independence and autarky (Loewen 2018: 71). It does not allow
for foreign land ownership and requires corporations which lease public
or private land to be at least 60 % Philippine-owned56. When corporations
or individuals lease public land, they are not allowed to lease more than
500 hectares for longer than 25 years (Republic of the Philippines 1987:
Art. 12). While this does not apply to privately owned land, these provi-
sions set some considerable limitations to foreign large-scale land invest-
ments. Because of these regulations, investment projects usually consist of
joint ventures between international and national investors and often re-
vert to contract farming agreements instead of lease.
Apart from these constitutional rules, different regulations and agencies
are responsible in different forms of tenure and types of investment. Regis-
tered land titles are probably the most straightforward, as it is the right of
the owner to decide about the transfer and use of their land. Nonetheless,
specific permits are needed, for example, if an investment requires the cut-
ting of trees (interview PH33).
It becomes more complicated for the land of agrarian reform beneficia-
ries (ARBs), of which there are 2,8 million, as mentioned earlier. When
ARBs enter into a formal agreement with a private investor, it is consid-
6.2.2
56 At the time of research there were plans by the government to abolish the restric-
tive provisions allowing for 100 % foreign ownership for investors in land as part
of a bigger constitutional change (interview PH3).
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ered an agribusiness venture agreement (AVA) and falls under the auspices
of the DAR (interview PH46). While these AVAs can take different forms,
the most common arrangements are leases and growership contracts (FAO
2016: 3). According to rules and regulations set out for AVAs in Adminis-
trative Order No. 9, the DAR is supposed to review and evaluate these
agreements (Department of Agrarian Reform 2006: Sec.4.5). Local DAR
officials should sign AVAs either as witness or as nominal party to the con-
tract in cases where the ten years prohibition period, during which this
land is not allowed to be sold, has not expired yet (Department of Agrarian
Reform 2006: Sec.4.6). Approval of the DAR should only be provided in
cases in which the AVA “guarantees the security of ownership and tenure
of ARBs, and ensure[s] an increase of their income” (Department of Agrar-
ian Reform 2006: Sec. 4.10).
The Administrative Order furthermore makes detailed stipulations on
how AVAs should be set up:
“The terms and conditions of the AVA contract shall be fully known
to all parties. If warranted, the parties may translate the contract into
the local dialect known to the ARBs. It shall be the responsibility of
the concerned DAR field officials to ensure that the ARBs are made
fully aware of and understand the options available to them, including
rights and obligations under the AVA contract.” (Department of
Agrarian Reform 2006: Sec.4.7)
The DAR has the role to advise and support ARBs as well as monitor ongo-
ing AVAs (interview PH46). It even has the power to end these contracts
on various grounds such as “[w]hen the AVA is no longer financially and
economically viable” (Department of Agrarian Reform 2006: Sec.19.3). In
practice, this usually means that the company is asked to change the condi-
tions of the contract so that ARBs can benefit from an AVA (interview
OH46).
To enter into AVAs, the DAR recommends the formation of coopera-
tives or farmer organizations (interview PH46). Farmer cooperatives, in
turn, fall under the responsibility of the Cooperatives Development Au-
thority (CDA), which sets rules for the running of cooperatives. In the case
of closing a contract with an investor, the General Assembly of the cooper-
ative, consisting of all members, has to agree formally (interviews PH7,
PH31). The CDA and related agencies on the provincial level furthermore
provide cooperatives with managerial support and capacity training (inter-
view PH31). Overall, these regulations of the DAR and CDA, therefore, go
beyond ownership rights but aim to protect smallholders from unfair con-
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tracts and to provide them with the necessary support to make informed
decisions. However, these provisions are specific for ARBs; other tenure ar-
rangements or informal tenure are not covered.
Apart from landowners, broader community consultations are only
legally required in the case of land in question being part of a formally reg-
istered ancestral domain. In line with the national Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act an FPIC process is required for any kind of investment in land
that is certified as ancestral domain of indigenous people. Such a process is
not necessary for communities not consisting of indigenous peoples
(Quizon/Pagsanghan 2014: 27).
In addition, land investments affecting protected forest areas or invest-
ments in biofuel production sites need an Environmental Impact Assess-
ment (Quizon/Pagsanghan 2014: 72; Government of the Republic of the
Philippines 2008: Sec. 2). However, there are no general rules on risks and
benefits sharing for investing companies with local communities (Eleazar
et al. 2013: 36). Nonetheless, more significant investment projects are sup-
posed to be discussed in periodic consultations with local administrations
and civil society actors, according to the Local Government Code of 1991
(Neame/Villarante 2013: 212). However, this rather vague demand for con-
sultations often seems to be unheard in the case of large-scale land invest-
ments:
“A key issue especially in large-scale land transactions is the overall
lack of a policy on information disclosure and access to information by
the public, especially by communities whose tenure and livelihoods
are likely to be affected. There are many cases where local communi-
ties are unaware, or else misinformed, about an investment or project
that is likely to affect their tenure.” (Quizon/Pagsanghan 2014: 71)
This lack of consultation seems especially problematic in cases where pub-
lic land is leased and land users do not hold formal tenure57.
Conflicts around land issues can be solved through various mechanisms.
Locally, barangay captains and community level mediation are involved in
resolving land issues and boundary conflicts. Barangay level conflict reso-
lution has to be tried first before a land conflict can be lodged with a for-
mal court (Eleazar et al. 2013: 32). However, local ‘authoritarian-clienteles’
elites – often large landowners, who managed to evade the agrarian reform
– exert considerable control over the local population and local dispute
57 However, they are protected from forced eviction and have to be relocated ade-
quately (Quizon/Pagsanghan 2014: 26).
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resolution. This leads to a situation that is often detrimental to the rights
and interests of the rural poor (Franco 2008b: 1864).
At the same time, formal court proceedings are often lengthy: In land
cases, it can take up to 5 or 10 years to get a decision in a lower court, and
if appeals go through to the Supreme Court, final decisions can take 20 or
more years. The costs and extensive periods involved in these processes do
not make formal courts an attractive way of dispute resolution (Eleazar et
al. 2013: 32–33). In addition to the court system, government agencies,
first and foremost the DAR, have quasi-judicial powers, for example, when
it comes to the implementation of the agrarian reform and can be one ac-
cessible way for local smallholders to claim their rights (Franco 2008a:
999). Overall, there are, therefore, mechanisms to solve disputes and en-
force laws, even if the formal way through the courts is often not the first
choice.
Evaluating the national legal opportunity structure
I will use the background of the land tenure system and rules for foreign
investment in land to evaluate the national legal opportunity structure ac-
cording to the elements defined in chapter 4.1.1. It will become apparent
that the national legal opportunity structure can be considered as favorable
in the case of agrarian reform beneficiaries.
In regards to the first element, the veto right against foreign investors is
mainly provided through the land tenure system. As shown in chapter
6.2.1, about half the farmland is used by farmers having formal ownership.
In addition, 10 % is claimed via certificates, which is also a formal form of
tenure. In the case of ownership like possession and tenancy, the picture is
a little bit different. While these categories usually enjoy a lot of security
locally, they are often based on informal and oral agreements, which could
potentially be challenged or ignored in the process of land consolidation
for outside investors. Yet, there are also several ways in which affected
smallholders could prove their ownership even if it is not formalized. In
consequence, many smallholders in the Philippines will have an effective
veto against a foreign company investing in their land. However, this is
certainly not true for all of them and depends on their individual tenure
status. Furthermore, there is no requirement for broader community con-
sultation, for example, in cases in which public land is affected. Element
one, therefore, can be regarded as partially fulfilled.
6.2.3
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The second element, which looks at support possibilities for smallhold-
ers making decisions on investments, is partially fulfilled as well. As dis-
cussed in the previous chapter, the provisions made in regards to ARBs are
rather extensive. The DAR has the task to review agreements, to support
ARBs in the decision-making process, and to oversee existing arrangements
with companies. However, as mentioned, these regulations do not usually
apply for non-ARB smallholders. Agreements between landholders and
companies are regarded as private contract negotiations and, therefore, not
subject to oversight through government agencies (Eleazar et al. 2013: 35).
Furthermore, an environmental impact assessment is only needed in cer-
tain cases and does not require a social component. There is, therefore, no
need for an independent social risk assessment.
The third element is, similar to the second element, mainly fulfilled for
ARBs. The regulations on agribusiness venture agreements are clear that
economic benefits and livelihood improvements have to be the aim of an
agreement between an investor and ARBs. If an AVA does not fulfill these
requirements, the DAR has the power to intervene on behalf of affected
smallholders. General provisions of the constitution aim to protect the
Philippine economy. Yet, in terms of benefit-sharing, there are no specific
guidelines for ensuring that local communities benefit from large-scale in-
vestments.
The fourth element is again only fulfilled to a limited extent. There is no
national inventory of large-scale land deals in the country and no clear re-
sponsibility in that regard. However, grievance mechanisms exist and judi-
cial avenues are open to be used in cases of land rights infringements. Yet,
especially calling on formal courts can be a lengthy and costly process. In
the case of affected ARBs they can call on the DAR, which has far-reaching
quasi-judicial competences as discussed.
Overall, looking at the national legal opportunity structure, a differenti-
ated picture emerges: All four elements are relatively well fulfilled for
agrarian reform beneficiaries, who therefore have a favorable national legal
opportunity structure. For other smallholders, there is less support and
oversight over their agreements with investing companies. However, it re-
mains to be seen in the further analysis if the favorable legal opportunity
structure for agrarian reform beneficiaries translates to better outcomes for
them.
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Case III: Green Future Innovations – success through combining strategies
The bioethanol project of Green Future Innovations was part of the biofu-
els frenzy, which set in after the new legislation in 2006. The investors
planned to construct a bioethanol refinery and grow sugar cane through
lease and contract grower agreements with the local population in the
Province of Isabela, situated in Northern Luzon (Shohibuddin et al. 2016:
110). The central affected municipality is San Mariano, where the refinery
is located.
Especially in the beginning, the project was contested by local far-left ac-
tivists, who feared to lose access to their land. Local protests and land occu-
pations escalated into an attack on company equipment, while a congres-
sional inquiry and an international fact-finding mission raised national
and international attention. The involvement of the Governor of the
Province of Isabela solved the conflict and the company agreed to return a
total of 2000 hectares of land. The mobilization efforts, of which legal mo-
bilization was only a small part, can, therefore, be regarded as a success,
In this chapter, I will first give a short overview of the project focusing
on the initial leasing process and problems associated with it before de-
scribing the current situation, which is rather beneficial for local small-
holders (chap 6.3.1). In a second step, I will describe the mobilization ef-
forts, among them legal mobilization through invoking international hu-
man rights and calling on the Philippine Congress and the Provincial Gov-
ernment to intervene (chap 6.3.2). Chapter 6.3.3 will then discuss the re-
ceptivity of the company to local concerns; however, this condition does
not play an essential role in this case, and my data is not conclusive. More
important was the effective mobilization organized through radical left
networks, who were already in place before the investment (chap 6.3.4). In
the last chapter, I will summarize the central findings and discuss open
questions (chap 6.3.5).
Overview of the investment of Green Future Innovations Inc.
Green Future Innovations Incorporated (GFII) was founded in 2007
through Japanese, Taiwanese and Philippine investors. Encouraged by the
biofuels legislation of 2006, the plan was to invest in sugarcane and to run
a bioethanol refinery in San Mariano (interview PH12). A second compa-
ny, Ecofuel Land Development Inc., was created in order to secure the
land – an envisaged 11,000 hectares (Shohibuddin et al. 2016: 110). How-
6.3
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ever, as both companies are closely related, I will not differentiate between
them and simply refer to Green Future Innovations or GFII58 in the fol-
lowing.
The leading investor in the bioethanol project was the Japanese Itochu
Corporation, a company investing in a variety of business sectors world-
wide, injecting 120 million USD in the project. The second Japanese com-
pany involved was the JGC Group, a company focused on engineering ser-
vices such as the construction of industrial sites and plants (International
Fact Finding Mission 2011: 11). Philippine investors were represented
through the Philippine Bioethanol and Energy Investments Corporation,
and the Taiwan-based holding firm GCO also participated in the project,
however, as minor shareholders (Molina 11/1/2010). The planned
bioethanol refinery was envisaged to be the “biggest biofuel enterprise in
the country” (Molina 11/1/2010). Two thousand hectares were planned to
be leased and managed directly by the company, and 9000 hectares of sug-
ar cane were supposed to be covered by contract growers. The project en-
joyed the broad political support of the Governor of Isabela and the Mayor
of San Mariano (Burgos 7/2/2011).
In the initial phase, the company started leasing the land in 2007. Com-
munity meetings were held at the barangay level but mainly served the
purpose of informing inhabitants rather than being open consultations
about the investment.
“[…]the nature of the project and its possible implications for the
community were not explained to the villagers, and nor was their in-
put requested with regards to the introduction of sugar cane into their
areas.” (Shohibuddin et al. 2016: 119)
Through the meetings, smallholders were approached to lease their land.
Lease agreements covered a period of six years and rent payments ranged
between 5000 to 10000 Philippine Pesos per hectare per year, depending
on the accessibility of the land. Simple barangay certificates were accepted
as proof of possession by the company (de la Cruz, Rosselynn Jaye 2012:
29–30). This simplified the leasing process and made the investment acces-
sible for smallholders without formalized tenure claims; however, it also
opened the door to land speculation and fraudulent land claims. As the
rent money was paid as lump-sum in the early phase of the project, mon-
58 Ecofuel Land Developmen Inc. did not exist anymore at the time of research
(2018). The company dealing with the sugarcane input is now called One Renew-
able Earth (interview PH12).
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eylenders used the opportunity to convince their debtors to lease their land
to the company to repay their loans (Alano 2015: 9). In these instances, the
smallholders were more or less forced to give up direct control over their
land in order to be debt-free. In addition, larger landowners bought up
land from farmers with informal possession and in at least one instance ex-
pelled tenants from the land to use it for sugar cane production (Alano
2015: 12). In other cases, barangay captains, relatives of company employ-
ees and local political elites were claiming land that had been used by
smallholder families without formal titles. These families faced displace-
ment and the loss of their livelihoods (International Fact Finding Mission
2011: 16).
One such case took place in barangay Del Pilar, where the barangay cap-
tain had allowed the company to survey 700 hectares even though he did
not hold possession of that land (interviews PH21, PH48). The company
did seem to regard him as a legitimate representative of the actual
landowners (interview PH48), who had allowed the barangay captain to
temporarily used their fields as grazing land but did not agree to the in-
vestment (Aljibe 2015: 46–47). The affected farmers organized through the
local farmers’ organization DAGAMI (Danggayan Dagiti Mannalon ti Is-
abela), which belongs to the radical left KMP described in chapter 6.1.3.
Through various strategies on the local, national and international levels,
they stopped the company from including the 700 hectares in their planta-
tions. I will take a closer look at the various avenues of mobilization in the
next chapter.
Apart from these bigger cases, smaller land conflicts occurred and the
company had to uproot already planted sugar cane or return leased land in
several instances (Alano 2015: 10). The initial process of leasing land for
sugar cane plantations was, therefore, not as smooth as planned and trig-
gered conflicts and mobilization against the investment.
As a response to the initial problems and due to changes in manage-
ment, the process of securing land for sugar cane plantations changed in
later years. Land possession is now not only validated through the
barangay captain but also through neighboring farmers, who are included
in identifying the boundaries of parcels of land (interview PH20). Agree-
ments with the company are only for three years and farmers can choose
between three farming models: They can lease the land to the company59,
enter into a contract growing arrangement in which they receive all the in-
59 The rent payments were between 7000 and 12000 peses per hectare per year at the
time of research in March 2018 (interview PH20).
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puts from GFII, or become an independent planter only registering with
the company as potential seller of sugar cane (interview PH20).
The small number of farmers I spoke to were satisfied with their op-
tions. Entering into a lease agreement is, for example, a way for them to
make barren land useable, if they do not have the means to prepare it
themselves. After three years, the company returns the land in a tilled state,
giving the farmer the option to grow something else then (interview
PH47). Farmers also entered into a contract grower arrangement as a step
to eventually become independent planters and autonomous of the com-
pany (interview PH19). Independent planters enjoyed the freedom of be-
ing able to control their own farm (interview PH15) and were able to sell
their sugar cane to another processing mill in a neighboring province
when they offered a higher price than GFII (Alano 2015: 9). Most of the
farmers seem to make a conscious choice to grow sugar cane but usually
only do so as long as it is more profitable for them than growing other
crops such as corn, the primary crop in the region (interviews PH14,
PH18, PH21). While my own data gathering is in no way representative of
all farmers, it does underline previous research that found that most small-
holders entering into sugar-cane planting arrangements with the company
had little complaints (Rutten et al. 2017: 11).
 
Even though the investment project is now well accepted in the region, the
company has economic difficulties, as it is not able to secure enough land
for sugar cane. At the time of research, in March 2018, 3000 hectares were
used for sugar cane production, which meant that the bioethanol refinery
was only running at half capacity (interview PH12). In 2016, a new man-
agement had taken over the company, which is now 100 % Philippine
owned. The attempts of the new management to secure more land were
not successful due to different reasons. First, the company wants to in-
crease plantations with mechanized farming and therefore focuses on flat
lands, which is rather difficult in the hilly area. Second, available land is
often remote, making accessibility, especially during the rainy season, a big
issue (interview PH20). Third, and probably most important, GFII has
problems to convince farmers to grow sugar cane. One issue is that farmers
do not have knowledge about sugar cane growing, as it had never been
planted in the region before the investment. Furthermore, the conditions
the new management is able to offer are not as attractive as earlier arrange-
ments with the company, making it less profitable for farmers to partici-
pate (interview PH20). According to a staff member of the local DAR of-
fice, the net income from rice or corn is higher than from sugar cane. In
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addition, ARBs are only allowed to divert lands to sugar cane that are not
suitable for food crops such as corn or rice60. Last but not least, local farm-
ers also benefit from government support programs such as the provision
of tractors for the production of corn, cassava or rice (interview PH47),
presenting them with viable alternatives to sugar cane.
Overall the investment of GFII presents a project which was initiated as
part of the biofuel boom but has until now not been economically sustain-
able for the investors. For the local farmers, GFII represents one additional
option and most of the smallholders growing sugar cane do not seem to
have significant complaints about the company. However, this was differ-
ent in the beginning, when some individuals used the opportunity to
make quick cash in wrongfully leasing land to the company. In the next
chapter, I will take a closer look at the multiple mobilization efforts that
took place to get back the land and ensure the rights of land-using small-
holders.
Escalating mobilization efforts from below and above
The main mobilization efforts took place in the first half of 2011 when
people in Del Pilar but also other barangays in San Mariano feared that
they would lose access to their land. I will describe these mobilization ef-
forts in a first step before discussing the responses of government actors
and the company that resolved the issue. It becomes clear that the legal
mobilization of the Congress was just one element of broader mobiliza-
tion efforts that involved mass protest and violent means.
Local mobilization efforts were organized by DAGAMI (Danggayan
Dagiti Mannalon ti Isabela), a local member organization of the KMP with
about 3000 members in San Mariano (interview PH21). DAGAMI seemed
to be especially strong in Del Pilar, where the barangay captain wrongfully
leased the land to the company. Apart from the instances of contested land
claims, farmers generally feared the loss of their land through the invest-
ment project. The first protest against the bioethanol project took place in
February 2011 in San Mariano with 400 participants (Burgos 7/2/2011).
Two weeks later, DAGAMI cooperated with the KMP and other far-left or-
ganizations to undertake a national fact-finding mission and collect data
6.3.2
60 This policy was introduced by the DAR, as a response about the debate about
bioethanol and food security in 2008 (interview PH46).
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on problems around the bioethanol project (International Fact Finding
Mission 2011: 14).
In the meantime, congressman Mariano of the KMP associated party-list
Anakpawis sponsored a House Resolution demanding an investigation in-
to the investment project “that would turn small owner-cultivators/farmer-
tillers into tenants under a contract-growing scheme threatening farmers
to lose their farmlands” (House of Representatives 2011). The resolution
puts the investment into the broader context of “prevailing contract-grow-
ing practice in the Philippines” which “favors the foreign partner” and
“drives many farmers to bankruptcy” (House of Representatives 2011).
Therefore it was demanded that the arrangements between the company
and the farmers are scrutinized and a full investigation be undertaken
(House of Representatives 2011). The resolution was referred to the Com-
mittee on Energy, which made efforts to get inputs from different govern-
ment agencies and furnished meetings with company representatives.
In the follow-up, a second fact-finding mission took place at the end of
May 2011 with the participation of international civil society members
such as from Friends of the Earth Japan, the Global Forest Coalition or the
Organic Consumers Association – USA. The mission was organized by
KMP, APC, IBON International, People’s Coalition on Food Sovereignty
and DAGAMI and contained visits to communities as well as meetings
with the company, local administration, but also provincial government
agencies and politicians (International Fact Finding Mission 2011: 3). The
report of the international fact-finding mission claimed that the project
was “exacerbating land grabbing conflicts and socio-economic inequities”
(International Fact Finding Mission 2011: 1) and demanded that govern-
ment agencies and the Itochu Group should withdraw their support for
the investment. The report contained not only information on anomalous
land titling processes in the shadow of the investment but also problematic
labor conditions on the sugar cane plantations, a heightened military pres-
ence in Del Pilar. The report described expected adverse effects on the ecol-
ogy as well as food security (International Fact Finding Mission 2011). The
findings were used for national and international advocacy vis-à-vis
Congress, national agencies and international institutions such as the UN
Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (interview PH8).
Apart from these national and international efforts, mobilization contin-
ued on the local and provincial levels. In April or May 2011, the conflict
led to an attack on company equipment in Del Pilar and the burning of
sugar canes in the municipality of Delfin Albano (interviews PH21, PH48).
The attack was ascribed to the NPA, which is active in the remote moun-
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tainous parts of San Mariano (interview PH12). The attack was perceived
as a warning by the company:
“Actually, it was a warning. A warning with a cost. There is a big cost;
there is a big loss on our part, because the tractors are for our farms.
When we don't have tractors, we cannot manage the farm [...] and the
cultivation.” (interview PH12)
After another rally, which took place in front of the company’s office in
Cauayan in June 2011, high ranking company officials met with leaders of
DAGAMI. They agreed to halt the development of the land in question
(interview PH48). In another dialogue that took place at the Provincial lev-
el, the Governor of Isabela intervened and called on all mayors to respect
and ensure legitimate land claims. In turn, he asked the activists to provide
mayors with evidence of fraudulent land claims, so they are able to resolve
the conflicts (interview PH48). Subsequently, the mayor of San Mariano
turned to the barangay captain:
“He [the mayor] presented the evidence that they have. They give it to
these captains, who are involved in this. And then, he told them a
question […]: ‘Why did you do this? There is this evidence that this
land belongs to someone else. So, why did you do it?’ That's the
question. And then he ordered them: ‘If you have no evidence that this
is yours, you better stop it.’” (interview PH48)
In consequence, the barangay captain of Del Pilar informed the company
that the land was not his own and it was returned back to the owners61
(interview PH48). In neighboring municipalities, this did, however, not
work and it took another rally – this time in front of the company head-
quarters in Metro Manila – and five more months before all the land was
returned to the smallholders working on the land (interview PH48). Ac-
cording to a national KMP representative, a total of 2000 hectares were re-
turned due to the actions of civil society (interview PH8). I, therefore, re-
gard the mobilization attempts as a success.
61 These accounts about the involvement of the Governor were narrated by one in-
terviewee only and I was not able to verify them through other sources. The
meeting with the Governor was confirmed by others (interview PH47), who did
however not participate and were therefor not able to help in establishing what
was said during the meeting.
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It is difficult to ascribe the mobilization success to individual instances
such as the legal mobilization through the congressional resolution, the
fact-finding missions or the NPA attacks. Instead, it makes sense to think
about the different strategies working together to explain the outcome. It
seems clear that the intervention of the Governor was an essential step in
resolving the conflicts around certain lands. It is likely that he was pres-
sured into doing so ‘from below’, by protests of DAGAMI as well as the
threat of more violence by the NPA, and ‘from above’, by the activities go-
ing on at the House of Representatives. However, I do not have additional
evidence to validate these points.
Other interventions seem less relevant, as they happened after the initial
conflicts were resolved. In 2012, some leaders of DAGAMI traveled to
Japan, upon the invitation of Friends of the Earth, Japan to meet with po-
liticians and company officials (interviews PH21, PH48). In the same year,
Olivier de Schutter, acting Special Rapporteur on the right to food and
James Anaya, acting Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peo-
ples, formally addressed the Government of the Philippines to voice their
concerns and gather information about the investment of GFII. Their let-
ter summarizes findings from the international fact-finding mission and
asks the government for clarification (OHCHR 2012). However, it seems
like such an answer was never provided. It is also unlikely that the involve-
ment of the two special rapporteurs made any difference, as the situation
in San Mariano was starting to calm down. While there was another
protest in front of the bioethanol plant in August 2012, which was mainly
triggered by an unpleasant odor emanating from the refinery (Global For-
est Coalition 30/08/2012), activists of DAGAMI seemed to change their
mind about the investment. One of the central leaders of the protest later
decided to grow sugar cane for the company himself (interview PH21). It
seems that local critics of the project were convinced over the years that
farmers do not lose their land and have another economical option now. It
might even be that the relationship with government agencies like the
DAR improved after the initial conflicts, as was described in an interview
with different staff members at the local DAR office:
“Interviewee A: And then it was proven beneficial and then later on
this left group they just went silent. […] In fact, they are now our
friends. They have acquired our program too!
Interviewee B: Yes, and we were able to keep them silent because we
have proven that [the project] is really beneficial to the persons within
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the area. And, they even extended their help! They help us in the con-
duct of our programs.
Interviewee C: They are asking for a certification from our office, so
that their back up land, their barren land will also be planted with sug-
ar cane.” (interview PH47)
This newfound cooperation seems rather remarkable as traditionally, the
KMP regards the agrarian reform as ‘bogus’ and usually does not seek col-
laboration with the DAR. However, locally some activists seem to cooper-
ate closely with government agencies and municipal administrators now
(interview PH21).
Overall, mobilization against the unjust leasing of lands and the GFII in-
vestment more generally did take place not only locally, but also nationally
and internationally. This combination of pressure from below and from
above most likely encouraged the involvement of the Governor. Through
reminding the mayors of affected municipalities to stop illegal land claims,
the Governor helped to resolve the issue in barangay Del Pilar and other
areas. In the end, general protests also died down when local activists real-
ized that they are able to profit from the investment.
The company: complications of a joint venture business
The previous chapter showed that one of the decisive factors to solve the
issue of the land illegitimately leased to the company was the involvement
of the Governor, who made sure that local politicians do not sign and stop
wrongful land claims. GFII and its foreign investors did not play a signifi-
cant role in this context. Nonetheless, looking at some of the investment’s
characteristics provides some insights into the difficulties of foreign invest-
ment in land.
As described in chapter 6.3.1, the leading investors in GFII and the
bioethanol plant was the Japanese Itochu Group, with an investment of
120 million USD. The Itochu Group has an extensive portfolio with invest-
ments in textile, food, information technology, metals, oil products, ener-
gy, insurance, finance and real estate (Gatdula 9/22/2009). The investment
in bioethanol was a response to both Japanese government efforts to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions (Gatdula 9/22/2009) as well as Philippine
legislation for biofuels (Molina 11/1/2010). It was planned to register the
project as Clean Development Mechanism under the UN Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (International Fact Finding Mission 2011: 11),
which did, however, not happen. As a big international corporation, the
6.3.3
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Itochu Group has a well developed CSR program, ascribes itself to uphold
human rights, and joined the UN Global Compact in 2009 (Itochu Corpo-
ration). The international fact-finding mission, as well as Japanese NGOs
such as Friends of the Earth Japan, directly addressed the corporation and
demanded action to be taken (International Fact Finding Mission 2011:
43–44). Yet, it is unclear if the Japanese company was able to directly influ-
ence management decisions made on the ground in San Mariano.
Evidence from my interviews indicates that the relationship between the
local, mainly Philippine management and the Japanese investors was
rather tricky. One of the activists who went to Japan to talk to the in-
vestors, for example, claimed that the Japanese managers thought that the
lease money was between 15000 and 20000 pesos and were surprised to
find out that locally the rate paid was between 5000 and 10000 pesos (in-
terview PH21). There were also stories that company employees regularly
stole fuel or fertilizer and sold it for their private gains (interview PH21).
The land leasing process, as was described earlier, was problematic. Espe-
cially in the first years, the company tried to acquire as much land as possi-
ble. However, it turned out that some of those lands were not even suit-
able for sugar cane growing, leading to unnecessary expenses (interviews
PH12, PH20). Due to the economic difficulties and local mismanagement,
the Japanese investors eventually pulled out in 2014:
“Oh, their business partners here were not loyal to them. They were
corrupt. […] So, the investment didn't [pay off]. There were no more
investments that were coming and so, yeah, they had to shut it down.”
(interview PH48)
In consequence, GFII was sold to the Philippine investors and was ac-
quired in 2016 by another Philippine business with experience in
bioethanol production (interview PH12). In result, there have been two
significant changes in management since the beginning of the investment,
each bringing with them considerable modifications.
Despite some management problems, the company seems to be recep-
tive to complaints made by farmers (interview PH19). At the same time,
farmers have a good bargaining position, as they can simply quit the con-
tract after three years.
However, overall I hardly have evidence on the company’s receptivity
for the years 2007 to 2011. At the same time, it did not seem too relevant
for the solution of the problem, as the central conflict was between small-
holders and some local elites who had used the investment to claim land.
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Support network: the radical left
The organizers of the protest against the company were able to use preex-
isting network structures, which linked local actors with national and in-
ternational civil society actors and politicians. I will discuss these links in
the first part of the chapter before I will reflect on the risks that come with
the support by the NPA.
When GFII started the investment project in the region, the farmers’ or-
ganization DAGAMI already existed and had about 3000 members in San
Mariano and up to 6000 members in the whole Province of Isabela (inter-
view PH21). As such, it was easily possible for them to mobilize members
for protests, such as in early 2011. As DAGMI acts as the provincial chapter
of the KMP the organization is closely linked to national KMP activists
who quickly got involved. Through their networks, they organized the in-
ternational fact-finding mission, in which 13 national and international
and six local organizations participated (International Fact Finding Mis-
sion 2011: 3). The international participation certainly created more pub-
licity and Japanese NGOs were able to address the company in Japan. In
addition, the KMP also provided the contact to the Congressman of
Anakpawis, who was the former chairman of the KMP. In essence,
through the KMP this whole machinery of mobilization strategies was
started targeting different levels of government:
“The legal strategy is, of course, the advocacy work. For example, nego-
tiations with the local government unit is part of the legal strategy,
right? And then we also seek help from progressive congressional par-
ties, representatives, like Anakpawis. […]There is no legal court strate-
gy because it is difficult. So we just use dialogues, advocacy. And also
the international advocacy.” (interview PH8)
The citation mentions the difficulty of court strategies, which is probably
linked to the fact that they can take up years and therefore be very re-
source-intensive (as discussed in chapter 4.2.2). Instead, the strategy fo-
cused on influencing politicians in order to get them to act on behalf of
affected smallholders.
At the same time, the organizations of the radical bloc also used the case
of GFII to advance their case for genuine agrarian reform through linking
the issues:
“With the drive to develop new high-value export-oriented crops over
the past decade, land grabbing in the Philippines has intensified and
exacerbated land inequities. Small-scale food producers have been dis-
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placed, indigenous ancestral domain has been violated, and the urgent
call of hundreds of thousands of rural families for genuine agrarian re-
form have been ignored.” (International Fact Finding Mission 2011: 4)
In this way, the resistance of the KMP to investment projects such as GFII
is based on the general belief that foreign investment in agriculture can
never be beneficial for local farmers. In consequence, the national actors of
the KMP remain in opposition to the bioethanol project (interview PH8),
even though there are no more actions undertaken. Locally some members
of DAGAMI have shifted in their opinion and are participating in the
project as described in chapter 6.3.2. The case, therefore, shows how local
farmers can use the support of the radical left network to create consider-
able pressure on the company as well as provincial and local politicians.
 
In addition to support from legal organizations from the radical left bloc,
the farmers also received support from underground communist organiza-
tions, first and foremost, the NPA. The New People’s Army has had a pres-
ence in the region since the early 1980s and the municipality of San Mari-
ano was once home to one of the biggest rebel camps in the country (Per-
soon/van der Ploeg 2003: 458). The remote mountainous areas, which are
part of the Northern Sierra Madres Mountain range, seem to provide space
for the NPA to set up camps and run their operations. During my field re-
search, it became clear that some remote parts of San Mariano are known
locally as NPA stronghold (interviews PH12, PH21) and are avoided by
some locals. The NPA has a history of attacking agricultural or mining in-
vestors who they deem to exploit the people and the environment; how-
ever, they also extort ‘revolutionary taxes’ from companies, so there might
also be economic motives for attacks (International Crisis Group 2011: 18–
19).
The attack on GFII tractors was regarded as support for the demands of
DAGAMI (interviews PH12, PH21). However, this support came at a cost,
as “the government suspected that DAGAMI and the NPA were connect-
ed” (interview PH21). In consequence, the leader of DAGAMI was ques-
tioned by the military and described himself as lucky in getting away with
his life (interview PH21). As mentioned in chapter 6.1.3, extrajudicial
killings of farmer activists are not unusual in the Philippines and the
Province of Isabela is no exception. In 2011, the vice-chairperson of
DAGAMI was killed in San Mateo (International Federation for Human
Rights 30/03/2011) and another leader of the organization in Delfin Al-
bano in 2016 (Cervantes 9/9/2016). Even though killings are often associat-
ed with private militias, they also take place through official policy or mili-
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tary actions against supposed rebels. In consequence, the support through
the NPA has to be regarded as ambiguous: While the attack might have
helped to show the company and local politicians the seriousness of the sit-
uation, being associated with the rebel group can become dangerous for
activists, like the members of DAGAMI.
Overall, my evidence shows that existing farmers’ organizations played a
decisive role in starting a fast and effective mobilization against the invest-
ment projects and wrongful land claims. The combination of local pres-
sure with a credible threat for violence, critical questions asked on the na-
tional level and international civil society attention proved efficient in cre-
ating a favorable outcome for local smallholders.
Discussion and additional issues
The case of GFII sheds some light on how foreign large-scale land deals are
affected and shaped by local conflicts and existing networks involving vio-
lent actors. Nonetheless, legal mobilization also played a role in this case,
even though it was only one part of a broader set of strategies. I will first
discuss my findings through the lens of the three core conditions before
discussing open questions.
First, the national legal opportunity structure does provide local small-
holders with some protection. The barangay captain of Del Pilar had
planned to lease land that he did not own. In consequence, legitimate
tenure holders could have brought the case to court. However, as dis-
cussed, in the Philippines, this is not the most efficient way to claim rights.
Instead, the farmers invoked their rights vis-à-vis the Provincial Govern-
ment and, through the help of the KMP, also vis-à-vis Congress. Paired
with other forms of mobilization, most importantly protests, fact-finding
missions as well as an attack on company property, the farmers were able
to defend their access to land. Yet, it is not clear which role the legal mobi-
lization played in comparison to other forms for explaining the outcome. I
will discuss this question further below. Looking at the case through the
lens of the NLOS, it also becomes clear that tenure rights need to be active-
ly protected in cases of large-scale agricultural investments. While local
farmers had secure tenure, this was put into question as the investor trig-
gered a rush for land through providing quick cash. The case, therefore,
shows how foreign investment can lead to new and intensified contesta-
tion around land.
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Second, the receptivity of the company did not play a big role. Instead,
the conflict developed between local smallholders and political elites, who
leased the land illegally or certified false land claims. The company did
play a certain role, as they did agree to stop the further development of the
land due to considerable pressure from DAGAMI. However, the solution
of the conflict came with the involvement of the Governor, who warned
local politicians to follow the law and stop wrongful land claims.
Third, local farmers had a strong support network, which existed already
and was able to go into motion quickly. The farmers mobilized locally
through protests and were supported on the national level by the KMP,
which involved the Congressman and undertook fact-finding missions.
Most activities happened within a couple of months, showing the efficacy
of the mobilization of the far-left network. At the same time, the involve-
ment of the NPA has to be regarded as ambiguous. It seemed to have pro-
vided farmers with additional pressure but also means the danger of retali-
ation by state forces.
 
The main open question, in this case, is the effect of different types of
strategies. As discussed in chapter 6.3.2, it was not possible to disentangle
the effects of local protests, two fact-finding missions, the violent attack
and the Congressional inquiry on the outcome of the efforts. As described,
the involvement of the Governor seems to have been central in enforcing
existing rules and protect the rights of smallholders. However, if the in-
volvement of the Governor was triggered by questions asked by the Con-
gressional Committee on Energy, local protests, the fact-finding missions
or the NPA attack, is impossible to infer from my available data62. I am
therefore not able to draw conclusions on the effectiveness of legal mobili-
zation in comparison to other forms such as protests, fact-finding missions
and violent attacks. Furthermore, I am not able to understand the role the
violent attack played in this case. Was it interpreted as a sign for the com-
pany to pay off the rebels, which would have not necessarily warranted the
engagement of the Governor? Or, was it a signal to the Provincial Govern-
ment to take care of local conflicts in order not to endanger the invest-
ment, which was largely supported by the Governor? In other words, was
the violence necessary for local actors to achieve their goals?
Overall, the case of GFII provides an example of a case in which local
actors were able to push for the protection of their land rights and ensure
62 Unfortunately I was neither able to interview the Governor of Isabela nor the
Mayor of San Mariano who were involved in solving the conflict.
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their access to land. This was reached through a combination of strategies
of which the legal mobilization of Congress and the Provincial Governor
were just one element. The radical left network offered important support
in this regard.
Case IV: Agumil Philippines: Uninformed consent and the difficult struggle
of local cooperatives
The investment of Agumil Philippines Incorporated in Palawan, which
started in 2007, received considerable attention as the first palm oil project
on the island. Agumil invested in Palawan through leasing land and con-
tract growing arrangements with 14 cooperatives. However, the risk of the
investment was predominantly carried by the cooperatives, who had to
take out loans from the Land Bank to finance the setup of the plantations.
Most cooperatives ran into substantial financial problems, as they were not
able to repay their loans, leaving them highly indebted. The case thereby
shows the failure of government agencies to support local smallholders de-
spite existing safeguards.
After several years, cooperatives were able to push for a Congressional
Inquiry into the matter. The inquiry found the agreements with Agumil to
be problematic and instilled a dialogue process on the Provincial level. As
a consequence, an offer for a revised agreement by the company and the
Land Bank was presented to the cooperatives. However, the cooperatives
were divided on whether to accept the deal or not, which would essentially
take away remaining control over the plantations. The legal mobilization
attempt can, therefore, not be described as a success.
In the following, I will first give an overview of the investment of Agu-
mil through focusing on the setup of the investment and the agreements
signed with cooperatives (chap 6.4.1). In a second step, I will discuss the
failure of various government agencies to provide support for cooperatives’
members and scrutinize the agreements before they were signed. I also de-
scribe the legal mobilization attempts, which led to a congressional in-
quiry and a dialogue process at the provincial level (chap 6.4.2). In a third
step, I will take a look at the Agumil and the Land Bank, which is responsi-
ble for the loans to the cooperatives (chap 6.4.3). In a final step, I focus on
the support network of the cooperatives, which will reveal that they have
hardly received any civil society support. Furthermore, I will address the
issue of missing coherence among cooperatives, which probably further
6.4
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weakened their position vis-à-vis the company (chap 6.4.4). Chapter 6.4.5
will then summarize and discuss my findings.
Overview of the investment of Agumil Philippines, Inc.
The investment of Agumil Philippines Inc. focuses on the production of
crude palm oil through the operation of a palm oil mill located in the mu-
nicipality of Brooke’s Point in the South of Palawan. The investment in-
volved Malaysian, Singaporean and Philippine investors. Formally, two
companies were created: The Palawan Palm & Vegetable Oil Mills, Inc.,
which is 60 % Singaporean and 40 % Philippine owned and runs the oil
mill, and Agumil Philippines Inc. (AGPI), which is 75 % Philippine and
25 % Malaysian owned and deals with the plantations63. However, both are
part of the Agusan Plantations Group, based in Malaysia (Larsen et al.
2014: 3).
To create the necessary oil palm plantations, Agumil secured land for
production either through leasing the land directly or through contract
growing arrangements with 14 local smallholder cooperatives. In addition,
two business-owned cooperatives grow oil palm independently of Agumil
but have to deliver their fruit bunches to the Agumil mill, as it is the only
one on the island (Larsen et al. 2014: 20). As the company does not pro-
vide official numbers, it is difficult to estimate the exact amount of
hectares planted with oil palm in Palawan. Data from 2014 name a total
area of over 6000 hectares (Department of Agrarian Reform 2017: 2),
which could be up to 10 000 (interviews PH36, PH44) or even 15 000
hectares (Larsen et al. 2018: 9) by 2018. These numbers also include planta-
tions by independently organized businesses; the amount planted by small-
holder cooperatives is around 2900 hectares (interview PH43).
The investment was welcomed as a way to enhance economic develop-
ment, create employment opportunities and tax gains (Larsen et al. 2018:
10). However, years after the growership agreements were signed, it be-
came apparent that the investment was not beneficial but highly problem-
atic for local smallholders. This is the issue I will focus on in the following;
however, it should be noted that there are also significant issues around
the encroachment on indigenous people’s land, illegal logging and busi-
6.4.1
63 As the investor is usually referred to simply as ‘Agumil’ locally, I will refer to the
company as Agumil in the remaining chapter. The contract signed with coopera-
tives refers to AGPI, which stands for Agumil Philippines Inc.
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ness people buying up cheap land as an investment opportunity (Neame/
Villarante 2013: 211).
To enable the investment, Agumil teamed up with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, a government-owned bank with a focus on providing finan-
cial services to rural populations and encouraging economic development.
The Land Bank provided loans to cooperatives that entered into a grower-
ship agreement with the company. Funding conditions of the bank re-
quired farmers to form cooperatives, as loans would not be granted to indi-
viduals. Furthermore, the Land Bank demanded the signing of two agree-
ments – the Production Technical and Marketing Agreement (PTMA) and
the Management Service Agreement (MSA) – between the cooperatives
and Agumil, as a way to ensure that there would be a buyer’s market for
the fresh fruit bunches (FBB) (interview PH45). Fourteen cooperatives
signed these two agreements and received subsequent loans with a 14 %
interest rate64. However, as none of the cooperatives was able to present
20 % of the equity required for a Land Bank loan, the company put up the
20 % for the cooperatives. In consequence, the cooperatives also have a
loan with Agumil (Palawan Council for Sustainable Development 2014:
6).
The PTMA regulates the relationship between the cooperatives and Agu-
mil: The cooperatives commit themselves to using the land under contract
exclusively for growing oil palm and delivering the fresh fruit bunches to
the mill of Agumil for 30 years. The company provides seedlings and train-
ing for the cooperatives, while the cooperatives are obliged to follow the
operating procedures set by the company. At the same time, Agumil has
the right to take over the management of the plantation if “the plantation
management was not carried out in accordance with AGPI’s technical rec-
ommendations” (Production Technical and Marketing Agreement 2007:
Art.II.7). In case of such a takeover, a 10 % management charge is billed to
the cooperative, who nonetheless has to pay for inputs such as fertilizer.
Costs advanced by the company are charged with a 14 % compounded
interest rate to the cooperatives (Production Technical and Marketing
Agreement 2007: Art.II.Art. 7). The terms and conditions for the takeover
of the management of the plantations are detailed in the Management Ser-
vice Agreement. In the agreement, the cooperatives agree to the manage-
ment of the plantations by Agumil and the use of the loans by the Land
Bank for these ends (Management Services Agreement 2007).
64 12 % interest rate in addition to a 2 % service fee.
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The MSAs were signed together with PTMAs and, in some instances, en-
tered into force right away. In consequence, some cooperatives managed
their own plantations, while other plantations were managed by Agumil
(interviews PH35, PH39, PH44). However, irrespective of their manage-
ment, most cooperatives ran into serious problems when it came to the
first harvests and the paying back of the loans after five years. Yields were a
lot lower than initially projected (interview PH35, PH39), while costs for
inputs such as fertilizers and transport had increased significantly (Neame/
Villarante 2013: 219). Furthermore, the prizing arrangement with Agumil
included a 15 % profit share for the company as well as an additional
milling fee of 750 Philippine pesos65 per metric ton of fresh fruits bunches,
which added another 15 %. In consequence, about 30 % of the revenue
went to the company in addition to the 10 % management fee, consider-
ably reducing the profit margins of the cooperatives.
At the time of research in 2018, only 4 out of 14 cooperatives were able
to pay their monthly amortization rates (interview PH45). Over the years,
the cooperatives had accumulated 218 million Philippine pesos (over 4
million USD) of debt with the Land Bank (Committee on Cooperatives
Development 2017), and compounded debt of 93 million Philippine pesos
(1,7 million USD) with Agumil (interview PH41). Most cooperatives’
members had hardly gained any income from the investment and would
have had considerable higher profits had they planted other crops such as
coconut or banana (interviews PH36, PH38, PH42, PH43). I will argue
that this situation could have been averted had the smallholder coopera-
tives had legal advice and institutional support before the signing of the
agreement. Before I take a closer look at the failure of different regulatory
mechanisms, I will describe the process leading up to the signing of the
agreements.
 
Various consultations on different levels preceded the setup of the oil palm
plantations in 2007. In 2004, Agumil, which already had a presence in
Mindanao, was invited by the then acting Governor to explore and devel-
op palm oil production on the island of Palawan. The project, which was
known as the ‘governor’s project’ (interview PH36), was then discussed
with different local government units and endorsed by different munici-
palities in the South of the island. The municipality of Brooke’s point do-
nated land for the nursery while the company started to inform landown-
ers about investment possibilities (Palawan Council for Sustainable Devel-
65 At the time of research in November 2018.
6. Analysis II Philippines
210
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748907602, am 02.12.2021, 19:08:03
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
opment 2014: 1). In some barangays and indigenous communities, meet-
ings took place in which the investment project was presented:
“However, when asked to describe these meetings participants stated
that they were animated by all the positive information and the way
the economic benefits of oil palm were pitched, such that there was al-
most no discussion of any possible negative impacts. In particular, par-
ticipants pointed out the lack of discussion concerning wider social or
environmental impacts, or on the impact of turning their land over for
such a long period if the financials did not work out as planned”
(Neame/Villarante 2013: 224)
At the same time, no environmental or social impact assessment was car-
ried out, and the land was not surveyed in a participatory manner, which
would have revealed land conflicts or illegitimate ownership claims
(Neame/Villarante 2013: 224).
Agumil staff focused on convincing holders of land titles, many of them
agrarian reform beneficiaries66, to form cooperatives in order to enter into
the agreement. Many cooperatives were formed solely for the purpose of
the investment (interview PH35), while in other instances, inactive cooper-
atives were reactivated (interview PH39). Many landowners were excited
about the opportunity to get rich:
“In 2006 or 2007 there were Agumil employees from Mindanao who
came here to Palawan. They went from barangay to barangay encour-
aging people to plant oil palm. They said that oil palm is one of the
most productive tree crops. So, that's why many landowners were en-
couraged to join the plantation – because, actually, we were expecting
to become rich.” (interview PH44)
Stories about becoming a millionaire (interview PH36) or the prospect of
owning a car (interview PH38) within a few years encouraged smallholders
to agree to the investment.
The PTMA and the MSA were only signed by the chairpersons of the co-
operatives, leading to a situation in which most cooperatives’ members
never saw the actual agreement (interview PH42). In addition, the grower-
ship arrangement with the PTMA, the MSA and the loan line agreement
with the Land Bank was presented as ‘take it or leave it’ package, which
did not leave room for negotiation (Neame/Villarante 2013: 225). Further-
66 Five cooperatives consist mainly of ARBs (Department of Agrarian Reform 2017:
2).
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more, the company seems to have exerted some pressure to sign the agree-
ments as quickly as possible. In one case, the agreements were signed at the
side of the road (interview PH42).
The cooperatives did not have any legal representation nor legal advice.
Even cooperatives consisting predominantly of ARBs did not receive sup-
port from the local DAR office, as there seems to have been not enough
time (interview PH39). In the end, the cooperatives agreed to the contracts
without proper understanding67: “Nobody explained the content of the
documents. And, you know, most of us were farmers. We don’t know legal
terms” (interview PH39).
The cooperatives questioned the contents of the agreement only years
later when they started to realize that they are not profiting, but rather los-
ing money through the investment (interview PH39). The realization came
with the first harvests:
“[…] because of no consultation, I haven't seen the contract. So, I just
presumed it's a good contract. But when the production started, there
were already fresh fruit bunches from the plantation. I was really
thinking: Why do we not have any profit from the plantation? […]
That's when I started my own computation and research on the inter-
net” (interview PH35)
Only then did the cooperatives seek legal advice through lawyers they
knew through their personal networks (interview PH35) or the DAR (in-
terview PH39). However, it was too late to change the parameters of the
agreements:
“When they asked the DAR for help we looked at all the documents;
but the problem is, they are all legal. They are legal contracts, so we
told them that they cannot breach the contract.” (interview PH40)
When the cooperatives began to understand their situation, they started to
mobilize and call on different institutions. I will further analyze these mo-
bilization efforts in the next chapter.
67 However, there were also landowners who were skeptical of the offer and did not
join (interview PH37).
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The failure of institutional mechanisms and subsequent legal
mobilization attempts by cooperatives
Several institutions and agencies were involved as the company started to
set up their operations. However, they failed to provide legal support or
advice to the cooperatives. I will describe this failure in the first part of the
chapter before I consider legal mobilization attempts made by the coopera-
tives in the second part.
Looking at the agencies, who were or should have been involved during
the planning of the investment project, it becomes clear that relevant ac-
tors either did not feel responsible for scrutinizing the growership agree-
ment between Agumil and the cooperatives or were not engaged enough
to do so. As described in chapter 6.2.2, the agencies, which would have the
mandate to support local cooperatives through legal advice, were provin-
cial and local DAR (Department for Agrarian Reform) and CDA (Cooper-
atives Development Authority) offices. While the DAR officials are respon-
sible for the support of agrarian reform beneficiaries, the mandate of the
CDA extends to all cooperatives. However, both agencies were not in-
volved at the moment the agreements were signed.
The CDA works according to the principle of subsidiarity and therefore
leaves the decision to enter into contracts with investors to the coopera-
tives. The provincial office was only consulted by the cooperatives, once
the financial problems became apparent (interview PH31). Similarly, the
local DAR office was not consulted by the cooperatives at the time of the
signing (interview PH39). Later on, both the CDA and the DAR provided
support to the farmers, either in the form of trainings (interview PH31) or
through direct material support such as the provision of tractors and
trucks (interviews PH39, PH40). However, both the provincial CDA and
the local DAR offices regarded the legal situation of the cooperatives as a
hopeless case (interviews PH31, PH40).
Apart from the DAR and the CDA, other agencies have oversight func-
tions even though they might not directly concern the cooperatives. The
Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA), for example, is mandated to oversee
the production of palm oil. However, it seems that the agency in Palawan
was not able to fulfill this mandate at the beginning of the investment, as
they did not have guidelines for the production of palm oil at the time
(Larsen et al. 2018: 6). Locally the PCA only became involved in the invest-
ment in 2017 when they started gathering information on the project. The
PCA now supports the cooperatives with training, free seedlings and
maybe also fertilizer in the future (interview PH43). Interestingly, all three
6.4.2
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agencies, the DAR, the CDA and the PCA seek to support the cooperatives
through training and resources, while the growership agreements and the
role of the investing company are not principally questioned.
Two government authorities responsible for environmental protection,
the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and the
Palawan Council for Sustainable Development (PCSD)68, seem to have
voiced some concerns in the beginning about the ecological consequence
of the introduction of a new plant on the island. Nonetheless, they sup-
plied the necessary certificates for the operation of the palm oil mill
(Palawan Council for Sustainable Development 2014: 2). However, no
complete Environmental Impact Assessment was done, as the company
did not formally control the plantations:
“On paper, they are different entities. So, somehow, they have circulat-
ed the law by doing that. If we call on a certain individual or coopera-
tive, they would say: ‘Well, we are not covered by your […] clearance
system because we are just small scale farmers. My area is only five
hectares, how would you regulate us?’” (interview PH30)
The certificate of the DENR sets environmental standards and requires the
setup of a Multiparty Monitoring Team, which is supposed to address is-
sues of concern (interview PH33). Monitoring Teams were set up on the
municipal level with the participation of municipal officials; however, it is
questionable how functional the Monitoring Teams ever were. Evidence
from one municipality shows that grievances raised by cooperatives in
these settings were not addressed by the company. Furthermore, in 2014,
the quarterly meetings stopped altogether (interview PH36, PH39).
In one instance, the DENR filed a case against Agumil for illegal log-
ging69 (interview PH33); however, this happened only after an indigenous
rights organization made them aware of what was going on (Community
Environmental and Natural Resource Officer 2014). Overall, both environ-
mental agencies were ready to give permissions to the company, while at
the same time being limited in their monitoring role, which seems to be
only fulfilled when civil society actors push for it. It, therefore, does seem
fair to conclude that the company did receive ‘preferential treatment’:
68 The Palawan Council for Soustainable Development is formally a national agen-
cy, which was created to implement the Strategic Environmental Plan, a national
law, to protect the unique ecological system on Palawan.
69 Until the time of field research in November 2018 the case was not decided in
court (interview PH33).
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“The project proponents managed to sail rather easily through the bureau-
cratic system, navigate regulatory failures and benefit from ambiguities in
project implementation” (Larsen et al. 2018: 19).
All five government agencies, the DAR, the CDA, the PCA, the PCSD
and the DENR had (and have) some oversight function over the Agumil
investment; however, none of them raised critical questions in regards to
the agreements with the cooperatives or provided legal support to the
smallholders entering into the project. Admittedly, not all of them had the
mandate to do so, but there were several opportunities to scrutinize the in-
vestment, which remained unused.
 
As described in the previous chapter, it took around four to five years be-
fore the members of the cooperatives realized that the investment might
not be as profitable as they had expected. Cooperatives tried to address
their grievances directly to Agumil and asked for renegotiations, which
were denied. Cooperatives also addressed complaints to the Palawan
Provincial Board, the DAR, CDA provincial offices (Larsen et al. 2014: 30)
and the PCSD (interview PH30). Initial responses of these agencies were
somewhat limited, as they viewed the contract between Agumil and the
cooperatives “as matters to be dealt with between private parties” (Larsen
et al. 2014: 31). As a consequence, cooperatives united in the Association
of Palm Oil Growers in Southern Palawan through which they filed com-
plaints and communicated with the Provincial Government collectively
(Larsen et al. 2014: 31). Yet, this cooperation was not sustained as different
cooperatives had different interests and demands and the association later
dissolved (interview PH39).
Other mobilization efforts came from indigenous rights groups who
mobilized through the NGO ALDAW (Ancestral Land/Domain Watch).
ALDAW had rung the alarm bells as early as 2010. They deplored the
threat to biodiversity and local food self-sufficiency, the introduction of
new pests and the “risk that members of local communities who have
joined the so-called ‘cooperatives’ will soon become indebted with the oil
company” (ALDAW cited in Schertow 14/11/2010). In the following years,
ALDAW collected data on encroachments of oil palm plantations on pro-
tected forests and ancestral domain and addressed the issue to the DENR,
the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples and the President of the
Philippines. In 2014, ALDAW organized members of cooperatives, small-
holder farmers and indigenous groups into the Coalition Against Land
Grabbing through which they called on a moratorium on further oil palm
extension on Palawan (Dressler 2017: 657). As the province-wide moratori-
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um failed, ALDAW focused on getting moratoria passed on the municipal
level (interview PH29). In their subsequent advocacy work, they mostly fo-
cused on ancestral domains and indigenous rights issues and did not pro-
vide further support to the cooperatives.
In the meantime, the Land Bank met with the cooperatives, who had
failed to pay their amortization rates. It offered them a restructuring of the
loans with a reduction of the interest rate from 14 % to 7 % and a waiving
of the penalty fee of 3 %. Subsequently, the loans of six cooperatives were
restructured, while the others did not agree (interview PH45). However,
the restructuring did not principally change the situation, as the coopera-
tives remained indebted and hardly generated income. In the following
years, the cooperatives mobilized to a varying degree: For example, in 2016
or 2017 five cooperatives worked together and dumped their fresh fruit
bunches in front of the Land Bank in Palawan’s capital Puerto Princesa as
a way of protesting against the high interest rate for their loans (interview
PH42)70. However, all these different mobilization attempts had limited ef-
fects. Some officials reacted sympathetically and their opinion turned
against further oil palm expansion; yet, the agreement between coopera-
tives and the company was not changed or fundamentally questioned.
 
The agreements between the cooperatives and Agumil were for the first
time officially challenged, when national CDA officials got involved and
brought the case to Congress. After the Chairman of the Cooperatives De-
velopment Authority heard about the problems of the cooperatives in
Palawan in 2015, he issued an investigation and called on Congress to in-
terfere (interview PH7). In July 2016, House Resolution No. 120 was
passed, calling on a congressional inquiry of the Committee on Coopera-
tives Development. The Resolution raised issues around the legality of the
agreements based on various ground: First, the cooperatives had not been
fully informed about the documents. Second, formal general assembly res-
olutions would have been needed for cooperatives to enter into the agree-
ments, which was not always followed. Third, Agumil was accused of vio-
lating the contract as they took over some of the plantations from day one.
It was furthermore reasoned that the cooperatives were not “operating on
a cooperative basis” (House of Representatives 2016).
70 It is not clear, if the protest had an effect. The interviewee argued that the Land
Bank subsequently lowered the interest rate. However, this information could
not be verified. It seemed rather likely, that the Land Bank had lowered the inter-
est through the restructuring of the loans.
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As part of the congressional inquiry, two hearings took place, one in
Quezon City (part of Metro Manila) in May 2017 and one in Puerto
Princesa in August 2017, where all cooperatives were able to participate.
During the process, different government agencies, especially the DAR
and the CDA submitted their opinion on the investment.
The DAR clarified that no clearance had been provided by the Provin-
cial Agrarian Reform Official. They also pointed out that the (quasi)-juris-
diction of the DAR and its Adjudication Board did not apply as the PTMA
stipulated that only courts in Palawan could adjudicate contractual mat-
ters. The DAR reminded the company of its corporate social responsibility
“to exercise positive dealing with the cooperatives” (Department of Agrari-
an Reform 2017: 6) and recommends the condonation of all interests and
charges of the loans to help the cooperatives to overcome their debt (De-
partment of Agrarian Reform 2017).
The CDA went one step further and demanded the rescission of the PT-
MAs and MSAs (House of Representatives 2018). This recommendation
was taken up as one option for the cooperatives to decide in the final re-
port submitted to the House of Representatives in January 2018. The re-
port made a total of 11 recommendations, such as the condonation of the
loans by the Land Bank, the technical and financial training of coopera-
tives, the construction of an independent oil mill and a temporary morato-
rium on further oil palm expansion. However, not all recommendations
were considered feasible by actors involved. The Land Bank argued that a
condonation of loans would set a bad precedent (Committee on Coopera-
tives Development 2018). The Provincial Government of Palawan was
mandated to create a rehabilitation plan for the cooperatives through the
formation of a task force with the participation of Agumil, the Land Bank,
the cooperatives and various government agencies (House of Representa-
tives 2018). Subsequently, the matter was dealt with by the task force in
Puerto Princesa.
The provincial task force met a couple of times throughout 2018 to es-
sentially scrutinize a take-out deal, which had been developed by Agumil
together with the Land Bank as a reaction to the congressional inquiry.
The deal foresees that a new company, associated with Agumil, will take
over all outstanding loans of the cooperatives with the Land Bank and the
company. In turn, the cooperatives are supposed to lease all existing plan-
tations to the company through a new lease agreement. The respective
landowners would receive a rent payment of 3000 PHP (around 50 USD)
per hectare per year, which will increase over the years to 4600 PHP (76
USD), in addition to a profit share of 200 PHP (3 USD) per metric ton of
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fresh fruit bunched produced (interview PH45). In addition, a 15 000 PHP
(250USD) sign in bonus was promised. Basically, all debts of the coopera-
tives would be paid and their contracts be changed to leasehold with a
profit-sharing agreement.
During task force meetings, this proposal and demands made in turn by
the cooperatives were discussed. However, for the cooperatives, it seemed
like there was no room for negotiation, as their demands were not heard.
They perceived that there was no space for compromise (interviews PH35,
PH39, PH44). The cooperatives demanded higher rent and profit share
payments in addition to a higher sign-in bonus, while the company main-
tained that meeting these demands would be financially impossible for
them. An official from the Land Bank commented on the demands: “there
was also a counteroffer, offered by the co-ops, but their numbers were not
supplemented by figures or projections.” (interview PH45). The missing
ability of cooperatives to show evidentiary data in their favor made it diffi-
cult to counter the company’s proposal, which was again a ‘take it or leave
it’ offer. Essentially, cooperatives can decide if they want to take the new
deal or stay with the initial contracts. At the time of research in November
2018, it was not clear how many cooperatives wanted to join the take-out
deal and opinions about the deal varied greatly between cooperatives.
If cooperatives wanted to take the offered deal depended on the individ-
ual situation of the cooperatives. For the cooperatives, which were able to
pay their amortization rates, the new arrangement might not make a lot of
sense. By the time they will have fully repaid their loans, their profits from
the plantations will be higher than the amount offered by the new deal (in-
terview PH44). One the other side, some cooperatives signaled their will-
ingness to enter the deal, as they were happy to finally escape the debt and
have a stable income (interview PH34). Others simply considered the lease
money to be too small:
“The negotiation failed because they wouldn't grant us the 7000, our
cooperative, we only wanted 7000. […] You cannot live of 3000 per
hectare per year, that's 250 pesos per month. […] we cannot live of
that.” (interview PH35)
While the deal would have been acceptable for this cooperative with a
lease payment of 7000 pesos, another cooperative asked the company also
to refund the amount of the amortization that they had repaid to the Land
Bank. This specific cooperative had already paid 9 million pesos and re-
garded the refunding the sum as a matter of fairness: “So, some of the co-
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operatives agreed, but who? They agreed because they had not paid even a
single peso to the bank.” (interview PH39).
Some considerable frustration and the feeling of being cheated were
voiced and at least four cooperatives did not want to take the deal. At the
time of research, they were debating about bringing the case to the court,
which they hoped would nullify the contracts and award them damages.
The cooperatives hoped to use the findings of the congressional inquiry in
court to show the one-sidedness of the contract (interviews PH35, PH42).
In consequence, I cannot define the current outcome as a success for the
cooperatives, even though the congressional inquiry did bring consider-
able movement in the case and suggested a solution to the debt problem.
However, while the take out-deal would redeem all the debts of the coop-
eratives, it would also mean that the smallholders would have to give up
control over their land and lease it to the company.
Agumil and the Land Bank
When it comes to the investment of Agumil, not only the company itself
but especially the role of the Land Bank is central for understanding the
problematic setup of the investment and the failure of subsequent legal
mobilization attempts of smallholder cooperatives. While I do not have a
lot of information on Agumil71, I have anecdotal evidence that the compa-
ny has not been acting transparently towards the cooperatives as well as
government agencies. At the same time, the Land Bank, the main funder
of the project, puts the blame of the financial failure on the cooperatives
themselves. Both the missing transparency and the ongoing support for
the company by the Land Bank make it difficult for the cooperatives to
achieve their goals.
 
Agumil Philippines Inc. was founded in 1993 as Malaysian-Singaporean-
Philippine joint venture in order to invest in the growing palm oil indus-
try in Mindanao. In 1998, the company set up its first palm oil mill in Agu-
san del Sur. Two more mills were constructed, one in Bohol and one in
Maguindanao (Habito 2012: 13–14). The palm oil mill in Palawan is the
fourth mill of the company. All plantations together were estimated to
6.4.3
71 Agumil does not share any information on the internet and acts rather secretive
towards outsiders. Information gathered here therefore relies on secondary
sources and interviews with cooperatives and government agencies.
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amount to 28 000 hectares across the country in 2013 (Land Bank of the
Philippines 2013: 42–43). In Mindanao, the company encouraged ARBs to
enter into growership agreements and sought the help of the Land Bank in
providing financing to smallholders (Habito 2012: 14). The investment in
Palawan was modeled after the project in Mindanao (interview PH45).
While there is some evidence that yields in Mindanao are higher than in
Palawan and some cooperatives can make a living of the palm oil planta-
tion (Nozawa 2011: 24), there are still similar stories of cooperatives being
trapped in debt, leading to decreasing production:
“The priority of the cooperatives is to pay the amortization, thereby re-
ducing costs through decreasing the amount of fertilizer, which results
in decreasing yields the following year. If the oil palm trees are neglect-
ed for several years, rehabilitation of the oil palm trees is necessary, in-
curring further financial assistance.” (Hambloch 2018: 21)
In Mindanao, there are additional problems with growers diverting the
FBB to other mills and rebel group actions impeding access to plantations
(interview PH45). In Palawan, the economic situation seems tense as well.
According to one interviewee, the mill was running on less than 50 % of
its capacity (interview PH45).
Agumil did not pledge to any industry guidelines or principles (Larsen
et al. 2014: 6), nor are the plantations certified by the RSPO or any other
scheme. Furthermore, it seems like there are no policies for ensuring a
clear and transparent communication with the cooperatives or govern-
ment agencies.
Right from the beginning, the communication between the company
and the cooperatives proved difficult –, especially around financial man-
agement. Agumil essentially controls all the funds of the cooperatives, as
they have to sign off on all expenses as a third party to the loans provided
by the Land Bank. In essence, the cooperatives, therefore, do not have full
decision-making control over the use of their own funds even though they
are the ones bearing the risk.
“The cooperative has to pay the loans, not the company. It's like that:
Agumil is the management of the cooperative, because of the MSA
agreement. So, they became our management with the plantation.
That's why they are the one holding the money, using the money for
it.” (interview PH39)
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Especially in cases where the company took over the control, cooperatives
often did not fully know or understand how their own loans were spent, as
the company failed to provide detailed reports of expenses:
“The ability of cooperatives to wrest documents from [Agumil] and
obtain some degree of insight into the financial management of their
operations appeared to depend partly on the technical competence and
backgrounds of board members and managers: It was clearly an advan-
tage when people had higher levels of education and regular employ-
ment, or contacts in government offices that they could use as lever-
age” (Larsen et al. 2014: 26)
Conflicts around how money should be spent seem to occur on a regular
basis (interview PH41)72. Some individuals are extremely suspicious of the
numbers provided by the company. They think that the company is cheat-
ing in regards to the pricing formula for FBB through claiming lower
prices at which they sell the crude oil (interview PH35). As there is no in-
dependent audit of the pricing process and no agency which sets prices for
oil palm, the cooperatives depend totally on the information given to
them by the company (Larsen et al. 2018: 13). The missing trust was also
voiced concerning the new deal:
“You know, they failed in the management although you were [trust-
ing] them again and they say you will be earning big. Now they are
giving us three thousand per hectare per year. So how can you believe
them? Nobody believes them” (interview PH35)
As there is no functioning grievance mechanism, it is difficult for the co-
operatives to address their concerns to the company in a timely manner
and smaller issues tend to lure on (interviews PH39, PH40 PH41).
In addition to the problematic communication with the cooperatives,
government agencies and local officials also find it difficult to retrieve rele-
vant information from the company. When local PCA officers started to
gather information on the project, they did not receive relevant data from
the company. In consequence, they had to undertake their own data gath-
ering through the cooperatives simply to arrive at the amount of hectares
72 It should be noted that not all cooperatives did regard the requirement of all ex-
penses being signed by an Agumil officer as problematic. Another interviewee
from a different cooperative welcomed this arrangement as it secured coopera-
tives’ members against possible fraud by the board of directors, which is often
voted for based on family ties (interview PH44).
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covered by oil palm (interview PH43). Similarly, municipal administrators
hardly received any information on the company either, even though their
municipalities are affected by the oil palm plantations (interviews PH36,
PH37).
The difficult communication with cooperatives and missing transparen-
cy vis-à-vis government agencies and administrations paints a picture of
Agumil as secretive and non-cooperative.
 
The Land Bank plays a central role in financing the cooperatives in
Palawan but also provides a credit line directly to the company (interview
PH45). Right from the beginning, the Land Bank has supported the invest-
ment project of Agumil in Palawan. As the government-owned bank and
Agumil had already collaborated in Mindanao, the investment in Palawan
was just seen as an additional project and did not undergo any indepen-
dent feasibility study or critical examination by the Land Bank (interview
PH45).
To ensure economic feasibility, the Land Bank required the smallhold-
ers to form cooperatives and the signing of the PTMA and MSA as a way to
ensure the proper management of the plantations. At the same time, the
contracts were regarded as private business between the company and the
cooperatives and were not further scrutinized, for example, in regard to
risk sharing (interview PH45). And while the Bank’s mission is dedicated
to “promot[ing] inclusive growth and improv[ing] the quality of life espe-
cially in the countryside” (Land Bank of the Philippines), it does not re-
quire social impact assessments nor social monitoring activities. Despite re-
ceiving funding from the World Bank, the Land Bank does not formally
adhere to IFC Performance Standards (Neame/Villarante 2013: 204–205).
Therefore, no mechanisms were in place that would have critically exam-
ined the contracts between Agumil and the cooperatives or the consulta-
tion process leading up the signing of the agreements.
However, it seems that even some existing rules were ignored. For exam-
ple, usually, to apply for a loan, “[c]ooperative applicants must have one
hundred members and a three-year track record, paid- up capital, complete
core management, and other such requirements.” (Palawan Council for
Sustainable Development 2014: 6). It seems clear that this requirement was
not fulfilled by most of the cooperatives, who were either newly formed or
reactivated for the sole purpose of the investment. It, therefore, cannot be
surprising that some of the cooperatives face serious managerial problems,
which the Land Bank regards as the cause for the economic problems:
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“Actually, in all cooperatives, the key is to have good members. Other-
wise some members are misusing the funds. Most of the […] past due
amounts of Land Bank cooperatives are due to mismanagement. […]
Sometimes when Agumil supplies fertilizer, instead of applying it to
the oil palm they divert it to other grounds” (interview PH45)
In response to the mounting debt, the Land Bank has restructured the
loans once and is ready for further restructuring. In the eyes of the Land
Bank, it is not very likely that the smallholders will lose their land if they
are not able to repay the loans, as the bank would rather write off the cred-
its. Otherwise, “the farmers would go back to Congress” (interview PH45).
However, at the time of research the Land Bank advised the cooperatives
to opt for the take-out deal as all the debts would be taken over by Agumil
and its new company: “That’s our best offer” (interview PH45).
The evidence shows that the Land Bank puts the main blame for the
debt problem on the cooperatives and not on the company. They are un-
likely to cut any funding for Agumil, which has received numerous credits
from the bank. Exerting influence on the company through the main fi-
nancier is, therefore, not an option for the cooperatives.
Overall, existing evidence shows that the company is not very open or
cooperative in their communication. The missing transparency causes dis-
trust among cooperatives and aggravates their difficult bargaining situa-
tion. The cooperatives had difficulties in making their point in the techni-
cal task force meetings, as they were not able to support their demands
with data. However, if the data is not available to them, it is clear that they
cannot make an offer that would be considered ‘realistic’ by the Land Bank
and Agumil. In addition, neither the company nor the Land Bank adhere
to any voluntary industry standards. The Land Bank, as the main funder of
the project, sees the responsibility of the debt problem with the coopera-
tives and therefore supports the current deal of Agumil. Against this back-
ground, the company has to be regarded as unreceptive.
Fragmented support and missing internal mobilization
Taking a look at the support network the cooperatives had available, a frag-
mented picture evolves. Especially around the time of the signing of the
contracts, the cooperatives were clearly missing independent advice. In the
following years, NGO support was selective and focused more on stopping
further oil palm expansion than improving the situation of the coopera-
tives. Cooperation among cooperatives did emerge but remained limited,
6.4.4
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as they had different goals. Nonetheless, the congressional inquiry was trig-
gered – it seems through some personal contacts at the national level.
The interviewed cooperatives did not report any NGO support (inter-
views PH35, PH39). Nonetheless, there were some mobilization efforts by
ALDAW, an indigenous rights organization, which was later renamed into
Coalition Against Land Grabbing. As described in chapter 6.4.2, the orga-
nization mobilized the cooperatives to demand a moratorium on further
oil palm expansion; however, the NGO does not focus on providing sup-
port for the cooperatives more generally. Other NGOs involved in the case,
such as the Environmental Legal Assistance Center, focus on environmen-
tal concerns and do not support the cooperatives with their debt problems.
In fact, there are certain tensions between different goals: If the coopera-
tives were able to solve their economic problems, civil society actors would
lose one argument (besides environmental concerns) to convince political
actors of a moratorium on oil palm.
“[M]any cooperatives found it hard, if not impossible, to access sup-
port from NGOs in the province. These organizations have limited re-
sources and a primary focus on indigenous land rights or environmen-
tal conservation, whereas the cooperatives were rather seen as part of
the problem.” (Larsen et al. 2018: 15)
The missing support might have limited the efficiency with which cooper-
atives tried to achieve their goals. While it is difficult to prove, some expert
knowledge on financial or legal issues might have helped the cooperatives
to boost their arguments in the technical task force meetings, for example,
through providing their own research or impact assessment of the pro-
posed deal. It seems that there was a considerable knowledge inequality,
which could have been overcome with the support of an NGO. Besides,
there was no advocacy campaign calling attention to the congressional in-
quiry or its findings.
In addition to the missing NGO support, the cooperatives had troubles
to mobilize together, therefore not always speaking with one voice or mak-
ing the same demands. Initially, they formed the Association of Palm Oil
Growers in Southern Palawan, through which they formulated common
positions (Larsen et al. 2014: 32). However, over time interests of different
cooperatives diverged too much, complicating cooperation. This led to a
situation in which cooperatives individually approached the company with
their demands. As described in chapter 6.4.2 regarding the new deal, one
cooperative asked that their paid amortization rates be reimbursed (inter-
view PH39), while another cooperative focused on demanding higher lease
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payments (interview PH35). At the same time, there is some communica-
tion and cooperation between a few of the cooperatives, as the example
with the protest in front of the Land Bank showed (interview PH35). Yet,
the cooperatives are not speaking with a unified voice, which does make it
less likely that the company gives in to their demands.
Even more, unity is often absent within cooperatives as well, as different
members have different interests. For example, older cooperatives’ mem-
bers, who regarded the investment as part of their pension, had higher in-
terests in immediate returns, were more sympathetic towards the take-out
deal of the company (interview PH39). Others believed in the long term
returns once the credits are repaid (interview PH44) or wanted to continue
the fight for a better deal with the company (interview PH35). There are
several instances in which individual landowning members prohibited the
cooperative or the company from entering their land anymore, as they
were upset about the decisions made (interviews PH41, PH45). These in-
ternal conflicts pose additional risks to the economic situation of the coop-
eratives (interview PH45) and further complicate possible attempts to find
common positions among cooperatives.
Despite the missing NGO support and difficult internal mobilization of
the cooperatives, a congressional inquiry was triggered, which did lead to
the new offer by the company and the Land Bank. The driving force be-
hind the inquiry was the national chairman of the Cooperative Develop-
ment Authority (CDA). He had met some of the cooperative members at a
national conference in 2015 and subsequently visited the region (interview
PH7, PH35). In addition, one chairman of a cooperative, who was a for-
mer local politician, used his contacts to make some congressional repre-
sentatives aware of the case (interview PH35). These national contacts
seemed pivotal in achieving an inquiry, which questioned the whole agree-
ment between Agumil and the cooperatives.
Summarizing the findings, it becomes clear that the cooperatives did
not receive legal or advocacy support from NGOs in the region to achieve
their goals of negotiating a better deal with the company. Even though it is
difficult to prove, I suspect that the provision of expertise and a concerted
advocacy campaign could have exerted more pressure on politicians and
the company alike, for example, during the task force process. Besides, a
more unified voice with common core demands might have helped coop-
eratives in achieving their goals. However, this would have required sub-
stantial mobilization efforts among cooperatives and their members.
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Discussion and additional issues
In this chapter, I will review my findings through the lens of the three core
conditions in a first step. In a second step, I will discuss the open question
of why the government agencies failed to scrutinize the investment project
before the agreements with the cooperatives were signed. In a last remark,
I describe how the company profited and continues to profit from govern-
ment agencies and regulations that are supposed to profit smallholder co-
operatives.
Focusing on the three core conditions, the following picture emerges:
First, the legal opportunity structure of the cooperatives was initially not
bad, especially when it comes to soft-law regulations that are in place to
ensure that small-scale farmers, especially ARBs, do not enter into detri-
mental business ventures. However, these regulations were not enforced,
as the responsible agencies were not consulted and did not take action on
their own. A window of opportunity to scrutinize and change conditions
of the agreements between cooperatives and the company therefore passed.
When the cooperatives ran into financial problems and were unable to re-
pay their debt, the situation looked a lot more complicated. While it
would have been possible for the DAR to interfere, this is often not done:
“[…] from a strictly legal point of view, contracts which have not been
approved by the DAR are null and void, in accordance with section 4.9
of DAR Administrative Order No 9 s. 2006, this provision has not
been strictly enforced by DAR nor the parties involved.” (FAO 2016:
13)
The missing involvement of the DAR was partly made up for by the CDA
and its chairman, who were able to trigger the congressional inquiry,
which found numerous problems with the contract grower arrangement.
Yet, the report of the Committee on Cooperatives Development is not a
legally binding document but rather contains recommendations on how
to solve the debt crisis of the cooperatives. As of now, these legal mobiliza-
tion attempts have not led to a satisfactory situation for all cooperatives.
Second, Agumil does not seem to be very receptive. Neither the compa-
ny nor the Land Bank as the primary funding institution adhere to volun-
tary international standards, limiting possible arguments in this regard.
Furthermore, the Land Bank blames the cooperatives for the economic
failure and continues to back the company. Minimal communication and
insufficient transparency on the side of Agumil further aggravate the diffi-
cult bargaining situation of the cooperatives.
6.4.5
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Third, the support network of the cooperatives remains weak and frag-
mented. They did not receive legal advice or NGO support before signing
the agreements with Agumil. And, while there was some NGO mobiliza-
tion around the investment project, it did not primarily focus on the situa-
tion of the cooperatives. Personal networks of individuals did help to trig-
ger the congressional inquiry; however, there is no public advocacy cam-
paign nor expert advice for the cooperatives on how to best deal with the
company and the Land Bank. I do assume that this missing support made
it more difficult for local actors to achieve their goals. In addition, I sus-
pect that the missing unity among cooperatives further complicated the sit-
uation. While this issue is related to the focus on networks, it focuses on
internal mobilization among local actors, a factor I have so far neglected.
However, it seems plausible that this plays an essential role for successful
legal mobilization. I will, therefore, discuss internal unity as a possible ad-
ditional condition in the discussion in chapter 6.5.
 
In addition to the three conditions, it is important to discuss one open
question: Why did the government agencies fail in their oversight function
and consequently not scrutinize the agreements between Agumil and the
cooperatives? There are three possible reasons which probably played to-
gether.
First, the development of oil palm plantations on Palawan was com-
pletely new. Provincial and local authorities were missing the capacities to
oversee the investment. It seems that agencies like the PCA did not have
guidelines in regards to palm oil (Larsen et al. 2018: 6). At the same time,
local agencies and government officials were probably not able to assess
whether the projections of the company, who predicted enormous yields
and profits, were realistic (interview PH37). They believed that the compa-
ny was an expert for oil palm and did not anticipate problems with the
plantations or the financing.
Second, the investment was the ‘governor’s project’ (interview PH36),
which probably led to government agencies turning a blind eye to possible
risks. This sentiment was raised by local civil society actors (Coalition
against Land Grabbing 13/10/2014) and elected politicians:
“As a member of the provincial board expressed it, the provincial polit-
icians are particularly concerned not to interfere in this matter since
this would influence the potential to attract private investors to
Palawan” (Larsen et al. 2014: 31)
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Third, coordination issues between agencies and missing procedural guide-
lines probably posed a hindrance as well. The DENR or the PCSD both
had to issue environmental certificates and were not directly responsible
for the cooperatives. However, it seems that they did not coordinate with
the CDA or the DAR to inform them about the investment. The CDA and
the DAR most likely did not get involved, as they were not informed
about the project by the cooperatives themselves. It seems that there are no
clear guidelines over how the DAR or the CDA should assist cooperatives
in entering into agribusiness venture agreements if the cooperatives do not
directly ask them. The case, therefore, points to more general problems
with implementing rules for AVAs in the country.
The beneficiary of the missing oversight by government agencies was
Agumil, who profited indirectly from regulations and technical attempts
to resolve the debt crisis of the cooperatives. The investment is set up in a
way that takes advantage of rules that are supposed to support smallhold-
ers in the country. Through setting up the investment with out-growers,
the company did not only get access to land but also access to credits, for
which they did not have to bear the risks. “We [the farmers] were the ones
helping Agumil to get the loan, providing them with the necessary capital
for the plantation” (interview PH42). Besides, the company avoids paying
higher taxes, as these have to be paid by the cooperatives, who, however,
have to pay lower rates than the cooperation would have to (interview
PH37). Furthermore, the setup with the cooperatives also helped Agumil
to circumvent clearance for the plantations from the PCSD. While the ris-
ing debts of the cooperatives also created problems for the company, espe-
cially with the congressional investigation, they indirectly profit from tech-
nical support provided by government agencies. As seedlings, fertilizer or
machinery are provided for free by the PCA and the DAR, profits for the
company will rise as cooperatives improve their productivity. The lowering
of the management fee and the possible takeover of the debts by the com-
pany are the only measures that make the company pay a share of the eco-
nomic difficulties incurred by the cooperatives. Overall, this case shows
how a company can make use of the cooperatives system in the Philippines
and how difficult it is to make substantial changes to an out-grower system
once it is in place – especially with a long term crop such as oil palm.
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Within country comparison and discussion
In this chapter, I will compare the findings from the investments by Green
Future Innovations and Agumil and discuss them against the background
of existing research on the Philippines (chap 6.5.1). In the final part, I will
describe my findings on an abstract level and discuss one possible addi-
tional condition (chap 6.5.2).
Comparison of Green Future Innovations and Agumil
To compare my findings from the case studies, I will use once again the
lens of my three core conditions, before I discuss one possible additional
condition. Apart from my case studies, I will use additional interview ma-
terial as well as existing research to underline central findings.
As described in chapter 6.2, the national legal opportunity structure has
to be regarded as somewhat favorable – especially for ARBs. They should
receive support from the DAR when they enter into agreements with in-
vestors. However, both case studies showed that these rights have to be
claimed and regulations have to be pushed to be enforced. In the case of
Green Future Innovations, local farmers called on different administrative
levels, such as the national and the provincial level. Through the quick mo-
bilization, they were able to stop the wrongful land claims by local elites
before substantive land development had taken place. This situation was
more difficult in the case of Agumil, where farmer cooperatives entered in-
to a contract with the company without fully knowing their rights or re-
ceiving support. Both cases, therefore, show the weakness of enforcement
of laws and regulations in the Philippines (interviews PH3, PH27, PH29,
PH37).
“The law is good. But the problem is the law enforcement, the imple-
menting agency. Why you do not implement according to the law?
That's a problem, the implementing agency and the person, who is in
charge to exercise power according to the law” (interview PH29)
In consequence, local actors and civil society networks have to push for the
implementation of rules and regulations. In neither of the two cases were
the courts invoked to interfere, even though some of the cooperatives in
the Agumil case were thinking about a court strategy in the future. In-
stead, local farmers called on different agencies, administrative officials
6.5
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and politicians to help them enforce the law. This behavior fits with the
description of ‘rightful resistance’ in China:
“They recognize that state power nowadays is both fragmented and di-
vided against itself, and, if they search diligently, they can often locate
pressure points where elite unity crumbles […]”(O'Brien/Li 2008: 14)
In the case of GFII, the decisive person seems to have been the Governor,
who had both the authority and it seems the political will to solve the con-
flict. In the case of Agumil, a possible benefactor is the Chairman of the
CDA, who helped get Congress involved, while other agencies such as the
DAR stayed mostly inactive. Getting politicians and administrative offi-
cials on different levels on their side is an important aspect of successful
legal mobilization in the country. This finding is in line with existing liter-
ature on struggles around agrarian reform implementation in the Philip-
pines (Franco 2008a; Borras 1998).
When it comes to the support network, there were considerable differ-
ences between the GFII and the Agumil case. In the case of Green Future
Innovations, local smallholders were able to mobilize through the existing
farmers’ organization DAGAMI and link to national actors through the
KMP. The preexisting network provided links to international civil society
actors who participated in the fact-finding mission as well as to members
of Congress through the Anakpawis party list. The network created consid-
erable attention for the investment in San Mariano within a couple of
months and likely helped to build up enough pressure for the Governor to
intervene. In the case of Agumil, there was a lot less outside support pro-
vided to the cooperatives. The KMP does not have a member organization
in Palawan, and existing NGOs on the island focused on indigenous peo-
ples’ rights and environmental concerns. In consequence, the congression-
al inquiry and subsequent meetings at the Provincial level were not accom-
panied by a broader civil society campaign, which could have heightened
the pressure on officials and the company to find a solution.
Experiences from other land struggles in the Philippines show that legal
strategies usually need to be paired with political pressure to achieve a pos-
itive outcome for farmers (Franco 2008a: 1015). As an NGO staff member
described it: “How the law is written is good, but the executive system is a
lot out of balance […] drastic measures have to be taken to push the sys-
tem” (interview PH27). She named hunger strikes, marches and camp-outs
as essential elements and argued that a certain sensationalization and me-
dia attention is needed for campaigns to be successful (interview PH27).
The case of the cooperatives indebted through the Agumil deal certainly
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did not achieve this kind of attention, whereas the GFII case got a lot of
attention through the fact-finding missions. The two cases, therefore, un-
derline the need for a support network that is able to create a broader cam-
paign to garner attention and pressure officials to get involved.
The third condition of the receptivity of the company did not seem to
play a big role in both cases. While I was not able to determine the recep-
tivity of GFII back in 2011 based on the broad questions formulated in
chapter 3.4.2, Agumil does not seem to be a very receptive company.
Nonetheless, comparing the two companies, one interesting issue emerges:
Different crops can lead to different set-up of contract-growing agreements
with important implications for smallholders. In the case of GFII, initial
lease and contract-growing arrangements lasted six years and were later re-
duced to three years, the lifespan of a sugarcane plant (interview PH12).
This allows farmers to decide after three years if they want to continue con-
tracts or exit the arrangement. They can react to changing sugarcane prices
or new alternative options. According to the bargaining logic, this arrange-
ment makes it more likely that companies listen to local complaints, espe-
cially in the context of sugar cane shortages, such is the case in the GFII
investment.
In contrast, oil palm is usually grown as a 25 years plant, making long-
term contracts necessary. Fresh fruit bunches have to be processed within
24 hours to ensure high quality, making proximity to a mill a necessity
(Hambloch 2018: 6). Even if farmers grow oil palm independently, they
might not have many choices to sell the FBB. The industry’s pricing
practices in the Philippines, for which Agumil seems to be representative,
lead to a buyer-driven value chain, in which oil palm growers do not have
a lot of bargaining space (Hambloch 2018: 10).
The crop itself and the way an investment is set up, therefore, influences
the power relations in the bargaining situation between local smallholders
and companies. In consequence, it makes sense to include characteristics
of investment projects and their respective industries as another indicator
for the concept of receptivity.
 
One possible additional condition was the missing unity of local actors in
the case of the Agumil investment. This was demonstrated by the differen-
tiated reactions of the cooperatives to the take-out deal. Even though it is
difficult to prove, I suspect that this dissonance makes it more difficult for
individual cooperatives to achieve their goals. If all 14 cooperatives would
make common demands and act in a unified matter, they would probably
be able to achieve more. In the case of GFII, this unity was created through
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the existing farmers’ organization, which claimed to represent the farmer’s
in San Mariano. Even though the representativeness of the organization to
speak for all farmers can be questioned73, DAGAMI has a clear leadership,
which could negotiate with the company in a unified way. I will further
discuss this additional condition on a more abstract level in the next chap-
ter.
In addition to the conditions, two additional issues came up in the case
studies and need to be discussed from a comparative standpoint.
The first issue of violent action appeared in the case of GFII. The attack
of the NPA probably helped local farmers to create more pressure for au-
thorities to act, but bore certain risks for the farmers themselves. Interest-
ingly, the investment of Agumil seems to have triggered a violent response
from the NPA as well. In July 2016, two trucks owned by the Provincial
Government and a warehouse with fertilizer owned by Agumil were set on
fire by armed persons (Sanchez Palatino 7/14/2016). The attack was later
claimed by a regional command of the NPA, who reportedly left behind a
letter: “Stated in the letter is the armed group’s protest against Agumil
Philippines Incorporation” (Sanchez Palatino 7/14/2016). During my inter-
views, nobody brought up the incidence, so its consequences are unclear.
Nonetheless, there seem to have been attempts by NPA members to con-
tact communities affected by the investment (Larsen et al. 2014: 33). Simi-
larly to Isabela, Palawan has high mountain ranges that seem to serve as
space for the rebel group to operate. As described earlier, attacks on com-
panies are not unusual for the NPA, who also levy taxes in that way. The
attacks on GFII and Agumil fit the pattern of similar incidences in Negros
or Mindanao (International Crisis Group 2011), however, the effect of
these attacks for smallholders is not always clear. Local farmers might be
able to use these attacks to their advantage as they do have credible means
to threaten the disruption of local peace and get attention from politicians
and authorities. Yet, the NPA is not always on the side of local smallhold-
ers. Moderate farmer leaders who work with government agencies to
achieve their interests are at times themselves the target of the NPA:
“For the underground communists, the only genuine land reform is
their own, and is to be implemented after they seize national state
power. The guerrillas harass, intimidate, and sometimes assassinate
73 DAGAMI seems to be strong in certain parts of San Mariano and not all over the
large municipality. Furthermore, their ideological orientation does not seem to
resonate with all farmers (interview PH47).
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leaders of these [moderate] autonomous peasant movements.” (Fran-
co/Borras 2007: 70)
In other instances, the rebel group is known to work with traditional
landowning families if it is in their economic interest (Franco 2008a:
1003). Furthermore, the presence of the NPA in a region can lead to fur-
ther militarization as companies seek military protection relying on regu-
lar and paramilitary forces (International Crisis Group 2011: 19). The in-
volvement of the NPA can, therefore, be both beneficial and risky for local
farmers.
Another issue that came up in the analysis of the Agumil case is the diffi-
culty of implementing rules for agribusiness venture agreements in the
country. Despite the DAR Administrative Order No. 9, which formulates
specific rules for AVAs as well as far-reaching oversight competences for
the DAR, the cooperatives entered into an agreement with Agumil with-
out any support. This seems to be reflective of AVAs more generally in the
Philippines. A study conducted by the FAO focusing on Mindanao came
to the following conclusion:
“The study has revealed that while AVAs have been in existence in the
Philippines for 26 years, there are still very few examples of successful
agribusiness arrangements between ARBs and investor-companies. The
study found out that most ARBs are not aware of their obligations and
entitlements under their contracts, for most of these provisions are
written in a language that they do not understand.” (FAO 2016: x)
The study concludes that lawyers who can explain the contracts to small-
holders entering into an agreement with the company would be helpful
(FAO 2016: 12). This is certainly in line with my findings from the Agumil
case. The GFII case provides somewhat of a contrast to this. As discussed,
the sugar cane project allowed for farmers to enter into three-year con-
tracts, which provided them with the necessary flexibility and the possibili-
ty to react to price changes of the commodities but also of inputs. The
short-term contracts by GFII, therefore, present a viable alternative option.
Furthermore, farmers who wanted to participate in the investment project
did not have to take up a loan, helping them to avoid the debt traps that
Agumil cooperatives are in now. These findings tie back in with my con-
siderations on the relevance of different crops and the set up of investment
projects.
Overall, my findings from the Philippines show the difficulties local
smallholders face in the large-scale land investments even when the nation-
al legal opportunity structure is relatively favorable. State laws and regula-
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tions have to be implemented and farmers need to push their rights to be
protected. A strong civil society network, which can garner political atten-
tion, is needed to create this necessary push. In addition, missing unity
among local actors can undermine the effectiveness of mobilization efforts
and should be considered as an additional condition.
Summary of findings from the Philippines
In this final chapter, I will summarize the analytical chapter on the Philip-
pines before I formulate my central findings in a configurational language.
I will furthermore discuss the possible additional condition of unity
among local actors in an abstract manner.
I started the analytical chapter on the Philippines with some context in-
formation. Large-scale land deals in the country have to be regarded
against the background of the agrarian reform, which tried to redistribute
large landholdings to small-scale farmers. Yet, certain government policies
focusing on green economy and the promotion of bioethanol production
created a new momentum for foreign investment in agriculture in the
country. Civil society mobilization regarding large-scale land deals follows
existing patterns and networks from agrarian reform struggles. There has
been and still is considerable civil society activity in the country around
land rights issues.
The effect of past mobilizations is a progressive stance by the Philippine
Constitution, which demands land redistribution as a means to achieve so-
cial justice and sets limits for foreign investment in the land. More detailed
regulations on large-scale land deals mostly focus on agrarian reform bene-
ficiaries, which are supposed to be protected from unfair contracts with
foreign investors. In consequence, the national legal opportunity structure
can be described as relatively favorable for local smallholders even though
ARBs are protected more than other farmers.
The two case studies then focused on how local actors tried to use this
favorable NLOS to their advantage. The case of Green Future Innovations
presents a success case; however, apart from legal mobilization through
Congress and the Provincial Governor, the radical left network also under-
took protests and factfinding missions. In addition, the NPA attacked com-
pany equipment. It is, therefore, difficult to ascribe the success to the legal
arguments only; rather, it was likely the mix of strategies.
The case of Agumil, presents an example of contract growing agree-
ments, which put the disproportionate risk of the investment on the shoul-
6.5.3
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ders of smallholder cooperatives. The cooperatives did not have legal sup-
port when signing the agreements and only started to mobilize years later.
While they achieved a congressional inquiry, they were not yet able to
achieve their goals.
Simplifying my findings, I can create the following empirical truth table
for the Philippines.






GFII favorable strong - success
Agumil favorable weak unreceptive failure
Apart from the pre-identified condition, my findings from the Agumil case
identified a possible additional condition: The degree of unity among local
actors. This condition can be formulated on an abstract level and it seems
likely that it plays a role in other cases as well. If company managers are
faced with a myriad of different demands, they might simply ignore them
or only answer to the ones that are least costly for the company. Further-
more, companies might exploit disunity among local actors:
“Conflicting attitudes within a community towards the benefits of in-
dustrial development allow corporations to focus on those people will-
ing to cooperate, and to dismiss or ignore more confrontational
views.” (Garvey/Newell 2005: 400)
In the case of Agumil, some cooperatives were happy to opt into the take-
out deal, leaving those who aimed for another outcome in a difficult pos-
ition. Acting together would have improved the bargaining situation of lo-
cal actors. It becomes clear that internal mobilization for collective action
is, therefore, an important component for successful legal mobilization. At
the same time, the relationship with the condition of the support network
needs to be discussed. Fundamentally, the question is how internal and ex-
ternal social mobilization are related. Can a group, which is divided inter-
nally, receive external support? Missing unity can certainly be a challenge
to outside actors such as NGOs, as they might not be clear to whom and
how they should provide support. Yet, there is also the option that outside
civil society organizations help to create unity by providing a common
frame or encouraging local mobilization.
Table 16
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In summary, it became clear that a favorable national opportunity struc-
ture in the Philippines creates a situation for local smallholders in which
they can protect their rights through legal mobilization. However, they are
dependent on strong support networks, which help them pressure the ad-
ministrative system and companies. Apart from the outside support net-
work, internal unity appeared as another possible condition, which rele-
vance has to be tested in future research.
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Discussion
The country studies have provided insights into the diverse settings of Sier-
ra Leone and the Philippines. The findings from the two countries and the
four cases of large-scale land investments help me conclude. In a first step,
I will draw a systematic comparison between the two countries and four
cases (chap 7.1). In a second step, I will abstractly formulate the findings
and discuss how the two additional conditions fit into an extended theo-
retical framework (chap 7.2).
Comparing Sierra Leone and the Philippines
My findings from Sierra Leone and the Philippines showed the relevance
of the three core conditions conceptualized in the theoretical framework
and helped me to identify two possible additional conditions. In the fol-
lowing, I will discuss the core and additional conditions in a comparative
way.
The national legal opportunity structure between Sierra Leone and the
Philippines varied considerably. The Sierra Leonean legal framework has
considerable shortcomings in protecting customary ownership and use
rights. Furthermore, unlike in the Philippines, there are no limits to for-
eign ownership of agribusiness companies or ceilings for land leases. In the
Philippines, many smallholders can claim ownership and are protected
from eviction. The differences in the tenure system and the regulatory
framework seem to influence the type of investment. While both cases
considered in Sierra Leone were large-scale leases with the company man-
aging the whole plantation, the cases from the Philippines had a nucleus
plantation on leased land in combination with contract-growing schemes.
I suspect that this mirrors tendencies in the countries more generally; how-
ever, I do not have statistical data to underline this claim.
Irrespective of the type of investment, the different legal situations in
the two countries considerably affected smallholders in making decisions
about the projects. Both cases from Sierra Leone showed that most affected
smallholders – customary owners or users of the land – hardly had any say
in deciding about the large-scale land deal. Only in the case of Addax there
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quirements of the country. In the Socfin case, local smallholders tried to
defend their customary rights; however, so far, they were not successful.
The two cases in the Philippines are different in this regard. Smallhold-
ers were able to individually decide if they wanted to take part in the in-
vestment, either through individual contracts in the case of GFII or
through joining a cooperative in the case of Agumil. In both cases, some
people actively decided against participating. Nonetheless, some problems
arose, in the case of GFII, because of wrongful land claims and, in the case
of Agumil, because many cooperatives’ members were not fully aware of
the risks of the investment. The case studies thereby show that legal provi-
sions in themselves are not automatically able to create ventures that bene-
fit local actors. Instead, laws and administrative orders have to be imple-
mented and enforced.
 
In regards to support networks, the overall picture varies between the two
countries: National civil society actors involved in the Sierra Leonean cases
are part of the same network, which formed around the issue of large-scale
land deals. In both cases, national and international partners ran advocacy
campaigns and provided local actors with legal representation, capacity
building, and, in the case of MALOA, financial resources. International
donors provide crucial funding for the Sierra Leonean NGOs and there-
fore contribute considerably to local support.
In contrast, civil society activism in the Philippines focuses on broader
land issues, mainly the agrarian reform. There are two blocs in the civil so-
ciety, which follow different ideological ideas and employ different strate-
gies. While both blocs maintain international links, they are less depen-
dent on international funding than civil society actors in Sierra Leone.
Comparing all four cases across countries, Agumil is the only case in
which the condition of a strong support network was absent. As described
in the case study, one possible explanation is the non-alignment of goals.
The goal of the cooperatives to achieve economic wellbeing is counterpro-
ductive for the goal of NGOs to stop all oil palm expansion on Palawan.
Similar divides between defensive activism seeking to stop palm oil expan-
sion and contract farmers, who struggle for better conditions, have been
observed in the oil palm industry in Indonesia (Pye 2010: 853). Further-
more, the case of the indebted cooperatives does not neatly fit the ‘land
grabbing’ narrative, as the cooperatives entered into contracts with Agumil
voluntarily (not necessarily well informed though). The case can, there-
fore, be seen as an example of the difficulty of receiving civil society sup-
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port if the issues at hand do not fit existing frames used by relevant CSOs
(Bob 2005: 27).
Regarding the other three cases, the type of civil society support varied
between GFII and the Sierra Leonean cases. In the case of GFII, the in-
volved network is a left-wing peasant movement, with a much more mili-
tant stance. The peasant movement was highly effective in its mobilization
efforts. It exerted considerable pressure: “mere mention of the militant
peasant organization provided smallholders a convenient leverage tool vis-
à-vis the company” (Rutten et al. 2017: 11). The well-known militancy of
the peasant movement (and possibly its indirect links to the NPA) might
have a positive effect on locals to achieve their goals.
The NGO advocacy around the land deals in Sierra Leone differs in this
regard and focuses on dialogue and peaceful means. National NGOs and
the local activist organization MALOA frequently emphasized their wish
to resolve issues peacefully and have a dialogue with the respective compa-
ny (interviews SL11, SL19, SL33, SL42). There is a fear of being viewed as
‘inciting’, which in the context of post-war Sierra Leone can quickly dele-
gitimize activism. It seems likely that militant forms of activism similar to
the peasant-based KMP in the Philippines would not be considered appro-
priate in Sierra Leone. Framing of grievances by civil society actors and
their respective strategies are linked to the country context and history.
Consequently, the condition of a strong support network can take differ-
ent forms and can be a militant peasant movement in one case and a tradi-
tional NGO, which provides locals with a lawyer in another case.
 
When it comes to the receptivity of companies, no clear patterns emerge
between the two countries. As mentioned earlier, the cases in Sierra Leone
were leases only, whereas the investments in the Philippines included
growership arrangements. Furthermore, the Philippine cases presented
joint ventures with the involvement of national businesspersons. Yet, there
was no systematic difference in the receptivity of companies or in the way
companies dealt with local actors. The companies were regarded as out-
siders by the local population in all cases and initially instilled hopes for
economic development.
The relevance of the difference between receptive and unreceptive com-
panies was shown through the comparison between the Addax and the
Socfin case in Sierra Leone, as discussed in chapter 5.5.1. The Philippine
cases do not add much to this. Furthermore, I was not able to establish the
receptivity of GFII back in 2011 when the legal mobilization took place.
Nonetheless, in the setup today, smallholders seem to have the most bar-
7.1 Comparing Sierra Leone and the Philippines
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gaining power in the GFII investment, as they can decide every three years
if they want to continue growing sugar cane for the company.
 
Apart from the three core conditions, the country chapters identified and
discussed two possible additional conditions: The role of local political
elites in Sierra Leone and the unity among local actors in the Philippines.
Comparing them across countries and all four cases provides further in-
sights and validates their relevance.
The role of local and national political elites is one possible additional
condition in explaining legal mobilization success and failure. The case of
Socfin in Sierra Leone made this condition visible: Local customary au-
thorities and national politicians derailed the mediation process of the Hu-
man Rights Commission of Sierra Leone. Furthermore, local authorities
suppress local mobilization and dissent. Political elites essentially block
mobilization attempts and ‘protect’ the company.
In the GFII case in the Philippines, local political elites played both neg-
ative and positive roles. Initially, barangay captains wrongfully claimed
land or signed wrongful land claims. In these cases, they misused their pos-
ition, which gave them the power to acknowledge informal land rights.
However, in the follow-up, legal and other mobilization efforts pressured
the Governor to intervene and to ensure that legitimate land rights are pro-
tected.
The two examples show that elites, who have a key role in decision-mak-
ing processes about large-scale land investment, might misuse their pos-
ition for their own personal gain. This finding is in line with existing re-
search from Ghana, Mozambique, and Zambia, which shows that custom-
ary authorities, who are supposed to represent their constituencies, tend to
abuse their power (German et al. 2013: 11; Schoneveld 2017: 127; Lanz et
al. 2018). Similar dynamics can be observed at the national level, as evi-
dence from Ethiopia, Nigeria, Zambia and Ghana shows:
“[I]n all four countries, investors were found to have offered well-re-
munerated positions to ex-politicians or to later hire government offi-
cials involved in enabling project establishment. In Ghana and Nige-
ria, there were even cases where government officials were hired
as ’consultants’ while in public service.” (Schoneveld 2017: 126)
In these contexts, local and national political elites are highly incentivized
to ‘protect’ companies from local demands and derail legal mobilization
attempts. In these situations, locals might rely on other elite actors or, ide-
ally, on an independent judicial system to protect their rights. Further-
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more, as the case of Addax indicates, a receptive company might be more
willing to deal with local communities directly. This should especially
hold for a company whose corporate culture emphasizes transparency and
the avoidance of corruption.
The second additional condition is the degree of unity among local ac-
tors. I explored the relevance of this condition in the Agumil case where
unity among cooperatives was missing. The other three cases provide addi-
tional support for this finding. Especially the Addax case is instructive in
this regard. Involved civil society actors named the unity among the com-
munity of Masetleh as a relevant factor for success (interviews SL26, SL28,
SL51). As described in the analysis (chap 5.3.2 + chap 5.3.4), the support-
ing NGOs helped in facilitating the unity among community members
(interview SL51).
In the case of GFII, the pre-existing organization DAGAMI ensured uni-
ty among its members, which the support network probably reinforced. In
the case of Socfin, unity among discontent landowners and users was creat-
ed through MALOA, which presented grievances as one unified voice. At
the same time, there were reports that Socfin had bought out some mem-
bers of MALOA through offering them jobs at the company (interview
SL42). Similar practices of dividing discontent groups through offering
material benefits were reported by civil society members in the context of
other investment projects in Sierra Leone (interview SL26, SL36) and seem
to mirror company strategies in other countries:
“[…] MNCs donate money and/or materials goods to communities in
exchange for their support. Although the sums involved are miniscule
for the MNCs, they are significant for poor communities. This practice
may pit individuals within communities against one another, allowing
the MNCs to divide and conquer the opposition.” (Calvano 2008: 796)
Splitting up local actors seems to be one possible counter-strategy taken up
by some companies. Internal unity requires internal mobilization and con-
sensus-building among local actors. In the cases of Socfin and GFII, this
was fulfilled by local organizations, whereas outside supporters played an
essential role in creating unity among local actors in the Addax case. Simi-
lar attempts to create unity among cooperatives in the Agumil case had
happened, as the example of the Association of Palm Oil Growers in
Southern Palawan showed. However, cooperatives were not able to sustain
the organization over time.
The comparison of the three core and the two additional conditions re-
vealed differences and similarities between the two countries and the four
7.1 Comparing Sierra Leone and the Philippines
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cases. The cases showed the relevance of a favorable legal system but also
its limits if it is not implemented properly. Support networks did play an
important role even though frames and strategies differed between the two
countries. Differences of the company helped to explain different out-
comes, especially in the Sierra Leonean cases. Finally, both additional con-
ditions seemed to play a role across countries. The unity of actors turned
out to be relevant in all cases, whereas the role of local and national elites
was not as clear-cut. Yet, there is evidence that they can potentially block
legal mobilization attempts.
An extended framework of legal mobilization success in large-scale land
deals
The previous chapter compared central findings across the two countries
and the four cases. I now link the results back to my theoretical frame-
work. I will first discuss the relationships between the three core condi-
tions on an abstract level, before including the two additional conditions
in a second step. In a third step, I will show how the additional two condi-
tions fit into the concept of an extended bargaining situation, which can
capture the complexity of actors in large-scale land deals.
To identify relationships among the three core conditions looking at the
truth table is helpful.






Addax unfavorable strong receptive success
Socfin unfavorable strong unreceptive failure
GFII favorable strong - success
Agumil favorable weak unreceptive failure
The truth table shows two configurations in which legal mobilization was
successful: In the case of Addax, the national legal opportunity structure
was unfavorable. Nonetheless, a strong support network and a receptive
company resulted in a successful outcome for the community of Maseth-
leh. In the case of GFII, a favorable national legal opportunity structure, in
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well. Unfortunately, I was not able to identify the receptivity of the compa-
ny in that case; however, evidence from process tracing indicated that the
condition was probably not significant, as the conflict was resolved
through the Governor, holding the barangay captains accountable.
Evidence of the failed legal mobilization attempts can provide further
clarification for the relationship between the three conditions. Comparing
the Addax to the Socfin case shows the relevance of the receptivity of the
company in cases in which the national legal opportunity structure is
weak, but network support is still strong. This shows the relevance of com-
panies following international soft law standards in countries with a weak
land governance structure.
The Agumil case points to the relevance of the support network, which
was absent in this case. However, if the missing support or the unreceptivi-
ty of the company is the main cause for the failure of the legal mobiliza-
tion attempt is unclear. Yet, I suspect that the cooperatives could have
been successful with more support. This would imply that the support net-
work is a necessary condition for legal mobilization success.
Overall, my considerations lead me to the following relationships be-
tween the three conditions: If the national legal opportunity structure is fa-
vorable and local actors receive enough help from their support networks
to enforce law, legal mobilization attempts should be successful. In the
case that the national legal opportunity structure is unfavorable and local
actors get the support of networks to use national and international less
formalized norms, the legal mobilization success depends on the receptivi-
ty of investing companies.
 
Apart from the three core conditions, the two additional conditions can be
conceptualized on an abstract level, as discussed earlier.
The role of political elites74 is a relevant condition, which might be espe-
cially helpful in explaining legal mobilization failure. Existing research on
large-scale land deals has emphasized that local and national political elites
usually play an important role in facilitating these deals (Keene et al. 2015;
Li 2015; Wolford et al. 2013), and as described in the previous chapter, of-
ten have a personal interest in ‘protecting’ investing companies. At the
same time, as research on ‘rightful resistance’ shows, state officials can play
a positive role, as they might act as an ally and enforce existing regulations
(O'Brien/Li 2008). Different members of the same administration may be
in favor of or against a large-scale land deal, and they might be open to lo-
74 Can be local or national elites, or both, depending on the context.
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cal goals to varying degrees. In these cases, identifying a powerful ally
within the administration might be a critical element to ensure that legal
mobilization attempts can proceed and be successful.
The degree of unity of local actors as a relevant condition for legal mobi-
lization success is logical from a social mobilization and business manage-
ment perspective:
“Without collective action, constituents would be disconnected indi-
viduals lacking a coherent interest in corporate behavior, and man-
agers would fail to perceive these constituents as consequential. By
framing their interests vis-à-vis the focal corporation, collective action
among potential stakeholders facilitates the emergence of stakeholder
awareness, both among the constituents of the organization and in the
eyes of managers.” (King 2007: 22–23)
My initial model did not pay specific attention to these internal mobiliza-
tion processes, as I focused my research question on local actors, who were
organized to the degree that they would voice collective demands. How-
ever, even when previous mobilization has taken place, it does not mean
that it remains unchallenged or that members of an organization stay uni-
fied. The dissolved Association of Palm Oil Growers in Southern Palawan
is a case in point and shows the need of local actors to create a certain de-
gree of unity among themselves.
Adding these two conditions to the empirical truth table gives a first im-
pression about their role. However, it should be noted that the explanatory
power of the conditions diminishes the more conditions are added. This is
related to the underlying logic of a configurational approach, which, as de-
scribed in chapter 3.1.2, takes seriously all possible combinations in which
conditions can appear and act together. For five conditions, this means
that theoretically, 32 combinations are possible75. I, therefore, combine the
results presented in the truth table with the findings from process tracing
and theoretical considerations to draw conclusions.
75 The number of possible combinations is 2number of conditions. This shows the limits
of applying a QCA logic to small-N research designs. The more conditions are in-
cluded, the less meaningful the results get as the combinations only describe one
specific case (Berg-Schlosser/Meur 2009: 27).
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Addax unfavorable strong receptive unified - success
Socfin unfavorable strong unreceptive unified blocking failure
GFII favorable strong - unified - success
Agumil favorable weak unreceptive not unified - failure
Focusing on the additional conditions, two cases stick out: Agumil and
Socfin. As discussed in the previous chapter, Agumil is the only case with
missing unity of local actors and missing a strong support network. There
is, therefore, the possibility that the two conditions are so closely linked
that they could be expressed by one condition76. However, the question of
the role of the condition of internal unity for the outcome of legal mobili-
zation would still be relevant. Following theoretical considerations dis-
cussed earlier and my findings from process tracing, I assume that a certain
degree of internal unity among local actors is a necessary condition for le-
gal mobilization success.
The case of Socfin was the only one in which legal mobilization was
stopped by local political elites. In other cases, political elites did play a
role as well; however, it is difficult to break their behavior down into sim-
ple categories. Government authorities at different levels usually play a
role in implementing large-scale land deals. Yet, whether they are able to
facilitate or stop legal mobilization is linked to the respective configura-
tions of power within the political system. I suspect that legal mobilization
attempts relying on soft law instruments should be easier to derail than
hard law instruments such as litigation, at least under the condition of a
sufficiently independent judiciary. Furthermore, I assume that the role of
local elites is less relevant in cases of a receptive company, as they might be
less likely to hide behind power holders. However, these assumptions need
further research.
 
Returning to the starting point of my theoretical framework, the two addi-
tional conditions can be integrated into the bargaining situation. My origi-
nal version described a simple bargaining situation between two parties:
Local actors on the one side and transnational corporations on the other
Table 18
76 A combinatory condition could be the degree of mobilization of local actors,
which could include the elements of internal and external mobilization.
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side. Yet, my empirical work showed a more complex picture, which needs
to be incorporated into the bargaining model, taking into consideration
multi-level and multi-party bargaining. On the side of local actors, internal
bargaining about a common position needs to be considered, while local
and national elites can potentially stop or enable legal mobilization at-
tempts on the side of the company. The following figure gives a simplified
impression of this extended bargaining model.
Extended bargaining model
Of course, graphic representations of complex realities are always some-
what limited. Yet, figure 9 helps to summarize my research findings and
my final conceptualization. As in the initial model in chapter 3.2.2, there is
an ongoing bargaining process between local actors and investing com-
panies. However, additional relevant actors are included in the extended
model. The support network helps local actors to pursue legal mobiliza-
tion. Political elites have the ability to ‘protect’ investing companies, even
though they are rarely as unified as presented in this figure. Within bar-
gaining is added to local actors to signify the relevance of the condition of
unity77. The legal opportunity structure is an underlying structure, which
influences the bargaining power of different actors, their role in the overall
situation and the possibilities for legal mobilization.
Figure 7
77 Within-bargaining theoretically applies to all other parties as well.
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Conclusion
Concluding this dissertation, I will review the research presented and dis-
cuss its meaning for the literature and policy debates. I will recap the re-
search question and the main findings in a first step (chap 8.1). The second
part will consider the limits of my research and formulate further research
desiderata (chap 8.2). The final part will discuss what these findings mean
against the background of current debates described in chapter 2 of this
thesis (chap 8.2).
Summary
My research endeavor was inspired by the ongoing international debate
about the regulation of large-scale land deals. Commentators following a
human rights or a market-based approach both argued for global rules but
in different forms and with different contents. While a human rights-based
perspective demands a veto right for local actors and binding instruments,
a market-based perspective focuses on consultations and the persuasiveness
of voluntary best practice standards.
Several new international instruments were developed containing traces
of both approaches. Civil society and academic reactions varied between
radically questioning the usefulness of regulation, being critical of missing
bindingness and optimistic assumptions. Yet, existing research on the use
of legal arguments, legal representation or legal institutions was so far in-
conclusive: Legal mobilization seemed to take place in large-scale land
deals. However, the conditions under which legal mobilization by local ac-
tors was successful had not been subject to systematic research. This is the
gap the dissertation helped to fill through answering the question: Under
which conditions can local actors successfully pursue their goals through legal mo-
bilization?
Addressing the research question required the development of a frame-
work, which was able to consider different perspectives – a legal, a social
mobilization and a business management approach. Viewed through the
lens of bargaining power, I brought the three aspects together with the
help of a configurational approach. I derived three core conditions: The fa-
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port networks and the receptivity of the company. These core conditions
served as a heuristic tool for my empirical analysis, which had the aim to
specify the relationship between the conditions and legal mobilization suc-
cess and add possible additional conditions.
My empirical analysis focused on two cases of large-scale land deals in
two countries: Sierra Leone and the Philippines. Both countries differ con-
siderably in regard to their national legal opportunity structure. While
smallholders in Sierra Leone do not have formalized decision-making
rights concerning large-scale land deals, many farmers in the Philippines
have means of claiming legitimate tenure rights and a veto right in land
investments. The national legal opportunity structure was evaluated in
both countries with the help of a ‘collective optimum’, created through a
human rights perspective on land. The effects of the respective national le-
gal opportunity structures were then analyzed through process tracing in
two cases of large-scale land deals in each country: Addax and Socfin in
Sierra Leone, and GFII and Agumil in the Philippines. The analysis aimed
to show the relationship between and the relevance of the three core con-
ditions. Further insights were created by comparing the findings within
and across countries. Data used in the analysis came from 102 interviews
conducted during field research in Sierra Leone and the Philippines as
well as a variety of documents from media, NGOs, companies, activist
groups, governments or academics.
Overall, my analysis showed how the national legal opportunity struc-
ture shaped the possibilities of local actors in mobilizing for their goals in
both countries. In the case of Sierra Leone, these possibilities were very li-
mited for local smallholders. In this context, the receptive company, Ad-
dax, which followed international guidelines, offered more space than
Socfin, which relied on local authorities to suppress local mobilization. In
both the Addax and the Socfin case, NGOs played an important role in
supporting local actors. In the Philippines, the favorable national opportu-
nity structure created a situation for local smallholders, in which they
could protect their rights through legal mobilization. Nonetheless, local
actors were dependent on strong support networks, which could help
them pressure the administrative system and companies. Apart from the
outside support network, internal unity appeared as another important
condition –, especially in the Agumil case.
The findings from the analysis can be summarized on an abstract level
to answer the research question. Legal mobilization of local actors should be
successful if the national legal opportunity structure is favorable and if local ac-
tors are unified and receive strong network support. In cases in which the nation-
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al legal opportunity structure is unfavorable, local actors also need to be unified
and receive strong network support. However, in these cases the success of the le-
gal mobilization will depend on the receptivity of the company and the role of
political elites.
Limitations and future research desiderata
There are certain boundaries to my research as well as open questions that
point out future research desiderata. I will discuss some general limits be-
fore going into more detail regarding the three literature strands identified
as relevant in the introduction.
My dissertation focused on the way legal mobilization is employed by
local actors to achieve their goals. I identified particular ‘local actors’ in
each of my cases without further discussing their status in the overall af-
fected population. The focus was not necessarily on the ‘most marginal-
ized’ groups. I mentioned this in the chapter from Sierra Leone, where I
pointed out differences between landowners and land users in customary
law. However, I did not focus on these differences in the analysis. Simi-
larly, I did not delve into the relationship between cooperatives and in-
digenous people in the Agumil case.
Furthermore, my research did not take into consideration gender-specif-
ic aspects of tenure systems and surrounding dynamics in large-scale land
deals (Alano 2015; Ryan 2017). My research did not focus on how compa-
ny investments influenced these existing societal inequalities and the role
different local actors played in these settings. It would, however, be of
interest, under which conditions legal provisions could mitigate or worsen
inequalities between societal groups or gender in large-scale land deals.
Furthermore, this dissertation did not assess the economic benefits or
losses of local actors on a systematic basis. However, from anecdotal evi-
dence collected during interviews, it seems that the GFII case was probably
the most beneficial to local smallholders. The smallholders who cooperat-
ed with the company saw it as one additional source of income, sometimes
using land that was otherwise not valuable to them. In contrast, the farm-
ers in the Agumil case were highly indebted and hardly received any finan-
cial outputs. The investment clearly did not improve their economic well-
being. The situation was more complicated in the Sierra Leonean cases as
the investments changed the local economy significantly. A household sur-
vey comparing communities in the Addax investment area to outside com-
munities showed that the average household income in the Addax area was
8.2
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indeed higher. However, prices for food had also increased in the project
area to nearly the same degree that income had risen (Rist et al. 2016: 5).
Determining economic benefits in such settings is a complex endeavor and
depends to a considerable degree on the methods used. It should be noted
that my ‘success’ cases do not automatically imply ‘economic success’; in-
stead, success in my cases showed that locals were able to influence the in-
vestment project in a way that they wanted. I do, however, assume that this
should at least protect local actors from economically detrimental effects.
In addition, my dissertation is not representative of all large-scale land
deals. As mentioned in the case selection chapter (4.2.2), I was focusing on
land investments, which had created some attention and subsequent mobi-
lization efforts by locals and civil society organizations. There can be in-
vestment projects, which are less problematic and respect local rights.
However, I regard my selected cases as typical for large-scale investments
that create national and international attention. I, therefore, expect that
my findings around local dynamics and legal mobilization attempts are
similar in other cases. My abstract model is furthermore applicable to oth-
er private sector investment cases such as mining projects, even though
state actors usually play a more significant role in sub-soil resource ex-
ploitation.
 
Apart from some general boundaries of my dissertation, my study points
to future research desiderata for the legal studies, social mobilization and
business management literature.
As described in the introduction, the dissertation contributes to the legal
studies literature by focusing on legal mobilization processes that take
place outside the courtroom in countries with a relatively weak rule of law.
I thereby provide a much broader picture of how people use and negotiate
the law in the context of large-scale investment projects in developing
countries. I did focus on legal possibilities and actions taken by local actors
and did not further discuss the legal protection of companies on the na-
tional and international levels. I thereby left out the international invest-
ment regime, which has received considerable criticism as being overpro-
tective of investors at the expense of local populations (Johnson 2016: 73).
More specifically, bilateral investment treaties have been criticized for lim-
iting governments in their regulatory responses regarding foreign invest-
ment in agriculture (Ewelukwa Ofodile 2014). The effects these treaties
have on individual cases would be a relevant further research endeavor. In
my examples, the role of international investment law did not surface, as
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no bilateral investment treaty had been signed between host governments
and countries of origin of the investors (UNCTAD 01/03/2019).
At the same time, my research leads to follow up questions such as the
long-term effects of legal mobilization on different levels: Does legal mobi-
lization leave local people feeling empowered and lead to new collective
rights claims (McCann 1994: 11)? Or does the experience with the law lead
to disenchantment and further marginalization (Gallagher/Yang 2017:
188)?
Furthermore, can legal mobilization attempts lead to broader changes
on the societal level? This question is especially relevant in Sierra Leone. As
described in chapter 5.1.3, a civil society network formed around the issue
of large-scale land deals. The network has considerable influence on the
political level, for example, in the development of the new National Land
Policy. Besides, the network frequently brings together affected people
from different regions of the country, who might, as a result, claim their
rights more vocally. Simultaneously, the land deals themselves can lead to
a questioning of existing customary rules, which start to be renegotiated
(Bottazzi et al. 2016). These dynamics might change understandings of
statutory and customary land rights and the role of chiefs. Mobilization ef-
forts and rights discourses employed by civil society against large-scale land
deals might have considerable long-term effects, as suggested by Alden
Wily:
“[T]he land rush is generating such increasing local reaction that sub-
ordination of majority rural rights shows signs of becoming less easy.
This may prove to be the case even in the most recalcitrant of cases
[…] If only for political reasons, those governments may later, if not
sooner, feel bound to modify their land laws […].” (Alden Wily 2014:
222)
These macro-level dynamics should be studied further in the next couple
of years, which should show moves towards more inclusive land legisla-
tions if the optimistic assumption formulated by Alden Wily was correct.
This issue of broader societal change touches on core questions of the so-
cial mobilization literature. The dissertation contributes to this literature
by focusing on a ‘middle ground’ of social mobilization, in which social
actors try to achieve their goals by referring to legal norms and pushing for
their enforcement. The cases represent local social actors who are not nec-
essarily interested in societal change but rather want to improve their liv-
ing situation. My research furthermore raises issues, which can be an-
swered with the help of a social mobilization perspective in future re-
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search. One question refers to the strategies employed by local actors and
their support networks. In many cases, legal mobilization such as the call-
ing on a national institution such as Congress in the Philippine cases or
the Human Rights Commission in the Socfin case, are only part of broader
advocacy campaigns and other activities. The case of GFII raised the
question of violence in contributing and explaining the success of local ac-
tors. The question arises under which condition which combination of
strategies might be most successful. As discussed in chapter 7.1, I assume
that the strategies used by local actors have to fit societal contexts.
Nonetheless, future research could focus more systematically on common-
alities across cases and countries.
The question of strategy is especially interesting as many civil society
campaigns around large-scale land deals involve the cooperation of local
actors from the Global South with NGOs from the Global North. Typical-
ly, these relationships face certain difficulties due to the differences in fi-
nancial resources, organizational background (Pieck 2013), but also re-
garding ideological or strategic views (Hahn/Holzscheiter 2013). There are
signs that these challenges can be mitigated by applying the principle of
affectedness, which is prevalent among civil society in the realm of food se-
curity governance (Schramm/Sändig 2018). In this regard, mobilization in
large-scale land deals can serve as an example of successful cooperation be-
tween locally affected people and international NGOs across borders.
Another issue is the process of opinion formation on the local level. My
research question focused on a point when people had already come to-
gether to take action. However, as indicated by the additional condition of
unity among local actors, this cannot be automatically assumed. Some au-
thors suggest that communities are usually divided among potential ‘win-
ners’ or ‘losers’ of an investment (Schoneveld 2017: 127; Borras/Franco
2013: 1730). However, there is evidence that opinions take form on a col-
lective level as interviews from villages in Kenya indicated:
“Only one location, village 5, had a mixture of opinions for or against.
Elsewhere, villagers were united, even if they varied in their reasons.
Interviews revealed heterogeneity in respondents’ livelihoods, educa-
tion levels and life-worlds. […] this might suggest villagers’ discursive
positions are shaped collectively.” (Smalley/Corbera 2012: 1049)
This finding underlines social mobilization approaches that assume that
the existence of grievances alone is not enough for collective action to ap-
pear (Granzow et al. 2015). Instead, framing processes take place that help
people to interpret events. In many cases of large-scale land deals, opinions
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form before an investment has taken place, which leaves further room for
interpretation as outcomes are only anticipated. Community leaders, polit-
icians, outside NGOs and other social actors might try to influence opin-
ion-making processes in local communities. Studying these micro-process-
es further would elucidate existing local power structures and their possi-
ble changes in the light of incoming investors.
Finally, my dissertation also contributes to the business management lit-
erature, through linking considerations about company stakeholders with
social mobilization and legal issues. The role of law has not been studied
explicitly in relation to the stakeholder salience model. However, as my
dissertation suggests that whether companies perceive certain groups as rel-
evant stakeholders depends on the legal situation, for example, whether
customary landowners and users have a veto right or not. A company’s de-
cision about who they regard as relevant stakeholder is dependent on the
legal situation in a country. This relationship can be further specified for
different economic fields in future research.
The empirical material of my dissertation did point to another critical
issue, which should be studied further from a business standpoint: The
economic viability of large-scale agricultural investment projects. While I
do not have data on profit margins, anecdotal evidence implies that only
three out of the four projects were economically profitable, namely the in-
vestment of Socfin. As described, the Addax investment had failed mostly
due to low yields. Yields were also substantially lower than projected in
the Agumil case, and the mill seemed to be running only at half capacity.
Finally, GFII was not able to encourage enough sugar cane growing and
therefore did not have enough raw material for the bioethanol refinery.
The economic difficulties raise two important follow-up questions that
need further research.
Under which conditions are large-scale land deals economically viable?
Large-scale investments seem to be especially risky, as mentioned in chap-
ter 3.1.1. In a World Bank study on 39 agricultural investment projects, on-
ly 45 % were financially profitable (World Bank 2014: 17). Furthermore,
large-scale agricultural plantations are difficult to manage and often strug-
gle to achieve higher yields then small-scale farming (Schönweger/Messerli
2015). However, if investing companies struggle, local populations are like-
ly to be negatively affected. This became apparent during the scale down
of the Addax project: Workers had to be laid off (SiLNoRF 2016), rent pay-
ments were late, and social programs like a garden project for local women
were stopped (interview SL15). Furthermore, a company that is struggling
financially will, of course, have a harder time giving in to local demands,
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for example, for higher rent payments. For locally affected communities,
non-viable investment projects are, therefore, an additional risk. There is a
clear need to assess the economic viability of large-scale land deals more
critically. Some investments appear to be based on unrealistic yield expec-
tations and fail to take conditions on the ground into consideration.
The second question is linked to the realization that the project that
seemed to be economically successful was the investment of Socfin, which
was the least receptive company out of the four cases studied. This puts the
‘business case’ for voluntarily following guidelines, mentioned in the in-
troduction, into question. Are companies that are self-committing to fol-
lowing international principles and guidelines really more successful eco-
nomically? The ‘business case’ argues that the costs of unresolved land con-
flicts will be higher for investing companies than doing proper consulta-
tion right from the beginning (World Bank 2014: xvii). However, the case
of Addax shows that following best practices is costly. A former employee
estimated the cost of the social affairs department, compensation paid lo-
cally and the running of the Farmers Development Program at 10 to 12
million USD (interview SL54). Nonetheless, the investment project still
faced criticism:
“[…] when you do apply best practice and you work with best prac-
tice, you still get bad press. […] best practice can be done, but it costs.
And a lot of investors were not prepared to even pay a fraction of the
money that Addax paid out.” (interview SL54)
If done correctly, consultations and keeping up good relations between
companies and local communities will be costly, especially if you consider
the amount of people that might need to be involved: 13,500 and 20,000
affected people in the cases of Addax and Socfin respectively. Economists
should engage in realistic calculations of what these processes cost. Sadly,
the case of Socfin might be an example of how ‘consultations’ can be done
‘cheaper’: by negotiating with the government and Paramount Chief and
leaving it to them to deal with local discontent. Of course, my data are li-
mited in this regard, however, I question that there is always a ‘business
case’ for applying voluntary standards. This is in line with existing research
on the relationship of corporate social responsibility and financial perfor-
mance of companies, which so far generated ambiguous results (Schreck
2011). Future research should analyze if and under which conditions a
‘business case’ exists for applying international soft law standards in large-
scale land investment deals.
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Implications of my findings for regulating large-scale land deals
What do my findings and my final answer mean for the existing debates
about regulating large-scale land deals? I will present implications for the
existing literature on large-scale land deals as well as policy debates.
My research findings provide evidence for all three positions taken
about regulating large-scale land deals described in chapter 2.3.1. Looking
back, an optimistic position emphasized the possible positive role played
by voluntary standards. In contrast, a critical position demanded binding
regulations as the way forward and a radical position stayed highly skepti-
cal of the usefulness of regulation overall. My dissertation shows that all
positions are justified in specific settings.
My findings from Sierra Leone clearly show how missing recognition of
customary tenure rights puts local actors in a tough situation. They hardly
have any say in large-scale land deals and their participation in decision-
making processes relies on the discretion of companies and local chiefs. Le-
gal reforms protecting customary land rights are therefore clearly needed.
This finding underlines the need for binding law (critical view) and pro-
tection of customary and collective tenure rights.
The case of Addax shows that settings of problematic land legislation, in-
ternational soft law instruments can make a difference. In the case of Ad-
dax, these were the RSB principles, the IFC standards and generally inter-
national best practices78. The company added agreements with landown-
ing families, which created space for direct negotiations between commu-
nities and Addax. The case study shows that international soft law does
make a difference and provides some evidence for the optimistic position,
even though the extent to which local actors were able to negotiate with
the company were highly limited.
The two cases from the Philippines show how legal protection of tenure
rights can be helpful for local smallholders but does nonetheless require
collective mobilization to be enforced, such as in the GFII example.
The Agumil case does show the limits of legal regulation in regard to en-
suring economic benefits for local smallholders. When the cooperatives
signed the contracts with Agumil, they were missing a clear understanding
of legal implications and financial risks. The example supports radical
views on regulation, which argue that smallholders will always lose out
when faced with influential agribusiness investors. At the same time, the
case highlights the importance of ‘informed’ in free, prior and informed
8.3
78 The VGGT had not been passed yet at the time when the investment was set up.
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consent and gives some indications of what this should include: for exam-
ple an understanding of legal consequences of agreements signed and the
awareness of economic risks, especially in cases, which requires smallhold-
ers to take out a loan.
Overall, my findings show the chances of legal reform but also the chal-
lenges in enforcing and claiming them in developing countries such as
Sierra Leone and the Philippines. Legal norms do not automatically lead
to better outcomes for local smallholders. Nonetheless, binding national
law can provide affected people with important arguments and puts them
in a better bargaining position vis-à-vis TNCs. In cases in which national
law is weak, international norms gain in importance. They are particularly
relevant in cases in which companies are obliged to them due to voluntary
self-commitment or their funding structure.
My findings underline the importance of ongoing efforts to translate the
VGGT into national law, such as in Sierra Leone (Koch/Schulze
02/12/2017). As described in chapter 6.2.2, the new National Land Policy
of the country contains several central provisions of the VGGT and goes
even further in providing FPIC for future large-scale land investment
deals. International soft law instruments, therefore, have a role to play in
guiding national reforms. These efforts should be further supported.
At the same time, creating new international instruments is another im-
portant avenue to enhance the legal opportunity structure of local actors.
My research points to the importance of a veto right for affected small-
holders. As discussed in chapter 2.2.3, there are developments towards a
right to land. However, the UN Declaration on the Rights of Peasants and
Other People Living in Rural Areas only provides affected people with a
participation right and not a right to give or withhold consent. This is a
shortcoming, as ‘participation’ or ‘consultation’ puts local smallholders in
a weaker position when viewed from a bargaining theoretical perspective,
such as I have taken in the thesis. The investment of Socfin provides an ex-
ample of how ‘consultation’ was interpreted: A few meetings took place
with some landowning families, who voiced their general interest in leas-
ing part of their land. This was considered as a general ‘yes’ of local com-
munities by the company to the investment. Against this background, the
specification of consultations in UNDROP, which demands “active, free,
effective, meaningful and informed participation” (UN General Assembly
12/17/2018: Art. 2.3), is already a step forward. My findings, nonetheless,
echo calls for FPIC for communities in large-scale land deals.
In addition to supporting calls for FPIC, my results show the impor-
tance of legal empowerment projects that have gained international atten-
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tion in the last years (Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor
2008; Goodwin/Maru 2017). Going beyond legal aid, legal empowerment
focuses on capacitating people “to exercise their rights” (Goodwin/Maru
2017: 158). This is especially relevant in the context of large-scale land
deals, where local actors usually need support in understanding the legal
documents that they are confronted with and future implications. At the
same time, the mere provision of legal expertise is not necessarily enough,
as communities might need help in terms of decision-making. Lawyers
and paralegals providing legal explanations should, therefore, know con-
sensus building and dialogue methods. Two guides developed by Namati,
in collaboration with the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment,
give some insights into how negotiation processes within communities
and with investors can be organized. They do, for example, include a pre-
investment stage, which aims at formulating a common vision for the
community, and establishes an understanding of the value of existing land
and natural resources (Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment/
Namati). Attempts in this regard have already been made by the Interna-
tional Institute for Environment and Development, who implemented dif-
ferent legal empowerment projects in regard to strengthening local land
governance in the face of incoming investors in Ghana, Cameroon and
Senegal (Cotula/Berger 2017). Overall, legal empowerment projects make
sense for improvement of local land governance and in the face of large-
scale land deals and should not only be implemented but also studied fur-
ther.
 
Despite these positive policy recommendations for legal reform and legal
empowerment projects, my research points to limits. One condition that
showed up was the role played by local and national political elites. While
legal empowerment projects might help to hold officials accountable in
some instances, political elites can pose a considerable challenge for local
communities. As mentioned in the discussion in chapter 7.1, research
shows that customary authorities and national politicians often misuse
their power position for their own personal gains. This is not surprising, as
the land sector is one of the most corrupt sectors in many countries (Trans-
parency International/FAO 2011).
Large-scale land investments usually lead to a considerable influx of cap-
ital, which is often exploited accordingly:
“Corruption in the administration of land remains rampant. It occurs
at all phases and all levels of large-scale land deals. These various forms
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of corruption make it easy for investors to circumvent even the most
carefully crafted regulations.” (De Schutter et al. 2016: 85)
Procedural regulations might be able to help create transparency and move
decision making power away from the individual to whole communities
(German et al. 2013: 11). However, corruption in the land sector is often
linked to corruption in other public sectors, and therefore a much broader
challenge.
One last issue needs mentioning: The issue of suppression and the rising
violence against land rights activists. In 2017, 207 environmental and land
rights defenders were killed globally according to data from the NGO
Global Witness. It was not only the deadliest year yet but also the first time
that killings in relation to agribusiness overtook the number of people
killed in the mining sector (Global Witness 2018: 8). These are just the ex-
treme cases. In many instances, local activists are silenced through legal
proceedings. The Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples
Victoria Tauli-Corpuz has noted an increase in criminal charges against in-
digenous land rights defenders, a dynamic she calls a ‘silent epidemic’
(Zweynert 4/10/2017). These developments show the difficult situation of
local activists in many places, such as MALOA faces in the case of Socfin.
After the research for this dissertation was finished, 15 MALOA members
were again arrested under false pretexts in January 2019 (Human Rights
Defenders in Sierra Leone 2019). The incidence shows that, while legal
mobilization worked in some cases discussed in this dissertation, the strug-
gle for land rights continues.
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Appendix: list of interviews
No. date place interviewee organization No. of
persons
Sierra Leone
SL1 23-Nov-16 Freetown staff member development
agency 1
SL2 23-Nov-16 Freetown staff member national NGO 1
SL3 24-Nov-16 Freetown staff member development
agency 1
SL4 25-Nov-16 Freetown staff member FAO 1
SL5 25-Nov-16 Freetown staff member international
NGO 1
SL6 9-Mar-17 Freetown staff members international
NGO 2
SL7 10-Mar-17 Freetown lawyer  1
SL8 15-Mar-17 Freetown staff member international
NGO 1
SL9 16-Mar-17 phone staff member national NGO 1
SL10 20-Mar-17 Makeni staff members university 2
SL11 22-Mar-17 Makeni staff member local NGO 1
SL12 24-Mar-17 Makeni staff member international
NGO 1





SL14 27-Mar-17 Malal Mara
Chiefdom
village elder  1
SL15 29-Mar-17 Makeni company staff company 1
SL16 29-Mar-17 Malal Mara
Chiefdom
youth leader  1
SL17 30-Mar-17 Makari Gbanti
Chiefdom
female activist  1
SL18 30-Mar-17 Makari Gbanti
Chiefdom
section chief  1
SL19 31-Mar-17 Port Loko staff member local NGO 1
SL20 4-Apr-17 BKM Chiefdom village elders  5
SL21 4-Apr-17 BKM Chiefdom village women  4
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No. date place interviewee organization No. of
persons
SL22 4-Apr-17 BKM Chiefdom chiefdom speaker  1
SL23 5-Apr-17 BKM Chiefdom village elders  3
SL24 6-Apr-17 BKM Chiefdom village elders  1
SL25 6-Apr-17 BKM Chiefdom village elders  2
SL26 10-Apr-17 Makeni paralegal national NGO 1
SL27 11-Apr-17 Malal Mara
Chiefdom
village elder  1
SL28 12-Apr-17 Makeni staff member local NGO 1
SL29 12-Apr-17 Makeni staff member local NGO  





SL31 20-Apr-17 Freetown staff member national NGO 1





SL33 24-Apr-17 Bo staff member National NGO
network 1
SL34 24-Apr-17 Bo activist local organisation 1
SL35 25-Apr-17 Bo staff member national NGO 1
SL36 26-Apr-17 Bo paralegal national NGO 1
SL37 1-May-17 Malen
Chiefdom
chiefdom speaker  1
SL38 2-May-17 Malen
Chiefdom
female activist local organisation 1
SL39 2-May-17 Malen
Chiefdom








activist local organisation 1
SL42 2-May-17 Malen
Chiefdom
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SL47 3-May-17 Pujehun official district
government 1
SL48 3-May-17 Pujehun staff members local NGO 2




SL50 8-May-17 Freetown staff members Ministry of Lands 2
SL51 12-May-17 Freetown lawyer national NGO 1
SL52 5-Jul-17 Skype staff member international
NGO 1
SL53 18-May-18 Skype staff member international
NGO 1




PH1 20-Feb-18 Manila professor university 1










PH4 22-Feb-18 Manila staff member international
NGO network
1




PH6 26-Feb-18 Manila lawyer national NGO 1




PH8 27-Feb-18 Manila staff member national farmer’s
association
1
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No. date place interviewee organization No. of
persons
PH9 27-Feb-18 Manila farmer activist national farmer’s
association
1
PH10 1-Mar-18 Manila clergy Catholic church 1
PH11 7-Mar-18 San Mariano official municipality of
San Mariano
1
PH12 7-Mar-18 San Mariano employees company 2
PH13 8-Mar-18 San Mariano barangay captain
+ secretary
 2
PH14 8-Mar-18 San Mariano independent
planter
 1
PH15 8-Mar-18 San Mariano independent
planter
 1
PH16 8-Mar-18 San Mariano bargangay
captain
 1
PH17 8-Mar-18 San Mariano contract farmer  1
PH18 8-Mar-18 San Mariano contract farmer  1
PH19 8-Mar-18 San Mariano contract farmer  1
PH20 9-Mar-18 San Mariano employees company 2
PH21 9-Mar-18 San Mariano farmer activist  1
PH22 12-Mar-18 Pagudpud official municipality of
Pagudpud
1
PH23 12-Mar-18 Pagudpud barangay
secretary
 2
PH24 12-Mar-18 Pagudpud barangay capatain  1
PH25 12-Mar-18 Pagudpud former barangay
captain
 1








PH28 29-Oct-18 Manila lawyer national NGO 1
PH29 5-Nov-18 Puerto Princesa staff members local NGO 2





Appendix: list of interviews
262
https://doi.org/10.5771/9783748907602, am 02.12.2021, 19:08:03
Open Access -  - http://www.nomos-elibrary.de/agb
No. date place interviewee organization No. of
persons





PH32 9-Nov-18 Puerto Princesa staff member local NGO
network
1





PH34 12-Nov-18 Brooke's Point chairman farmer's
cooperative
1





























staff members Department of
Agrarian Reform
2
PH41 14-Nov-18 Batarazza board members farmer's
cooperative
9
PH42 14-Nov-18 Batarazza members farmer's
cooperative
2









PH45 19-Nov-18 Puerto Princesa staff members Land Bank 2
PH46 23-Nov-18 Manila staff members Department of
Agrarian Reform
3
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No. date place interviewee organization No. of
persons





PH48 28-Nov-18 Cauayan farmer activist  1
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